How European Integration Is Being Politicized in Western Europe

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CONTENT

CHAPTER 1

Introduction[1]

What role does European integration play in domestic politics in Western European countries? Since the early 1990s and in the course of an unprecedented deepening and widening of the European Union, European integration has become an ever more contested political issue. Not only has Euroscepticism among citizens grown continuously over the years (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), but the issue has made its way into national election campaigns, fostering party competition and creating new opportunities for challengers, mostly from the right-wing populist end of the spectrum (Kriesi 2007). Evidence also suggests that European matters have eventually become an integral part not only of institutionalized politics, but also of the realm of protest politics and social movements (Balme

[1] The book *Politicizing European integration – Struggling with the Awakening Giant*, published in 2016 with Palgrave Macmillan, is a revised, extended and updated account of this thesis' content [Link].

and Chabanet 2008; Imig 2004). In short, the longstanding former "permissive consensus" in this area among the political elite has been eroded and given way to a new "constraining dissensus" (Hooghe and Marks 2006).

However, the true extent of the domestic politicization of European integration is far from clear and remains a source of scholarly disagreement. Many scholars believe that the "sleeping giant" (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004) – a metaphor used to describe the widespread Euroscepticism among citizens with the not yet exploited potential to fundamentally reshape domestic politics – has been finally woken up by political entrepreneurs who deliberately mobilize on this issue (de Vries 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2009; also see van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; Kriesi 2007). If this holds true, the structuring of domestic political conflict and political competition, as we know them, is set to change radically. Indeed, a few highly visible manifestations of massive European contestation left a lasting imprint on the first decade of this century – particularly the defeated referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, and more recently on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland (approved only on the second attempt). Yet do these single extraordinary events reflect the true significance of European integration in domestic politics? A second strand of scholars is skeptical arguing that the extent of Europe's politicization is greatly exaggerated. In their view, the issue of European integration is, and will remain, a "giant fast asleep" – particularly because those who ultimately matter, namely the mainstream parties, have no incentive to politicize it (Green-Pedersen 2011; also see Mair 2001, 48). They expect European integration to remain a marginal issue in domestic politics and unlikely to rock the boat, as opposed to other newly emerging issues, such as immigration.

Intimately connected to the question about the scope of the politicization of Europe is the question of what actually drives this process. Which politicians strive to politicize this political issue, and for which underlying reasons? The prominent inverted-U-

curve hypothesis suggests that it is fringe parties from both the left and the right which oppose European integration in the same motivated strategic move to challenge mainstream politicians (Mair 2001; Sitter 2002; Taggart 1998). Yet a few scholars have gone beyond this simple notion of a curvilinear pattern of contestation. They argue that this conflict goes much deeper, given that these two groups fundamentally differ in their ideological outlook and that opposition against Europe has already entered the mainstream (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004; Kriesi 2007). In their view, substantive and more general political divides, such as the economic left-right and the cultural TAN-GAL[2] dimensions, crucially shape political contestation about Europe and explain why some actors eagerly try to politicize Europe, while others refrain doing so.

The present study engages in this ongoing scholarly debate about *the extent of the domestic politicization of European integration as well as its agents and causes* by presenting new theoretical arguments and fresh empirical evidence. Moreover, while focusing on European integration the study also contributes to the more general question of why a political issue becomes politicized (or not). The approach adopted, as will be shown shortly, is also motivated by the recent call by Peter Mair (2007, 162): "What is really needed here, however [...] is a much more systematic, inductive, and largely bottom-up comparison of political discussions at the national level [...] we need to know more about how Europe actually plays in national political discourse, as well as about the way it is conceived".

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[2] The TAN-GAL dimension stretches from traditional, authoritarian and nationalist (TAN) values to green, alternative and libertarian (GAL) views.

This study is situated at the intersection of two fast-growing fields of research, political communication (specifically framing and agenda setting) and research on European integration politics. Such a combined approach offers several advantages and, together, allows for a better understanding of the politicization of Europe. Three key features distinguish the study from others. First, it *does justice to the inherently multifaceted nature of European integration*. Instead of treating this issue analytically as a monolithic "black box", as usually done in previous research in this field, this study differentiates in many of its analyses between the four fundamental areas of integration, namely deepening, enlargement, market making, and social regulation. Disentangling the issue of European integration then enables the equally complex patterns of political conflict surrounding it to be uncovered. Second, the study *develops a more comprehensive conceptualization of issue politicization*. It conceives of politicization as consisting of three elements: polarization (resulting from dissenting elite attitudes), the intensity of the public debate (as an outcome of the emphasis politicians give to an issue), and the connection of the issue to more basic political concerns (as done via framing). It therbey draws together three normally separate strands of research into one common framework. Third, the study *focuses on public debate as the central venue for political contestation in contemporary Western democracies*, which is also reflected in the choice of the data. I rely on original data from a large-scale quantitative media-content analysis covering public statements not only by parties, but by all kinds of relevant political actors in six Western European countries and spanning multiple years. This novel data allows for the comprehensive, yet still systematic comparative analysis of the politicization of European integration that is presented in the following chapters.

The main argument can be summarized in a nutshell as follows. The question of how to deal with European integration in domestic politics poses a tough challenge for

the political elite in Western European countries – politicians struggle constantly, sometimes desperately, with this intricate giant. This is not because Europe is a new issue that is unrelated to traditional lines of conflict. Ideology is a crucial factor in shaping domestic conflict about Europe. Pre-existing lines of conflict powerfully shape politicians' responses to European integration. Yet, due to its multifaceted nature, European integration is related to existing lines of conflict in complex and multiple ways. This provides numerous opportunities and substantive reasons for politicians of all sorts to politicize Europe but, at the same time, makes it a difficult and risky task. The lines of conflict are unclear, the meaning of the issue difficult to control and potential strange bedfellows discourage mainstream actors in particular. Many opportunities, yet it is difficult to successfully take advantage of them – this setting leads to an enduring politicization of European integration which, at the same time, only has a limited magnitude. Culturally conservative parties – the Radical/Populist Right, but also representatives of the Conservative and Christian-democratic party family – are currently the most successful in dealing with this delicate task by mobilizing opposition primarily against the cultural dimension of European integration.

The argument is developed as follows: *Chapter 2* lays the foundations for the subsequent chapters by providing the overall theoretical framework and outlining the argument in more detail. *Chapter 3* on the design of the study introduces the innovative method used in this study to collect the empirical data – the nuclear sentence coding of actor statements in the mass media. Moreover, it explains why investigating the politicization of European integration by studying public debate offers considerable advantages over other, more traditional approaches. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the reliability and validity of this novel data.

Chapter 4 goes on to identify the general dynamics and relevant political actors in the public debate on European integration. The great battle over Europe does not take place on the streets, as some scholars suggest, but in the partisan arena. Party politicians and public authorities, the chapter indicates, dominate and exercise tight control over the debate, while civil society representatives such as social movements are marginalized. This pattern does not change fundamentally during referendum campaigns, whose exceptional ability to focus public attention indeed provides additional opportunities for otherwise marginalized actors. Yet it is the already strong parties that manage to benefit the most from these periods of heightened public attention, particularly the Eurosceptic fringe parties.

Next, *Chapter 5* demonstrates that – contrary to some scholars' claims – elite attitudes to Europe are clearly structured and related to their ideological core concerns. Other frequently mentioned factors such as government-opposition status and nationality only hold secondary relevance. Yet the patterns vary depending on the particular sub-issue at stake, which confirms the inherently multidimensional nature of this issue. Interestingly, the cultural TAN-GAL axis is the strongest structuring force across all sub-issues, yet the economic left-right axis also has some (shifting) influence. This complex linkage of European integration with the political space, it is argued, not only places high demands on political analysts who strive to uncover them, but also poses a challenge for politicians on the ground, who struggle with how to incorporate European integration into their programmatic profiles.

Chapter 6 shows that the European integration issue emphasis is also shaped by ideology, although to a smaller extent than attitudes. The reason is not that strategic considerations play a more important role here. Rather, an individual party's choice about how strongly to emphasize Europe is seriously constrained by the importance assigned to

this issue by the general political agenda. If no one else is talking about Europe, an individual party does not succeed on its own in prioritizing this issue. Nonetheless, the chapter finds that the closer a Eurosceptic party is to the culturally conservative TAN pole of the political space, the more likely it is to emphasize Europe. Yet the growing tendency during the 1990s among these parties – mainly from the Populist/Radical Right, but also some members of the Christian-democratic and Conservative party family – to emphasize Europe stagnated or was even reversed in the 2000s. The issue of choice is not Europe, but immigration, to which these parties are increasingly turning.

The framing of European integration is explored in *Chapter 7*. We will see that the complex structure of the European integration issue offers much leeway to political actors concerning how to present it to their constituencies, resulting in highly diverse framing. An intense framing contest is raging in which politicians try to connect Europe to their respective political core concerns. Depending on their programmatic profile, politicians strive to frame European integration in more economic or cultural terms. Accordingly, opposition may be motivated by two very different motives – either by worries about unemployment and the dismantling of the national welfare state, or by perceived threats to national sovereignty and national identity.

Finally, *Chapter 8* looks at the system-wide politicization of European integration and uses a new indicator for this purpose that combines issue polarization and salience. The findings in the previous chapters provided conflicting arguments on the importance of Europe in domestic political conflict compared to other issues. The result of the empirical analysis, as will be shown, turns out accordingly and suggests a sustained but at the same time limited politicization of Europe in Western European countries.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical framework: The politicization of a complex issue

The central argument of the present study is that pre-existing lines of political conflict powerfully shape politicians' responses to European integration. In many respects European integration is a very peculiar political issue. It is not only a comparatively new issue, but also highly complex and touches on numerous political topics. This holds major implications for the way the issue relates to political conflict generally and this, in turn, affects how Europe is being politicized in domestic politics. This chapter develops the theoretical framework for exploring the politicization of this unusual political issue. It starts with a section describing how European integration is linked to political conflict in general. The multiple linkages to existing lines of conflict are crucial for a thorough understanding of the politicization of Europe which, as a result, is more complex and less straightforward than of most other political issues. The reason for these multiple linkages, the next section argues, lies in the multi-faceted nature of European integration. A failure to consider this adequately in the analysis is likely to lead to flawed conclusions. Consequently, the section sets out to open the "black box" by distinguishing four sub-issues that each represent a distinct, yet fundamental area of European integration, namely market making, social regulation, deepening and enlargement. Next, the chapter clarifies how

it conceives of the concept of politicization – a threefold process that comprises the polarization of politicians' orientations, an intensification of the public debate, and the connection of the issue to core political concerns creating wider resonance and shaping public opinion. Moreover, I elaborate on the three corresponding strategies that politicians rely on to politicize European integration: adopting dissenting attitudes, issue emphasis and framing.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE GENERAL POLITICAL SPACE

In order to properly understand the politicization of Europe, we need to explore how contestation over Europe is connected to more general lines of political conflict. Politics takes place within the realms of the political space. This can be conceived of as a virtual space of low dimensionality in which political actors, notably but not exclusively parties, position themselves with regard to political issues and compete for public support. Although there is an infinite number of political issues and politicians may in principle hold any combination of positions on them, only a limited number of conflict dimensions structure the political space. The reason for this is that positions on issues cluster – political actors bundle them into distinct programmatic packages (Hinich and Munger 2008, 1511; Kitschelt 2000, 850–1). For example, tough attitudes on immigrants are rarely combined with support for gay and lesbian rights. Similarly, a politician is unlikely to call for both lower taxes and more economic regulations. In politics, not everything goes with everything; positions on different issues are interconnected. This clustering of issue positions is accomplished by political ideologies, understood in a very basic sense as an internally consistent set of normative propositions about what is good, who gets what, and who rules (Hinich and Munger 1992, 13–6). Political ideologies provide a shared meaning of what a specific package of positions is essentially about. They are difficult and extremely costly

to establish and, once adopted, they severely constrain politicians' positional flexibility. As a result, issue positions are sticky, and political actors develop a well-established reputation based on their political ideologies. In a long-term and comparative perspective, this is also captured by the concept of party families (Mair and Mudde 1998), each of which is characterized by a particular programmatic profile.

As to the reasons why politicians rely on political ideologies and accept the constraints that come along with them, the literature provides several compelling explanations in addition to what is probably the most apparent, namely that parties care about their ideology because ideological conflict is the very reason of their existence in most Western democracies. This is suggested by the cleavage approach (Rokkan and Lipset 1967). First, thanks to ideologies, voters only have to look for a few fundamental principles instead of getting to know a party's positions on all possible issues, including yet unknown future ones (Kitschelt 2000, 851). Hence, political ideologies reduce complexity, solve problems of uncertainty and a lack of information and therefore make it easier for politicians to communicate with and attract voters. Second, ideology solves the commitment problem that politicians face: Why should voters believe that rational politicians will stick to their position after the election, rather than opportunistically readapting their position to the (new) median voter to win the next election? Ideology solves this problem as it enables politicians to build solid reputations based on more general concerns (Hinich and Munger 2008, 1512). In order not to lose their reputation, they have to stick to their ideology, even if it may be costly in the short term, e.g. when incompatible views prevent them from forming coalition governments with certain other parties.

These ideological constraints also explain the standard reaction of established political actors when a new issue emerges, such as European integration. Politicians try to fit it into the existing political space by aligning it with established conflict dimensions and by adjusting their ideological framework only slightly. Usually, this strategy works

out as long as it does not lead to serious inconsistencies or the new issue does not become all-dominant.

In most Western European countries, the political space essentially has a two-dimensional structure. Politicians do not compete along a single left-right dimension, but along both an economic and a cultural axis (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008; for a critical discussion see Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009, 313). The economic left-right axis sees adherents to market intervention and an encompassing welfare state opposed to proponents of market liberalization and lean government. The cultural axis has changed its meaning over time and – with the waning of the religious cleavage – currently stretches from traditional, authoritarian and nationalist (TAN) values to green, alternative and libertarian (GAL) views.[3] Moreover, the cultural axis has been particularly affected by the newly emerging conflict between the winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008). Political actors are located in this two-dimensional political space according to their positions on the issues that make up each of the two dimensions. For individual parties, their traditional party family affiliations are supposed to be reasonably good predictors of their location since members of a party family share a similar programmatic profile.

Figure 2.1 shows the configuration of this highly relevant sub-set of political actors, the parties, in this two-dimensional space. The data it relies on are party statements

[3] These labels were introduced by Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2004). The cultural axis has also been labeled the new politics, post-materialist (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987), or libertarian-authoritarian axis (Kitschelt 1994).

on any political issue made in national election campaigns between 2002 and 2007.[4] I present these empirical results already here because this configuration constitutes the point of departure for the further argument. The score a party has on the economic left-right and the cultural TAN-GAL axes is a salience-weighted index of its average orientations regarding all economic and cultural issues, respectively.[5]

The horizontal economic axis ranges from the economic left to the right pole, the vertical politico-cultural axis from the traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) pole at the bottom to the upper green-alternative-libertarian (GAL) pole at the top. As shown by the distribution of the parties in the configuration, the two axes are negatively associated, meaning that the parties tend to concentrate in the upper-left and the lower-right quadrant. Hence, culturally liberal parties tend to also be to the economic left, while culturally conservatives are likely to also be to the economic right. However, the resulting correlation of the two axes is, with -0.50, far from perfect. The members of each

[4] For each country, I used the statements from two national election campaigns, one shortly before and one during or shortly after the debate period under study: Austria 2002 and 2006, UK 2001 and 2005, Germany 2002 and 2005, Netherlands 2003 and 2006, Switzerland 2003 and 2007. See *Chapter 3* for further details of the data and the coding method.

[5] Alternatively, I performed a factor analysis to create the axis scores inductively. The extraction method used was principle factors, the rotation method oblique oblimin (as the factors that represent the two axes of the political space are expected to be correlated on theoretical grounds). The resulting two factors correlated highly with the corresponding salience-weighted additive index scores (as used in the present study): r=0.88** for the index score of the economic axis with the economic factor, r=0.95** for the index score of the cultural axis with the cultural factor (N=29). Because factor analysis does not allow for weighting and, moreover, because the factor scores are more difficult to interpret, I use the weighted additive index scores for all the following analyses.



Notes: The politico-cultural axis spans from the traditional-authoritarian-nationalist TAN-pole at the bottom of the figure to the green-alternative-libertarian GAL-pole at the top, the economic axis from the economic leftist pole at the left to the economic rightist pole to the right. The two reference lines indicate the average scores of the two axes (-0.24 for the economic axis, 0.10 for the cultural axis). A parties' score on the two axes is a salience-weighted index of the orientations towards cultural and economic issues, respectively, in domestic election campaigns in the 2000s. The issues assigned to the economic axis are welfare, economic liberalization, and budgetary rigor. The issues of the cultural axis are cultural liberalism, culture, immigration, army, security, and ecology. In addition to these issues, a few statements on infrastructure and institutional reform were also coded. However, as they are not clearly attributable to one of the two axes, I excluded them from the analysis. To avoid endogeneity in the later analyses, statements on European integration are not included.

FIGURE 2.1. Location of the parties in the political space

party family cluster together at those places where we would expect them. The Radical Left Parties and the Greens are situated at the upper-left quadrant near the economic leftist and the culturally liberal GAL-pole; the Populist/Extreme Right are close to the culturally conservative TAN-pole and scattered along the economic axis; and the three mainstream party families are in the center of the configuration. Among the mainstream parties, the Social Democrats reach out to the economic leftist and the culturally liberal GAL-pole, the Christian Democrats and Conservatives more to the culturally conservative TAN-pole, and the Liberals to the economic right pole. There is also quite some overlap among party families, suggesting that in many cases the party family concept is a relatively imprecise predictor of a party's programmatic profile.

Readers familiar with the work of Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008; 2012) will notice that this figure closely resembles the one presented in Kriesi (2012). However, the method used in that study was different, namely multidimensional scaling, due to the different research interests. The aim there was to inductively explore the dimensionality of political space and the location of the various political issues, including European integration. By contrast, the present study takes the two-dimensionality of the political space and the assignment of political issues to the economic and cultural axes as given. The scores the parties have on these two axes of the political space are then used to explain the politicization of Europe. Hence, while the issue of European integration is treated in Kriesi et al. (2012) as one of several independent variables that make up the structure of the political space, the present study treats the issue of European integration as a dependent variable which, among others, is explained by the configuration of the political space. Consequently, the axis scores used in this study are calculated *without* the statements on the European integration issue to avoid endogeneity.

How is Europe expected to fit into the existing two-dimensional political space? Recently, it has been argued that Europe has become firmly integrated into the political

space and, moreover, that the issue is strongly attached to the cultural axis, more so than to the economic one (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004; Kriesi 2007). European integration, in this view, has chiefly become a political conflict between green, alternative and libertarian (*GAL*) supporters on one hand, and traditionalist, authoritarian and nationalist (*TAN*) opponents on the other. The latter include not only fringe parties from the Populist/Extreme Right, but also Conservative and Christian-democratic mainstream parties (such as the British Conservatives and the German CDU/CSU).

Hooghe, Marks et al. (2009, 17; 2002, 131–2) suggest that this opposition from the TAN-pole is motivated by more general concerns about national sovereignty and national community, which these parties are eager to protect. This sits nicely with public opinion findings which show citizens' attitudes to Europe are not only and not even primarily shaped by economic and other utilitarian concerns, but by identity (de Vries and van Kersbergen 2007; McLaren 2006). Specifically, an *exclusive* national identity spurs Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2004).

Kriesi and colleagues (2012; also see Kriesi 2009) argue similarly, but see opposition to European integration as part of a more general structural conflict between the winners and losers of globalization. In their view, this conflict is not exclusively cultural, but also includes an economic dimension related to the opening up of previously protected domestic markets, ongoing economic liberalization and de–regulation. However, their empirical findings suggest that this new cleavage is only successfully mobilized by TAN-parties and therefore mainly expressed in cultural terms. Consequently, they argue that the politicization of European integration is also primarily culturally driven (also see Kriesi 2007).

In contrast, some studies argue that conflict over European integration is not mainly aligned along the cultural dimension of conflict but is primarily driven by eco-

nomic rationales, e.g. by adherents of a regulated capitalism vs. free marketers (Steenbergen and Marks 2004; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). Indeed, up until the mid-1980s European social democratic and green parties constituted the main source of opposition against European integration, which back then was largely a matter of market making. However, these left parties finally came to accept the common market as "only game in town" and, instead of trying to reverse integration, they pushed it further in the direction of social regulation and other market correcting measures (Marks and Wilson 2000, 442–8). This development ran against the interests of many political actors from the right, who are generally skeptical of more market intervention but continued to promote further liberalization steps. Hence, the direction of the linkage between European integration and the economic conflict dimension has become ambiguous. Political actors on both sides of the economic left-right divide have reasons to support and oppose European integration, but for opposite reasons.

The ambiguous alignment of European integration with the economic line of conflict might be a reason why, as suggested by the literature referred to above, the once dominating economic dimension in contestation over European integration is, at the beginning of the new century, surpassed by the cultural dimension. Another factor that weakens the alignment of the economic axis is the general growing convergence of the parties along this axis (Kriesi et al. 2008). The economic divide has lost some of its conflict potential in recent decades. However, although for these reasons I expect the linkage between European integration and the economic dimension to be weaker than that with the cultural dimension, the former is expected to be still crucial for the politicization of Europe – if only to complicate matters by interfering with the predominant politico-cultural linkage and leading to contradictory attitudes to Europe. Moreover, since European integration is a moving target, the relative importance of the two conflict dimensions may again change in the course of the further development of European integration.

There are other scholars who do not share the claim that Europe is embedded in the political space and primarily aligned along the cultural axis, as argued in the present study. First, it has been argued that European integration is not embedded at all, but orthogonal to the existing domestic lines of conflict (Hix and Lord 1997, 49–50, also see Benoit and Laver 2006, Chapter 5). If that were true, the politicization of Europe would be independent of the traditional programmatic profiles. One manifestation of the lack of embedding of a newly emerging issue is conflict that breaks out within parties, causing internal division or even fissures. For European integration, this was indeed the case in France in the 1990s. Hence, the Eurosceptic *Mouvement des Citoyens*, led by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, broke away from the Socialists in 1993 after the Maastricht referendum while, on the right, Philippe de Villiers' *Mouvement pour la France* and the *Rassemblement pour la France* led by Charles Pasqua was formed. At the very beginning of the life career of an issue, orthogonality is the norm. It takes some time for politicians to incorporate a new issue into their ideological packages. The crucial question, however, is whether the established political actors succeed in embedding the emerging issue within reasonable time or, by contrast, whether it remains unconnected to the traditional political issues, either to become marginalized or to establish a fundamentally new basic line of conflict.

Second, it has been argued that opposition parties mobilize the issue mainly for strategic reasons in order to challenge the governing coalition, and fringe parties simply take a Eurosceptic stance to signal to voters that they are different from the mainstream parties (Mair 2001; Sitter 2002; Taggart 1998). However, while such government-opposition dynamics certainly play a role (like for many other issues, too), this factor should not be overemphasized. Research along these lines has usually focused on fundamental opposition to Europe ("hard Euroscepticism") and, of course, such an extreme anti-Euro-

pean stance would deprive any party of its ability to govern and to join government coalitions as it would lead to a permanent conflict with its governmental tasks. Yet moderate critical positions on and opposition to specific European integration sub-issues are also common among mainstream parties as the resistance of the moderate left against earlier drafts of the services directive and the widespread opposition to Turkey's accession among the Christian Democrats and Conservatives illustrates. In addition, while many opposition parties are indeed fundamentally Eurosceptic, quite a few are not, like many Green or small Liberal parties. Nevertheless, despite these critical objections this prominent alternative hypothesis will be duly considered in the subsequent empirical chapters.

To conclude, this section presented the general structure of the political space in Western European democracies and argued that European integration is firmly embedded therein. Therefore, ideology is expected to critically shape the politicization of Europe, although strategic considerations might also play a role. Moreover, I presented the hypothesis that the issue of European integration is embedded in a complicated way as it is linked to both the cultural and, to a lesser extent, economic axis of conflict.

DISENTANGLING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

What is the reason for these multiple and over time changing linkages of the European integration issue with traditional lines of conflict? The answer is quite simple: The process of European integration itself is truly multi-faceted. The initial objective of creating a single common market has come a long way, and at the same time the scope of integration has been steadily extended to encompass other purposes. The EU is now active in virtually every policy field (although its competencies vary greatly) and has a say in areas that used to be exclusive domains of the nation-state. Current European policies are not restricted to the common market and the related monetary union, areas in which they are

mainly preoccupied with fine-tuning, re-regulating (e.g., implementing common social and environmental standards), and tackling some "unfinished business" (e.g., the liberalization of services). European policies also deal with regional redistribution (e.g., the cohesion and structural funds), fundamental rights, immigration, internal security, and foreign relations, not to forget the continuous institutional reforms and ongoing widening of the European Union. In short, European integration has given rise to an unprecedented "system of multi-level governance" (Hooghe and Marks 2001) on the European continent.

Political conflict over European integration, as a consequence, is also not unidimensional. Disagreements over European integration are not just a matter of arguing whether and how much Europe one would like to have, as the influential "hard vs. soft Euroscepticism" dichotomy by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008a; 2008b) suggests. Particular political actors will answer this question differently, depending on the specific aspect at stake. For example, the European Greens strongly opposed the Commission's services directive, which seeks to create a single market for services, out of a fear of "social dumping". However, at the same time they were one of the few party groups that unanimously welcomed the start of accession negotiations with Turkey.

Yet, despite this obvious insight, most existing research on the politicization of Europe has treated European integration as a unitary issue and stuck to what one might call a "black-box approach" to European integration (or, alternatively, reduced it to the question of further deepening). The reason for this has less to do with a theoretical deficiency, but a lack of adequate data. Against this backdrop, I argue that to understand the politicization of Europe and uncover how European integration is precisely linked to the political space one needs to break the issue of European integration down into its components and take a closer look at what is actually at stake when Europe is being debated.

Consequently, this study distinguishes four sub-issues of European integration, *Deepening*, *Enlargement*, *Market making*, and *Social regulation & redistribution*, which represent different fundamental areas of European integration. Based on Bartolini's (2005) Rokkan-inspired framework for theorizing European integration, which he conceives as a process of transcendence and redefinition of existing cultural, political and economic boundaries, these four sub-issues represent more general conflict dimensions. Since the present study is not dealing with European integration per se, but *political conflict over European integration* and how it relates to political conflict in general, this is a suitable analytical framework. It is more useful for our purposes to categorize European policies along these conflict dimensions, and not along criteria specific to integration, such as supranational EU legislation vs. intergovernmental policy coordination, or constitutional vs. "normal" issues, as political actors and particularly citizens care little about these differentiations in every–day political conflict.

According to Bartolini, European integration leads at the national level to a lowering of the long-standing boundaries that were gradually established in the age-long processes of state- and nation-building in Europe.[6] This ongoing development has often been accompanied by the creation of new external boundaries at the European level and by the founding or strengthening of European institutions, although not necessarily. Hence, we can distinguish between areas of European integration where the main thrust is the re-

[6] See Milward (2000) for the argument that European integration is actually a means to "rescue the nation state", in particular with regards to economic policy, in times of increasing globalization. These two views are often seen as contradictory. However, I will not engage here in the ongoing debate on the motives and essential character of European integration, which would be a different subject of study.

moval or extension of existing boundaries, and areas where such a dismantling is accompanied by a significant degree of center formation at the European level. This is the first distinction I draw for the categorization of the European integration sub-issues. The other distinction is between the economic and politico-cultural dimensions of European integration, with the latter including all issues dealing with non-economic areas, i.e. cultural, politico-administrative[7], and coercive boundaries. *Figure 2.2* shows a two-by-two table that results from cross-tabulating the two criteria, and in which the four European integration sub-issues can be placed.

The two sub-issues dealing with the economic dimension of European integration are *Market making* and *Social regulation & redistribution*. They both promote the lowering of national boundaries in economic and social policies. But whereas *Market making* policies stop there, *Social regulation & redistribution* policies go further by establishing market complementary measures at the European level, thereby stimulating new center formation. Hence, the two sub-issues are similar to Scharpf's distinction between negative and positive integration, "i.e. between measures increasing market integration by eliminating national restraints on trade and distortions of competition […] and common European policies to shape the conditions under which markets operate" (1996, 15).

More specifically, the sub-issue of *Market making* aims at removing national barriers to economic exchange. Policies subsumed under this sub-issue are concerned with strict enforcement of the "four freedoms" of goods, services, capital, and labor (workers),

[7] As long as there are no economic regulations concerned. Economic regulations are assigned to the *Social regulation & redistribution* sub-issue.



FIGURE 2.2. European integration disentangled – the four integration sub-issues

and hence the establishment of a competitive common market. This has been a core objective of European integration from the start. A historical milestone was achieved with the Single European Act (SEA) entering into force, when the objective was set to remove any existing obstacles to a single market by the end of 1992. More recent examples are the drafting and adoption of the services directive (the "Bolkestein directive"), the extension of the free movement of persons to new member countries, and the pursuit of the Lisbon Strategy with its goal to make the EU the "most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world" (European Council 2000).

Policies of the sub-issue S*ocial regulation & redistribution* are meant to correct market failures and compensate for the perceived adverse effects of market liberalization by strengthening the EU' social dimension (social protection and equality). This is mainly achieved by re-regulation at the European level. Typical examples include environmental and labor market regulations, common measures against unemployment, collective rights for employees, and some degree of fiscal harmonization. With the regional and cohesion

funds, there is also a certain redistributive element – to date only between member states, not directly between individuals. Because of the marginal relevance of this redistributive element, and for ease of terminology, this sub-issue will be subsequently called *Social regulation*.

Enlargement is the politico-cultural counterpart to *Market making*. It does not lower national boundaries but European ones by pushing them further and incorporating new member countries. The integration process was initiated by just six countries back in the 1950s, while the European Union now includes 27 member states. The second round of EU enlargement into Eastern Europe and Turkey's potential accession are prime examples of the ongoing enlargement in the period under study. However, the conflict inherent here is not merely about the geographic borders of Europe, but also about its cultural and social boundaries, which touches on questions of group identity and social belonging. Therefore, this sub-issue includes related calls to strengthen "Fortress Europe" and discussions of Europe's "Christian heritage".

Finally, the politico-cultural sub-issue of *Deepening* contributes to the strengthening of the new supranational center. It consists of non-economic policies that shift competencies from the national to the European level, including issues that further develop the EU's institutional framework. Examples include the democratic participation of citi-

zens, the strengthening of the European parliament, policies to enhance judicial and police cooperation, a common foreign and security policy, and the various aspects of the constitutional treaty.[8]

With these four fundamental European integration sub-issues, the several thousand statements in our data on almost any European integration policy can be systematically classified – instead of simply lumping them all under one single label. Note that the four sub-issues are a categorization of different policies and hence should not be confused with competing visions of European integration, such as the federalist vs. the intergovernementalist model, Jachtenfuchs, Diez, and Jung's (1998) polity ideas,[9] or the neoliberal vs. the regulated capitalism project (Hooghe and Marks 1999). Yet the two perspectives are somewhat related as each of these visions comes with specific policy preferences. For example, adherents of a European regulated capitalism are in favor of *Social regulation* policies and they are at the same time likely to be skeptical of further *Market making* measures (especially if not accompanied by flanking social regulation). Moreover, they are also likely to be in favor of deepening (as it facilitates the introduction of such measures). However, not all policy preferences can be derived so straightforwardly. It is unclear, for example, whether adherents of a European regulated capitalism are in favor or opposed to further *Enlargement.* In the end, the connection between specific

[8] In the Swiss case, bilateral treaties are assigned to this sub-issue as well, as they represent far more than simple economic integration. Taken together, they provide a comprehensive framework of Swiss-EU relations.

[9] Jachtenfuchs, Diez, and Jung (1998) identify the following distinct polity ideas: intergovernmental cooperation, federal state, economic eommunity, and network.

policy preferences and the competing visions of what European integration should actually mean is an empirical question.

European integration is not only multi-faceted but is also a moving target that changes its characteristics over time (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Historically, with the establishment of the common market (although still imperfect) and the monetary union in the 1990s the core objectives of European integration have gradually shifted from market making to market shaping. Moreover, areas other than the economy have gained more importance. Hence, the relative weight of each of the four sub-issues is changing over time. This leads political actors to incrementally adjust or even abruptly reverse their attitudes to European integration. For example, Marks and Wilson (2000, 442–8) argue that once the Social Democrats had accepted that membership and the common market were "the only game in town", they changed their originally skeptical attitude to deepening and eventually became strongly supportive, which further propelled the shifting emphasis in the integration process from market making to social regulations. We will therefore also keep an eye on developments over time in the subsequent empirical chapters.

THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPE – A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The multi-faceted nature of European integration and the resulting complex linkages of this issue with the general political space, as explicated in the two previous sections, are expected to have a crucial impact on how Europe is being politicized. But what does politicization exactly mean? I suggest that politicization is best understood as *a process by which a particular political issue enters the field of mass politics, in which the audience is widened and public contestation increases*. The *Oxford Dictionary of the Social Sciences* defines politicization as a "process through which certain issues become objects of public contention and debate, and are thereby legitimated as concerns of the state or

political realm. Politicization is therefore generally a contentious process […].” (Calhoun 2002). The notion of the *politicization of the integration process* already present in the neo-functionalist work by Philippe C. Schmitter is in line with the above general definition. For Schmitter, politicization is a “rise in the controversiality of the regional decisionmaking process”, because “national actors find themselves gradually embroiled in ever more salient or controversial areas of policymaking”. This situation is “likely to lead to *a widening of the audience or clientele* interested and active in integration” (Schmitter 1969, 166, italics in original). Interestingly, he hypothesized that politicization would lead to a reevaluation of the integration goals, but eventually push integration further – an overly deterministic view.

Based on a comprehensive review of previous studies, Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue there is compelling evidence of the widespread and sustained politicization of Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. According to them, this is suggested by three key indicators: public attitudes to Europe are well-structured, Europe is salient in the general public (and therefore relevant for party competition), and the issue is connected to the basic dimensions that structure domestic conflict in European countries (2009, 6–7). While a number of prominent scholars (Börzel and Risse 2009; Kriesi 2009; Schmitter 2009) share their general conclusion, they nevertheless disagree on several issues such as the broader implications and specific causes, and call for a more solid empirical foundation for these claims. Moreover, Green-Pedersen (2011) in particular argues decisively against this view of a widespread politicization of Europe, claiming on the contrary that the sleeping giant is “to remain fast asleep” and that the politicization of Europe constitutes, if anything, a strongly limited phenomenon. Part of this scholarly disagreement may be due to different understandings of the concept itself and its different measurements. Some of the above authors focus on diverging positions on European integration, while

others mainly consider salience; some look at the development of the European integration issue over time, while others compare it with other political issues; and some authors focus on mainstream parties, while others deem fringe parties and non-partisan actors most relevant.

That being said, it seems desirable to adopt a comprehensive conceptualization of politicization that takes account of the various insights of these diverging approaches. I suggest to distinguish between three essential elements of politicization (also see de Wilde 2007; 2011): the polarization of attitudes, the intensification of the public debate, and a connection of the contested issue to pre-existing basic political concerns (which ensures wider public resonance). [10] As shown above, politicization is often simply equated with one of these elements. By contrast, I argue that all three of them are necessary for substantial and enduring politicization.

To study these three elements of politicization jointly, public debate is the preferred place we should turn to. As public debate is open to all kinds of political actors, it reflects the ongoing contestation in various sub-systems, such as the party system or the arena of protest politics. Hence, in public debate the spectrum of actors that are potentially able to politicize Europe is not by design *a priori* restricted to a specific type of actors, as in the majority of studies that focus exclusively on the party system. While in the follow-

[10] While politicization is in principle a dual process, i.e. the political elite is responsive to citizens' demands and these demands are in turn shaped by the political elite, I focus on the politicization as reflected within the political elite. Besides pragmatic considerations to limit the scope of this study, this approach also seems justified by the findings of Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries (2007) who show that the way the political elite deals with Europe has a significant impact on citizens' attitudes.

ing chapters the parties are at several points discussed in more detail due to their outstanding role, the study repeatedly takes a broader perspective and looks at how other political actors deal with Europe. This allows us to verify whether the special focus on parties is actually justified. What is even more important, in our contemporary era of "audience democracies" (Manin 1995) the *mass-mediated public sphere* is the main forum of political contestation (Bennett 2001; Ferree et al. 2002; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Kriesi 2004). The public sphere increasingly serves as the main reference point for citizens and politicians alike. *Chapter 3* on the design of the study discusses in detail the further advantages of an analysis of public debate, as well as the related challenges. Now let us look at each of the three essential elements of politicization.

The polarization of attitudes. The presence of diverging attitudes among different social groups or political actors is a precondition of political conflict. Yet the degree of controversy surrounding a particular issue varies considerably. Traditionally, the concept of polarization is used in the context of the study of party systems to describe the "degree of ideological differentiation among political parties" (Dalton 2008, 900), as proposed in Sartori's (1976, 120) seminal study.[11] Applied to individual issues, polarization is high if the distances between the attitudes of the relevant political actors are large. This is particularly the case if some actors adopt extreme stances. In the case of European integration, scholars observe that since the beginning of the 1990s fringe parties mainly from the right, but also from the left, have become fundamentally Eurosceptic, and even mainstream parties have moved away from the formerly pre-existing "permissive consensus" in favor of Europe and adopted more skeptical positions. Hence, the growing amount of

[11] For an application of the concept of polarization to the electorate, see e.g. Baldassari and Gelman (2008); Baldassari and Bearman (2007).

negative orientations towards European integration has led to increased polarization of this formerly consensual issue. Therefore, the factors that explain *negative* orientations towards European integration are particularly relevant to us, although it is not necessarily the case that issue polarization is driven by negative attitudes.

The intensity of the public debate. Clearly, if no one talks about an issue there can be no political conflict about it – a certain degree of visibility is necessary. This is far from trivial since the carrying capacity of the public sphere is highly limited and many more issues compete for attention than actually make it into the news, let alone for them to become established them as a regular topic of public debate. During the earlier times of the "permissive consensus", European integration was largely a blind spot for public contestation, although this has changed. Europe has become a regular topic of political debates. The salience of a political issue can either be followed over time, as is usually done in studies exploring individual issue dynamics in public debates (see e.g. Ferree et al. 2002; for European integration Boomgaarden et al. 2010), or salience can be assessed relative to other political issues, i.e. the share of statements in which politicians deal with European integration, as is done by most agenda-setting studies (see e.g. Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2004; for European integration Green-Pedersen 2011). The present study will consider both of these approaches to salience.

It is crucial to keep the two elements of politicization, polarization and intensity (salience), well separated. A political issue may be intensively debated in public, but the general course may be hardly polarizing, such as in the case of welfare, a typical valence issue, particularly during the golden years of continuous and undisputed expansion. Conversely, some issues are highly polarized but hardly salient, such as abortion. Unlike in the USA, in most Western European countries this issue is rarely relevant to general political competition, although it is still occasionally able to ignite fierce short-term debates.

As will be shown in *Chapter 8*, this distinction between polarization and salience is also highly relevant to the issue of European integration.

A connection to political core concerns. Salience and polarized attitudes among elite members alone are insufficient to trigger the politicization of an issue. What is needed, moreover, is public resonance – the engagement and mobilization of citizens around an issue. This is similar to Schattschneider's (1960) notion of "expansion of conflict", i.e. the public is being increasingly involved in a conflict originally confined to a few individuals. As Schattschneider argues, members of the political elite can win or lose a conflict by successfully including or excluding the audience.

Frames fulfill a crucial function in mobilizing and engaging citizens, as has been widely acknowledged in the social movement literature (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). According to Entman's (1993, 52) influential definition, to frame is to "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation". Hence, frames provide citizens with cues as to *why* they should care about an issue. By explicating what an issue is actually about, elite frames are able to "activate adherents, transform bystanders into supporters, exact concessions from targets, and demobilize antagonists" (Snow 2004, 385). Especially in the case of a complex and relatively new issue such as European integration, political actors have to actively and explicitly construct these linkages and they enjoy considerably leeway concerning how to present Europe to the citizens.

Which frames are conducive to politicization, i.e. resonate widely and have the power to mobilize the public? For Williams (2004, 105), public resonance is basically the fit between a frame and the audiences' beliefs, worldviews and personal experiences. In the case of the abstract issue of European integration, however, it is unlikely that it can be readily connected to personal experiences. Instead, beliefs and worldviews should play

an important role only. Likewise, several scholars argue that the resonance of a frame depends on whether it successfully builds on *widely shared cultural material* (Benford and Snow 2000, 619; Hänggli and Kriesi 2010, 143). A typical framing strategy is therefore to connect an issue to values that are widespread in the population (Chong and Druckman 2007b, 101).

Yet, as already argued above, politicians are constrained by their ideological profile. In particular because *credibility* matters – in terms of both the content of the frame (internal consistency) and the source (reputation). If they are interested in politicizing an issue, politicians will not pick any value that might find resonance among the wider public, but one that is part of their ideological profile. Once the linkage is established, the conflictive issue and the existing more general political core concerns mutually stabilize and reinforce each other; political conflict stretches beyond the individual issue and feeds broader political divisions.

STRATEGIES TO POLITICIZE EUROPE

The politicization of Europe does not happen automatically or simply by chance; politicians are crucial to its success or failure. As Hooghe and Marks (2009, 18) argue, "[a]s European integration has grown in scope and depth, it has proved ripe for politicization. But there is nothing inevitable about this. Whether an issue enters mass politics depends not on its intrinsic importance, but on whether a political party picks it up." Political actors choose whether they want to politicize European integration, and the outcome of these efforts leads to either a high or low level of the politicization of Europe in a particular country and for a particular point in time. The present section looks in more detail at the strategies available to them.

If politicians think they benefit from politicizing an issue, what will they do about it? They can rely on a combination of three strategies that are related to the three components of politicization outlined above. First, they will adopt a position distinct from the majority of the political elite, which increases issue polarization. In the case of European integration with its traditional pro-European consensus, this means taking a Eurosceptic position. Second, they will emphasize European integration with the aim of pushing it onto the political agenda and focusing public attention (intensification of the debate). Third, to create a sustained effect and to mobilize citizens, they engage in the framing contest over Europe. By framing appropriately, they are able to influence how citizens place the issue and the conflict surrounding it within the broader political context. Establishing such a connection between the issue in question and their political core concerns not only helps to persuade citizens of their own issue stance, but also to promote and sharpen their ideological profile.

Dissenting attitudes. The first available strategy to politicize an issue is to adopt a position that is distinct from other groups of the political elite. In the case of European integration, this means taking a Eurosceptic position as pro-European attitudes have been prevailing for a long time. The idea that issue positions are central to political competition goes back to the classic work of Anthony Downs (1957) and is a core assumption in the vast literature on spatial theories of politics (e.g. Enelow and Hinich 1984; Enelow and Hinich 1990; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). In this view, parties try to maximize votes by adopting optimal positions on policy dimensions in terms of direction and proximity to their targeted voters. Positions are also relevant for cleavage theory (Rokkan and Lipset 1967), which assumes that political conflict can be traced back to a limited number of structural divisions that shape collective identities and are organizationally manifested, usually in the form of parties. Yet while a (crude) rational choice perspective assumes

that politicians are largely free in their choice of the position they want to adopt, the cleavage perspective emphasizes the importance of existing ideological constraints. Groups of issues are bundled together and related to specific cleavages.

Hence, ideological reputations and commitments should severely constrain potential attempts by politicians to position themselves strategically on a particular issue, including European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 19). At the same time, however, the multi-faceted nature of European integration provides considerable leeway for politicians concerning how to link the issue to pre-existing lines of division. Taken together, actor positions can be expected to be systematically linked to their programmatic profile, but at the same time to be conditional on the specific European integration sub-issue in question. For example, a Conservative party in the lower-right quadrant of the political space may oppose enlargement (for cultural motives), but at the same time support market making measures (for economic reasons). Similarly, a Green party in the upper-left quadrant might fully endorse further deepening (for cultural motives), and at the same time oppose market making (as it contradicts its economic leftist stance).

Issue emphasis. A second strategy is to promote a particular political issue by emphasizing it relative to others. The vast literature on issue competition and "issue ownership" argues that parties primarily compete by drawing attention to those issues that benefit them, while trying to depoliticize unfavorable ones (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge et al. 2001; Petrocik 1996; Riker 1986). Politicians trying to politicize Europe will elaborate on this issue whenever they have the opportunity to talk about it in public. Specifically, politicians with strong and consistent negative attitudes should emphasize the European integration issue heavily and try to put it onto the political agenda.

It has recently been argued that parties have moved closer to the center ground and positional differences have diminished due to increasing voter de-alignment, the parties' professionalization and therefore de-ideologization, and ever more external economic and political constraints (e.g. economic globalization and the European Union). As a result, "valence issues" (Stokes 1992) – issues on which voters and parties largely agree, such as economic prosperity – have grown in importance, and voters base their vote choice less on the issue positions taken by a party and more on a party's perceived competence, i.e. the ability to deliver in a particular policy field. Party strategies therefore aim at increasing the salience of those issues regarding which they think they have a comparative advantage (Green 2007). However, Green finds for the UK that at least for the European integration issue, party positions still matter a lot as these have become not less, but more conflictive. Hence, instead of juxtaposing approaches based on (diverging) positions and on issue salience, it seems more fruitful to combine them (also see Green and Hobolt 2008; Meguid 2005; Wagner 2012).

While both dissenting positions and issue emphasis are crucial elements of politicizing an issue, the two approaches might differ in how strongly they are influenced by politicians' strategic considerations (as opposed to ideological motives). It has been argued in the literature on issue emphasis that positions are difficult to change for politicians, while it is considerably easier to manipulate the salience of an issue (see, e.g., Bale et al. 2010, 413–4). Hence, a short-term strategic consideration might be highly relevant for issue-emphasis strategies, yet less important for positioning.

Finally, the issue-emphasis strategies employed by individual political actors are to some extent influenced by the general political agenda. If an unfavorable issue is at the top of the political agenda, it is difficult or at least costly to fully ignore it. In contrast, it would be a waste of resources to heavily emphasize a favorable issue that only attracts marginal public attention. Accordingly, political actors are likely to take the importance

of the issue on the general political agenda into account when choosing whether and how strongly to emphasize an issue (Steenbergen and Scott 2004, 187–8; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 261; Sides 2006). Framing, to which we turn next, is a strategy that can be used by politicians to prevent the potential damaging effects of having to emphasize an unfavorable issue – by interpreting it in an alternative, more favorable way.

Framing. Political actors back their positions with arguments, often with those that link the issue in question to more general political concerns in a way favorable to them. Such framing provides cues for the citizens as to what conflict over Europe "is actually about" – is it primarily a question of national sovereignty, of future economic well-being, or of international stability and security? While framing works in principle for any issue, it should be particularly effective in the case of European integration, as it is a complex, abstract and relatively new issue for which opinions are not yet definitely made and firmly established. Its meaning for citizens is still in flux and therefore highly malleable by political actors who enjoy quite some leeway in constructing the links between European integration and the underlying lines of political conflict (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 13; Janssen 1991, 468).

Elite framing can pursue two analytically distinct aims. First, with regard to the issue that is being framed, the intention of political actors is to *shape public opinion, i.e. to persuade citizens of their own issue position*. The underlying mechanism is that, depending on which consideration citizens base their evaluation, the result of this evaluation may turn out differently. Research has shown that framing is able to shape public opinion, although the effect varies according to the context, topic, individual attributes and frame employed (for an overview, see Chong and Druckman 2007b). Hence, political actors try to frame the issue in such a way as to reach as many voters as possible and to maximize support for their cause (Jacoby 2000, 750).

This is arguably the primary motive for framing in a referendum campaign, where winning the vote is the ultimate goal. In such situations, a political actor may also engage in counter-framing, i.e. trying to rebut the opponents' frame or to deliberately broaden their argumentative repertoire (Hänggli 2010, 11). However, the latter strategy is limited and not without risks. If they overdo it, political actors risk losing their credibility, which is based on some degree of ideological consistency (see Hinich and Munger 1992). Employing a frame only because it resonates among citizens, even though it is not in line with the actor's general programmatic profile, may do more harm than good. If, for example, a Green party all of a sudden cares about national identity, or a traditional economic interest association argues in favor of an issue because of environmental considerations, it is very likely that this would make citizens suspicious or confuse them, and the argument will not be persuasive. Worse, the reputation of the political actor may seriously suffer.

This brings us to the second aim of elite framing, and this perspective is neglected by most of the framing literature: *Framing establishes and strengthens the connection of a particular issue with a particular ideological profile*. Framing ties separate issues together, makes the motivation for such a connection explicit to the citizens, and thereby gives ideological coherence to a party program. This is also suggested by Hinich and Munger (2008, 1512), who argue that "[t]o be able to persuade voters that they can trust the party to do as promised after the election, parties must give reasons and explanations rather than just take positions. But explanations require some sort of overarching system of justifications, and the advancement of values that can be applied to a variety of issues. Parties trade on reputations, but reputations are meaningful only if they provide potentially separating signals. If parties act on their ideologies when such actions do not appear self-interested, reputations gain value as signals." By framing, political actors make explicit the ideological underpinning of their issue stances.

Successful framing by a political actor renders a particular core concern more salient and hence enables a party to emphasize and articulate a particular political line of conflict that goes beyond the debated issue. Framing an issue enables a political actor to shape political conflict more generally and to sharpen its ideological profile.

In practice, these two aims of framing – on one hand persuading citizens of their issue stance and, on the other, promoting their ideology – usually go together because political actors enjoy a rhetorical advantage on the frames that citizens easily associate with them (Jerit 2008, 4). Hence, politicians will primarily use those frames to persuade citizens that fit their programmatic profile, i.e. the frames they own. The logic behind this "frame ownership" is analogous to the concept of issue ownership.

Specifically, political actors close to the culturally conservative pole are expected to take advantage of European integration primarily to promote their nationalist ideology and to make this fundamental divide more salient. Those actors near the libertarian pole of the cultural axis, by contrast, are expected to cue citizens preferably by referring to universal and multicultural values. Frames related to the secondary, economic line of conflict will also be used, in particular by political actors for which this traditional conflict is still the most pressing (e.g. the Radical Left and economic interest groups). Actors that are near the economic left pole should connect European integration to questions of welfare and labor, while those to the right should rely more on arguments related to wealth and prosperity. The connection of the contested issue with basic conflict dimensions via framing also increases its public resonance. Hence, both the individual issues as well as the more general conflict promote each other mutually, and politicization increases.

Moreover, as suggested above, framing can be used to overcome the limitations of issue emphasis. As Petrocik (1996, 829) argues, "[w]hen the opponent's issues are unavoidable, they can be interpreted in a way to highlight some feature of the issue on

which they are likely to be regarded as more competent." In other words, politicians readily apply favorable frames that "are consonant with their party's traditional philosophy" (Sides 2007, 408) to an otherwise unfavorable issue. This is why "trespassing", emphasizing an opponent's issue and entering into dialogue, is a relatively frequent phenomenon – which issue ownership theory does not predict. According to Sides, who coined the term, trespassing is widespread because "candidates have enough rhetorical freedom when designing campaign messages that an amenable frame can likely be found for nearly any issue". (Sides 2007, 467). In the long-term, such successful framing may even establish new or alter existing issue-ownership patterns by redefining the linkages between an issue and the general political space.

Conclusion

This chapter explicated the theoretical framework and derived some general expectations that will guide the empirical analyses in the subsequent chapters. Politicization is essentially a process whereby the level and scope of conflict around a particular issue increases. It can be most comprehensively studied in public debates in the mass media, which are the main forum of political contestation nowadays. Public debates are – at least in principle – open to all kinds of political actors and allow us to study all three defining elements of politicization in detail: the polarization of attitudes, issue salience (intensity of the debate), and the connection of the issue with core political concerns to create wider public resonance and shape public opinion. However, politicization does not happen automatically – political actors choose whether they want to politicize a particular political issue. Three corresponding strategies are therefore related to the three elements of politicization: Politicians may adopt dissenting attitudes (in the case of European integration, this means

taking a Eurosceptic stance), they may emphasize the political issue, and they may engage in framing the issue to connect it to more basic political concerns and mobilize citizens.

The central argument of this study is that the politicization of Europe is strongly influenced by the way the issue of European integration is embedded into the general political space. Pre-existing lines of conflict powerfully shape politicians' responses to European integration, be it the orientations they adopt, issue emphasis or the framing. However, the multi-faceted character of European integration is expected to result in multiple, changing and sometimes contradicting linkages with pre-existing lines of conflict. Specifically, I expect European integration to be currently strongly aligned with the cultural axis of the political space and to evoke opposition primarily from culturally conservative politicians. Yet the traditional economic axis is likely to interfere with this dominant logic. The alignment of the economic axis with Europe is supposed to be ambiguous since opposition to Europe may arise from both the left (as prevalent in earlier times) and from the right poles.

The complex linkage of European integration with the political space poses a difficult challenge for political actors and scholars alike. Researchers are unable to uncover the underlying systematic patterns as long as they treat European integration as a unitary issue. Consequently, this chapter called for opening the "black box" of European integration for the analysis and proposed a typology of European integration policies distinguishing the sub-issues of enlargement, deepening, market making, and social regulation. Each of these four sub-issues represents a fundamental aspect of European integration, and individual politicians' responses are expected to vary significantly depending on the particular aspect at stake. *Chapter 5* will elaborate in depth on the structuring of European integration orientations conditional on the sub-issue at stake.

Politicians struggle, in many cases badly, with connecting European integration consistently to their more general ideological concerns. Particularly the mainstream parties might end up with seemingly contradictory patterns of attitudes, which are difficult to communicate to voters and likely to impede the politicization of Europe. Overall, politicians' resulting diverse and cautious responses are expected to result in the sustained but simultaneously limited politicization of the European integration issue. We will come back to this question of the system-wide politicization of Europe in *Chapter 8*, equipped with the results of the previous chapters' analyses of the public debate on Europe and of the politicization strategies pursued by the various political actors. First of all, however, the design of the study is presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

Design of the study

This brief chapter lays the methodological foundations for the subsequent empirical chapters. It introduces the innovative approach adopted to gain a better understanding of the politicization of Europe – the study of public debate by relying on the "nuclear sentence" coding of politicians' statements in the mass media. The distinct advantage of this approach is, as will be shown, that it allows this question to be tackled in its full scope and complexity, while still being systematic and comparative.

In general, using mass media content as a source for political analysis has a long tradition in political science, particularly in the field of political communication. However, it is still rare in studies that deal with the politicization of European integration, which commonly rely on expert surveys (Hooghe, Marks and colleagues), party manifesto data (e.g., Gabel and Hix 2004), or public opinion surveys (e.g., Gabel and Scheve 2007; McLaren 2007). Certainly, there are a few studies dealing with European integration that rely on media data, but their focus is primarily on the media themselves or the public sphere (de Vreese 2003; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Trenz 2005). By contrast, a central aim of this book is to demonstrate the huge potential of the study of public debate

and the use of mass media particularly in those areas of political science that have routinely relied on other, more traditional empirical sources. Also for this reason, the present chapter will detail how the data was generated and discuss its reliability and validity by comparing it to alternative data. First, however, the next section presents the selection of the countries for this study and some of their particular characteristics.

THE SIX WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES UNDER EXAMINATION

Applying a most-similar-systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970) to the overall framework of the study, the selection of the six Western European countries included in the analysis – Austria, the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland – follows a "comparable-cases strategy" (Lijphart 1975). These countries share many basic common features, but at the same time differ in some aspects that are expected to have an impact on the phenomenon we want to explain – the politicization of European integration, or more specifically, orientations towards it, its salience, and the framing of this political issue.

As for the similarities among the countries under study, these are all some of the most economically developed liberal democracies with stable political institutions and consolidated party systems. Moreover, they are all exposed to the process of European integration. This also holds for non-EU member state Switzerland, a country politically and economically highly interdependent with the EU. The conclusion of several bilateral sectoral agreements with the EU that led to the adoption of substantive sections of the acquis communautaire has been described as "integration without membership" (Lavenex 2009). Further, European integration is a regular key topic of Swiss political debates, even more so than in most member states, as the unsettled question of EU accession looms large every once in a while.

Relevant contextual variations among the six countries are discussed in the subsequent chapters, but these are the most important: First, the UK and Switzerland are two countries renowned for their traditional Euroscepticism (Kriesi 2007, 89), while the founding EU members France, Germany and the Netherlands were committed to European integration from the start. Austria adopts an intermediate position in this regard. Second, during the period 2004–06, for which I most closely examined public debate, direct-democratic votes related to European integration (in particular referendums) were held in Switzerland, France and the Netherlands. These direct-democratic votes with their considerable agenda-setting power (Hoeglinger 2008, 224; Marcinkowski 2006, 413–4) provide a window of opportunity that is expected to encourage the politicization of Europe. Third, the party systems of the UK and Germany lack any relevant right-wing populist party, while the mainstream parties of the remaining countries have to face such a challenger, a constellation that is expected to foster the politicization of Europe as these parties are known to mobilize their voters with the issues of immigration and European integration (Kriesi et al. 2008).

Features of the particular national social security and welfare systems are potentially relevant regarding orientations towards economic integration. In terms of welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990), the sample consists of cases close to the lean liberal ideal type, as well as the status-preserving conservative type, and some mixed regimes. A paradigmatic case of the liberal welfare state is the UK. Germany, France and Austria are representatives of the conservative welfare state regime. Switzerland is generally considered a continental welfare state with strong liberal traits remaining (Armingeon 2001). The Netherlands defies any easy classification as it is a hybrid type combining conservative and universalistic social democratic characteristics (Vis, van Kersbergen, and Becker 2008). An additional factor related to the politico-economic context

is unemployment. Countries suffering from severe unemployment are France and Germany, with high rates of 9 percent or more, compared to the remaining countries in the sample with rates of 5 percent or less during the period under study (OECD 2010).

The main reasons this study is restricted to Western European countries are, first, that the Eastern European party systems are still highly fluid and, second, that the Eastern European parties' configuration in the political space is dissimilar to the standard line-up in Western Europe (see Kitschelt 1999). This leads to an entirely different logic of the politicization of Europe in these countries (see Marks et al. 2006).

WHY STUDY THE PUBLIC DEBATE USING MASS MEDIA DATA?

A public debate is the sum of all public communication related to a particular issue in a – usually implicit – process of argument and counter argument by political actors (Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wueest 2012). This definition is similar to that used by Ferree et al. (2002) in their seminal study of the abortion discourse in the USA and Germany. Studying the public debate on European integration offers several advantages compared to mainstream approaches dealing with the politicization of Europe. We can distinguish between theoretical and more pragmatic reasons. In line with the former is the argument that the mass-mediated public debate can be considered an *arena of political contestation in its own right* (Gamson 2004; Kriesi 2004). The public sphere functions as a "master forum" (Ferree et al. 2002, 10) of political contention in contemporary forms of representative democracies, which can be described as "audience democracies" (Manin 1995). According to Manin, political debates are transferred from parliamentary backrooms to the public sphere, where they are confronted with the logics of a commercialized media system.

Moreover, citizens' perceptions of political issues, actors, and political conflict in general are largely shaped by their representation in the media. Or, as Neuman, Crigler, and Just (1992, 11) summarize this argument: "Citizens have come to depend on the media because they have virtually nowhere else to turn for information about public affairs and for cues on how to frame and interpret that information." The ordinary citizen does not read policy proposals nor does he consult the carefully balanced and rapidly outdated party manifestos (see Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011). Rather, they obtain information on important issues and political actors' positions from the mass media. In addition, the mass media not only serves as a central point of reference for citizens, but for politicians as well. Based on extensive interviews with politician, Herbst (1998, Chapter 2) finds that the political elite even relies – somewhat naively – on media content as a proxy for public opinion when making policy decisions.

There are also pragmatic reasons to study public debate. Such debate brings political actors from various political arenas together (e.g. parties from the electoral arena, social movement organizations from protest politics, interest organizations from the administrative arena) and therefore permits a simultaneous analysis of the full spectrum of actors who are potentially relevant for the politicization of European integration. In most other research designs, the scholar has to decide in advance which actors to take into account and which to ignore. By contrast, in the present study we can empirically assess the relevance of particular actors and actor groups – in general, but also for particular episodes of the debate, e.g. referendum campaigns. Moreover, the approach here allows the collection of data on positions, salience and framing simultaneously. This is not only for European integration in general, but differentiated for the particular sub-issues. Taken together, this enables a comprehensive and fine-grained, yet still systematic comparative analysis of the politicization of Europe.

GENERATION OF THE DATA – NUCLEAR SENTENCE CODING OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES[12]

For each of the six countries, the most widespread quality newspapers were content analyzed, namely *Die Presse* (A), *Le Monde* (F), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (D), *NRC Handelsblad* (NL), *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (CH), and *The Times* (UK). These quality newspapers exhibit a high level of influence on other news organizations' editorial decisions and therefore on media agenda setting in general (Bennett et al. 2004, 445; Gerhards, Neidhardt, and Rucht 1998, 191). Other advantages of elite media are, first, that they are a relatively homogenous type of media product, which is especially important in our context as we are not interested in particular media characteristics but in cross-country comparisons. Second, quality newspapers report much more extensively on political matters than tabloids or television (Druckman 2005, 468–9).

We applied a two-step procedure to obtain a representative sample of relevant articles for the public debates on European integration for the years 2004 to 2006. The first step involved identifying relevant events in each country that were related to European integration. These events were identified by a systematic retrieval using various yearbooks such as *Keesing's World Record of Events* and *Facts on Files: World News Digest Yearbook*. This list of events constituted the basis for developing an extensive keyword list for each country, which helped us to find potentially relevant articles. Relying on such event lists yielded the advantage of knowing about the relevant discussions

[12] In addition to the data concerning the public debate on European integration for the years 2004 to 2006, which is discussed in this section, *Chapter 6* and *Chapter 8* rely on an additional data set of national election campaigns from the 1970s until the 2000s. This data was generated with the same method, but without coding the more fine-grained sub-issues and frames. See Kriesi et al. (2012) for further information about this data.

in each country before we deployed a keyword search. This is especially important when dealing with an issue as complex as European integration, which is debated in a variety of different ways in each country.[13] Thus, we sought to reduce the risk of missing important aspects of the debate in our selection procedure. In the second step, we selected a chronological random sample for each country. From this sample, we coded all articles in which a European integration-related issue appeared in the title, lead, or first paragraph.

The coding was done sentence by sentence using a slightly adapted version of the "nuclear sentence" coding method (Kleinnijenhuis, de Ridder, and Rietberg 1997; van Atteveldt 2008, 29–33). This method represents a very flexible and inductive approach, intended to capture the full complexity of political communications by reducing a real grammatical sentence into its elements and the relations between them. With this method, each statement is reducible to a basic structure with the four elements of subject actor, issue evaluation (position), the particular European integration issue, and up to five frames. I elaborate on each of these elements in the following.

[13] The European integration debate is to be understood in a broad sense, i. e. we were not only interested in articles about the great questions of the deepening and widening of the European Union, but in all policies at the European level and those with an explicit European dimension. However, we restricted our analysis to a manageable number of contested and influential sub-issues by only selecting those that attracted a certain minimum threshold of public attention. With this procedure, we managed to exclude the flood of meaningless technical, purely factual, or uncontroversial media coverage, which would have diluted our analysis.

As for the *subject actor*, we coded the name of the person (if mentioned in the article) and the organization on behalf of which the statement was made. The issue *positions* could vary between -1.0 (opposition) to +1.0 (support).[14] The European integration *issue* was coded on a low level of abstraction and later for the analysis aggregated into the more encompassing four European integration sub-issues.

In addition, and as an extension to the standard nuclear sentence method, we also coded the *framing*, i.e. the justification an actor supplies to support an issue position. What is special about our approach is that we code frames at a propositional level – contrary to the majority of media frame studies on European integration which typically focus on the whole newspaper article (e.g., de Vreese 2003; Trenz 2005). In an article, sometimes multiple justifications of a position are reported in successive sentences. We coded such frames as being part of a nuclear sentence, but only if they were clearly attributable to the respective actor and position. Hence, the coding not only provides information on the content of the framing but also, more specifically, on the actors who invoked a particular frame (frame ownership).

Moreover, as previous research has found, actors often back their issue statements by using multiple frames (Lerch and Schwellnus 2006, 307), usually because their statements in the public debate are targeted at a heterogeneous audience, and frames resonate differently among the various constituencies. Hence, using multiple frames can be seen

[14] Understated opposition/support, i.e. when a political actor e.g. "considers thinking about supporting" a policy, was coded -/+0.5, respectively. Ambivalent positions, i.e. if an actor explicitly refuses to take position on a particular issue, were coded 0.0. Yet these three intermediate types of evaluations were uncommon and each make up only 5.0 percent or less of all nuclear sentences.

as a strategy to maximize the appeal of a particular issue position. To account for this behavior, we coded up to five frames for each nuclear sentence.

Table 3.1 provides an illustrative example of the coding of two sentences in a newspaper article. From the first sentence, two nuclear sentences have actually been coded, which demonstrates that a single real sentence can actually contain several nuclear sentences. Moreover, only the issue position in the second real sentence is backed up by justifications, a cultural nationalistic-exclusive and an economic prosperity frame. Coding several hundreds of articles this way, we finally came up with a dataset of several thousands of nuclear sentences and frames, as the overview in *Table 3.2* shows. The data and detailed documentation is available by the author on request.

TABLE 3.1. *Nuclear sentence coding example*

[1] While taking a clear stance in favor of the European Constitution in his speech yesterday, Edmund Stoiber carefully avoided mentioning the "Turkish question"– an issue on which his party, the CSU, is deeply divided. [2] However, the party chairman has unambiguously rejected EU membership for Turkey on several occasions before, mainly because Turkey, lacking a Christian heritage, was 'culturally too different', but also out of 'serious economic concerns.'

Nuclear sentence No.	Political actor	Evaluation (position)	European integration sub-issue	Frames (up to 5 frames per sentence)
1.1	CSU (Stoiber)	+1.0	European Constitution	-
1.2	CSU	0.0	EU accession of Turkey	-
2	CSU (Stoiber)	-1.0	EU accession of Turkey	1. Nationalistic-exclusive (Christian heritage) 2. Economic prosperity (unspecified)

TABLE 3.2. *Number of coded nuclear sentences and frames of the debate on Europe*

Country	Coded newspaper	N articles	N nuclear sentences	N frames
Austria	*Die Presse*	339	2,774	1,087
UK	*The Times*	217	2,000	756
France	*Le Monde*	619	4,869	4,113
Germany	*Süddeutsche Zeitung*	240	2,217	888
Netherlands	*NRC Handelsblad*	521	3,444	2,951
Switzerland	*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*	919	3,030	1,936

Notes: Dataset on the European integration public debate 2004–2006.

VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE DATA

Scholars working with media data are used to the critical objection by fellow political scientists that their results are certainly interesting, but that they reflect "only the media". This is usually followed by the slightly malicious question of what about the "true" position or motives of a political actor and, depending on the background of the questioner, he/she thinks of roll call data, expert surveys, party manifestos, or some other well-established method. There are several rejoinders to this general criticism. One need not go as far as radical constructivist currents in communication and media science who argue that "[w]hatever we know about our society, or indeed about the world in which we live, we know through the mass media" (Luhmann 2000, 1). From this theoretical perspective, the only socially relevant manifestation of political attitudes would be represented in the mass media. Even if one does not share this radical view, one certainly cannot ignore the paramount importance of the mass media in shaping how citizens and politicians perceive politics, although direct experience (a vivid illustration is a child putting their finger in a

socket) and face-to-face or group interaction also constitute relevant sources of social reality (van Bulck 1999).[15]

Less benevolent scholars might ask to what extent media data reflects the real attitudes of political actors. This of course immediately raises the question of where to find these "real" attitudes. Are they to be found in party manifestos (e.g. Budge et al. 2001 in general; Gabel and Hix 2004 for European integration)? Party manifestos are thought of as representing the views of the party elite, but they typically avoid internally controversial and potentially divisive issues – a particular characteristic the European integration issue is well known for. Moreover, and probably most importantly, ordinary citizens rarely read party manifestos.

Alternatively, are real attitudes tapped by expert surveys (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006 in general; Hooghe, Marks and colleagues for European integration)? Here a limited number of country experts have the difficult task to judge the policy positions of parties. Often, these experts also rely heavily on information from the mass media for their judgment. I mention these critical points not to degrade these approaches – they have greatly improved our scholarly knowledge and have their specific merits – but simply to show that it is not so easy to find an uncontested measure (for more criticism of these two particularly relevant approaches, see Dolezal 2008 and Mudde 2011).

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[15] Van Bulck draws heavily on the works of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. Moreover, he suggests that individuals may actually regard the mass media as one of the more trustworthy sources, as "[n]ot every symbolic representation is equally probable and believable, but a message distributed by television is not necessarily less believable than a message received from a friend. […] A rumour spread by neighbours about the death of a king or a president may, in fact, only become believable (and therefore 'real') after the media have acknowledged it" (1999, 10).

One way out of this dilemma is to compare the measures of the different data sources to assess their convergent validity. Helbling and Tresch (2011) are the first to compare the measures of party positions on European integration from the Chapel Hill expert surveys (CHE), the Comparative Party Manifesto Project (CMP), the European Election Studies (EES), and political claims analysis (PCA)[16] with the approach used here, the nuclear sentence coding of mass media data. They find that the different *position* indicators correlate highly and that the degree of shared variance across all methods is high. Hence, the validity of the position measures seems to be satisfactory for all data sources.

The results are less convincing regarding the *issue salience* measures, for which correlation and shared variance are low, as found by Netjes and Binnema (2007, 48). They did not include media data in their comparison, but suggest that mass media coding may be a "harder" measurement of salience than the data sources tested. Helbling and Tresch (2011) find that the mass-media salience measure of nuclear sentence coding sharply differs from the other methods. Hence, issue salience in the mass media seems to tap a different underlying concept than the other indicators. One reason might be that while manifesto data captures the initial promises or intentions of parties, mass media salience reflects the effective outcome, their actual behavior (Netjes and Binnema 2007). The latter is, however, influenced by additional factors such as unexpected events and developments, the agenda-setting efforts of competing political actors and the general political agenda. Taking this automatically into account, mass media data is likely to be

[16] PCA is an alternative method for coding mass media content and is used to study the European integration debate in Koopmans (2010). For details of the method, also see Koopmans and Statham (1999).

the most accurate measure of issue emphasis in real-world political contestation (Epstein and Segal 2000).

As for the framing, the available evidence suggests that on the condition that media frames are coded at a propositional level – as done by nuclear sentence coding – it is reasonable to infer from the framing in the media to the framing used by political actors. In her study on framing effects in direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland, Hänggli (2010, 172) compares the framing in political actors' campaign material with the media output. She finds that the media reported the frames the different political actors used quite accurately and concludes that they "respect frame ownership" (although more powerful actors on average receive more media attention). In other words, the arguments attributed to a particular political actor in newspaper articles are the same as those promoted in that actor's own leaflets and press releases. Note, however, that this finding only applies to frames at a propositional level attributable to a particular political actor, not to the overall framing of an article – which is what most framing studies, unlike the present one, are concerned with. The framing of a whole article is a different story, and it is much more at the discretion of the journalist who is crafting it (see e.g. Callaghan and Schnell 2001).

While the discussed validity of media data for political analysis is a concern of political scientists, media and communication scholars are quick to point to potential problems of reliability and media selection bias. The ideological orientation of a mass media outlet, i.e. whether it leans more to the left or the right, and differences between media types, i.e. newspapers and television, are the most often mentioned potential sources of bias.

According to Hallin and Mancini (2004, 67, 73–5), all the media systems of our six countries under study exhibit a high degree of political parallelism (i.e., particular newspapers share particular political views), although they represent different types of

media systems.[17] Caused mainly by the legacy of the traditional strong linkages between political parties and newspapers, this political parallelism constitutes a potential source of bias in our data, especially as we only coded one medium per country. However, the coding method we used is relatively robust to such distortions as we only considered directly and indirectly cited statements from external political actors, such as parties, governments, interest groups, and so on. All the information extracted from the newspapers – issues, positions, and frames – are clearly attributable to such an external actor's statement. We deliberately did not code opinion pieces, such as editorials and regular columns, where the political orientation of a newspaper comes to the fore most clearly.[18] Further, we also did not consider judgmental statements made by journalists in regular articles – a practice still common in many European newspapers where the norm of a clear separation of fact and opinion is less established in journalistic culture than in the USA (Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Hallin and Mancini 2004, 226).

Moreover, by exploring selected threads of the public debate on European integration in the 1990s with political claims analysis, an actor-centered mass media coding method similar to ours, Statham and Koopmans (2009, 450) find that party positions on European integration are robust across different newspaper types and newspapers with

[17] For Hallin and Mancini, France belongs to the polarized pluralist model, typically found in the Mediterranean area; the UK belongs to the Anglo-Saxon liberal model; and Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and the Netherlands are classified as democratic-corporatist models, typical of Continental and Northern Europe.

[18] For an insightful study into how the media deals with European integration in editorials, see Pfetsch et al. (2008).

ideological orientations. They find no significant differences between center-left vs. center-right newspapers, and broadsheets vs. tabloids. Only regional newspapers tend to report generally more pro-European statements.

However, while journalists may report the content of politicians' statements accurately, they may select their sources depending on whether they are close to their own ideological profile. A right-leaning journal such as the German FAZ might provide political actors from the right more space than those from the left, for example. Hence, this would not affect the positions, but the measured standing or the salience of an actor in the media. Hagen (1993) provides evidence for Germany that the journalistic practice of more frequently selecting statements from "opportune witnesses" does indeed exist.[19] A closer look at his results reveals that the more extreme the ideological orientation of a newspaper (*taz* as the newspaper most on the left, *Die Welt* most on the right), the stronger this effect, while moderate newspapers (including the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the German newspaper in our sample) are more balanced. Therefore, while we cannot rule out that some bias might be reflected in our salience measure due to the restricted newspaper sample, the decision to choose a moderate quality newspaper in each country limits this effect.

Finally, is the decision to exclude the additional and much more resource-demanding coding of television coverage in the present study a tolerable omission? The scholarly debate on whether there are substantial differences in political coverage among newspapers and television, and which of the two forms have a greater influence on citizens, is still undecided. However, a recent study by Druckman (2005) that was meant to overcome

[19] However, Gerhards, Neidhardt, and Rucht (1998, 95–9) find no substantive differences in the actor salience between newspapers in the public debate on abortion in Germany.

the methodological pitfalls of earlier work suggests that, at least for the USA, differences are quite limited. He finds that "television news and newspapers differ substantially in the quantity of coverage, but do not drastically differ in terms of content" (476). Moreover, according to this study, only reading newspapers plays a significant role in informing voters on candidates issue positions. By contrast, watching TV news, discussions with family and friends, or being directly exposed to the campaign do not.

Taken together, these findings on the potential risks of bias in media data due to ideological orientations and different media types and channels, although certainly not the final say in these ongoing scholarly debates, suggest that the exclusive focus on one single newspaper per country is a reasonable choice for the present comparative study, given the existing time and resource constraints.

A last methodological issue to discuss is inter-coder reliability. In a pretest, the coefficient of reliability for the identification of the nuclear sentences was 0.77; the inter-coder agreement for the actor variable was 0.88, for the issues variable 0.85, and for the frames 0.74. Given the common acceptance level of 0.8 (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002, 600), and in light of the fact that particularly the frames are very complex variables, these numbers are quite acceptable. Following the pretest, supplementary training and continuous monitoring addressed remaining uncertainties. Moreover, the coding work of individual newspapers was divided among several coders to reduce any potential bias caused by individual coders.

CONCLUSION

Studying the public debate by coding nuclear sentences, this chapter argued, holds huge yet hardly exploited potential for new and improved insights into the politicization of

European integration. Not only because the public debate constitutes a "master forum" of political contention in modern democracies, as the mass media decisively shapes citizens' perception of politics, but also because the data generated by this approach compares favorably with other data in terms of validity and reliability. A main reason for this is that the coding is not done at the article level, as in the majority of studies that rely on mass media data, but at the level of actor statements, with each position and frame being clearly attributable to a particular political actor.

The data reflects political actors' original attitudes (issue positions, emphasis, and framing) quite accurately. Positions on European integration showed to be relatively robust and were similar across different measures, including our approach. The framing of European integration – not by the media or in different countries, but by individual political actors – is an understudied topic and no cross-validation has been conducted so far. However, the above-mentioned findings by Hänggli (2010) suggest that by coding media frames at a propositional level, we can be fairly confident about tapping the framing that was actually intended by the politicians. The measured salience of an issue varied considerably across the different methods. This urges us to keep in mind what salience as measured in the mass media means: Not the intended or desired amount of attention for a specific issue by a particular political actor, as reflected, for example, in party manifestos, but the actual emphasis a political actor gives to an issue in public political contestation, which is also affected by the strategies of other actors and the general political agenda.

Finally, what speaks strongly in favor of the approach used here is the ability to disentangle European integration, i.e. to determine the different elements of politicization

not only for the issue of European integration generally, but for specific sub-issues.[20] This advantage will be particularly important in *Chapter 5*, which explores the multidimensional structuring of European integration orientations.

[20] The CHE expert surveys also asked for the positions on a limited number of European integration sub-issues.

CHAPTER 4

Content and participants of the public debate on Europe

The public sphere is the central venue for political contestation in modern mass-mediated democracies (Bennett 2001; Ferree et al. 2002; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Kriesi 2004; Manin 1995). Citizens rely fundamentally on the mass media to obtain information on contested issues and politicians' differing views. Political actors compete for scarce public attention to gain political influence, and this holds for governments, political parties, interest groups, and social movements alike – although the latter depend even more on access to the public sphere as they lack institutionalized channels to the political system. Conflict over Europe is no exception in this regard. Politicians invest heavily in public communication in order to convey their views of whether Europe is a relevant issue and what European integration is essentially about, and to convince citizens of their attitudes on Europe.

This chapter explores the dynamics, content and participants of the European integration debate. It looks at the main driving factors and the particular role referendums play in that regard. As will be shown, referendums have an outstanding ability to focus public attention and broaden the field of participants. At the same time, however, they take place only infrequently and calling a referendum (or giving reason to call one) is in

effect usually at the discretion of national governments, which considerably limits their role in the politicization of Europe in most countries. Moreover, the chapter presents the major issues of the European integration debate during the period under study, 2004 until 2006, and the relevant participants discussing them.[21] The question of which political actors engage in the European integration debate is of particular relevance. Most studies on the politicization of Europe routinely focus on the parties, without empirically verifying whether this is actually justified. In fact, there are good reasons to believe that other actors play an important role, too, e.g. social movement organization or economic interest groups.

INSTITUTIONAL EVENTS AS MAIN DRIVERS OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEBATE

The public debate over European integration is dynamic and involves significant ebbs and flows. Public attention devoted to European issues varies considerably over time although European integration has become a permanent topic of political contestation. This section discusses the main events that drive the public debate on European integration, the resulting dynamics for the period under study, and what this implies for the politicization of Europe. We know from previous research that news coverage of European issues is in general low, and attention is highly centered on events (e.g. Peter and de Vreese 2004). During routine periods in European politics, national issues prevail in the member countries. By contrast, important events such as national referendums on Europe spark off intense public debates in the affected countries and they typically go far beyond the

[21] It is beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate how journalists cope with Europe, or the degree of the Europeanization of the national public spheres. These are questions the growing literature on a European public sphere deals with (see Koopmans and Statham 2010; Trenz 2005; 2005; Tresch 2007).

actual issue voted on and engage in fundamental questions about European integration. Similarly, during the regularly held European Council summits, newspapers all over Europe are usually filled with stories about the European Union in which politicians express their views about current issues and speculate about future developments.

In their recent study of EU news coverage from 1990–2006, Boomgaarden et al. (2010) find that public attention is mainly attracted by infrequent institutional and policy-related events. The visibility of Europe in the news is greatly increased in particular by national referendums, changeovers of the Commission, elections to the European Parliament, and enlargement steps (in this order of appearance). To a lesser extent, the regular Council summits also increase visibility, especially in those countries holding the rotating EU presidency. Moreover, the national referendums not only have a tremendous impact in those countries where they take place, but show significant effects in other member states, too. As a result, temporal variation in the countries in terms of public attention follows similar patterns.

Further, what characterizes most of the key events of the European integration debate is that they are extraordinary but predictable, and scheduled and controlled by public authorities at the European and national level. This is quite an exceptional situation – many other political issues are driven by contingent events and activities outside the realm of the state, e.g. terrorist attacks, single incidents, or party political contestation over, for example, the issue of immigration (see Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wueest 2012; Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden 2007). Of course, the European integration debate also involves such contingent events, although their impact is clearly secondary to the large-scale institutional events.

Why are referendums in particular so powerful in shaping the European integration debate? Generally, they exert a strong agenda-setting effect because they force political actors to focus on a specific issue for a certain period of time. For Kriesi (2004, 202),

referendums allow for a "quasi-institutionalized going public". In most countries, it is up to governments to decide whether to call a referendum. However, once scheduled, governments cannot control the outcome, as the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005 vividly demonstrated. As Hooghe and Marks (2009, 20) put it, "[r]eferendums are elite-initiated events which can have elite-defying consequences".

Fortunately for them, governments enjoy quite some leeway whether to put a treaty to a popular vote, not least by scaling down the scope of a treaty beforehand, and they usually avoid it if they presume the odds are against them. Even if a referendum fails, not everything is lost as they can call a vote for a second time, usually making some minor concessions. This is well illustrated by the case of the Lisbon Treaty which succeeded the defeated Constitution and was ratified in most countries by parliament only. In Ireland, after the Lisbon Treaty had been turned down in a first referendum, the vote was simply repeated a year later. Only in Switzerland, where access to direct-democratic procedures is open to all, are referendums under very limited governmental control. In such a context, political challengers and more marginal actors are also able to use referendums as a highly effective tool to shape the political agenda – and to politicize Europe.

Table 4.1 shows the origin of the events that triggered statements about Europe during our period of study 2004–06. The findings confirm the expected importance of institutional and policy-related events that are initiated by national governments or the EU. Slightly more than 50 percent of all statements were made in the context of events that took place in public authority arenas at the European or national level – mostly policy decisions by the Commission or the Council, and meetings by European bodies and the member states. Further important sources of statements are direct-democratic processes (25.4 percent), and the parties and legislative arena (20.7 percent). Other arenas are largely irrelevant. These irrelevant arenas include not only the arena of interest groups, i.e. the privileged actors of the economic sector with traditionally close ties to the political

TABLE 4.1. *Origin of the events driving the European integration debate*

Event arena		
Public authority arenas	*51.2*	
European Union		39.1
Domestic state		12.1
Intermediary arenas	*48.1*	
Direct democracy (referendums and initiatives)		25.4
Parties and legislature		20.7
Interest associations		1.7
Protest		0.3
Economy and Society	*0.7*	
Total percentage	*100.0*	
N	7,372	

Note: Share of statements triggered by a particular event arena; only statements for which the triggering event could be identified; country weights applied.

system and who therefore depend less on public visibility, but also the protest arena whose representatives rely critically on public support to be able to exert pressure on governments (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005, 103). I will come back to this lack of protest politics in the European integration debate when dealing with the participants of the debate.

The impact of specific key events is visible in *Figure 4.1* which displays the temporal development of the debate intensity. The national referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands (and the referendum on the Schengen Treaty in Switzerland) were held at the end of May/beginning of June 2005 and added an enormous boost to the public debate. This did not only happen in the countries where they were held, but also in the other member states. The agenda-setting function of European referendums goes beyond national boundaries as they usually have far-reaching consequences for the integration process in general. In contrast, the frequent referendums held in non-

member state Switzerland are less important for other countries and therefore have little resonance outside. They are typically about bilateral agreements with the EU and are therefore only crucial for Switzerland. Further events in the period study that are also classified by Boomgaarden et al. (2010) as having a high impact, namely the Commission's changeover, EP elections and the Eastern enlargement, led to a marked increase in debate intensity in many of the countries under study, but none as strongly and systematically as the referendums. There are also significant country-specific differences due to other, minor events, but the degree of common variation caused by the key events is remarkable.

To summarize, European integration is clearly an issue in the control of public authorities. The public debate on Europe is driven primarily by key institutional and policy-related events that are initiated by either European Union bodies or national governments. Boomgarden et al (2010, 519) conclude "the more the EU does, the more likely it is to get on the news agenda". Conversely, this implies that if the EU and (as I would add) national governments remain inactive in these matters, European integration holds little salience in the public debate. A consequence of this is that non-state actors and party politicians in opposition who are interested in politicizing this issue are unable to get the debate going (and have difficulties developing a strong hold on this issue). Such a situation is uncommon for many domestic issues. Immigration, for example, is driven to a considerable extent by deliberate attempts of oppositional politicians trying to politicize it (Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden 2007). Moreover, the results showed that referendums are institutional events with an unparalleled ability to focus public attention. However, their impact is limited by the fact that they are largely controlled by national governments and take place only infrequently – with the exception of Switzerland.



Note: Number of statements on European integration per month; major institutional events indicated.

FIGURE 4.1. Intensity of the debate over time

THE CONTENT OF THE DEBATE

Since major institutional events provide the main impetus for the European integration debate, this should also be reflected in the topics being discussed. The most important events during the period under study were the referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands held in the summer of 2005, which brought many fundamental and institutional questions to the fore. A further milestone event was the simultaneous accession of 10 Central– and Eastern European countries in the spring of 2004, including Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – the largest enlargement round to date.

Table 4.2 reports the salience of the four European integration sub-issues according to the typology developed in *Chapter 2*.[22] Across all countries, deepening and enlargement, the two politico-cultural sub-issues, dominate the debate with 74.4 percent of all statements, which is well in line with the above-mentioned key events. In member states that held or announced referenda on the Constitutional Treaty (the UK, France, and the Netherlands), deepening is the most salient sub-issue. In non-EU Switzerland, deepening is the most important sub-issue as well due to the referendum on the Schengen accord. Enlargement is the most important sub-issue in Germany and Austria, which are

[22] Statements not clearly attributable to one of the four categories account for roughly 10 percent of all statements, but were excluded from the analysis. Two issues with which some of the statements of this very heterogeneous residual category dealt are worth mentioning, namely the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and budget negotiations. The interrelated issues of the CAP and the budget have substantial redistributive side-effects at the micro-level, but even more so at the macro-level, particularly in France and the UK. However, the reason they were not assigned to the social regulation sub-issue is that the specific topics debated in the period under study were mainly idiosyncratic questions about the net payments of individual countries (e.g. the British rebate).

TABLE 4.2. *Content of the European integration debate*

European integration sub-issue	All countries	A	UK	FR	DE	NL	CH
Market making	18.8	15.6	17.1	17.7	23.3	17.5	21.7
Social regulation	6.8	3.0	4.1	12.8	1.4	6.2	13.2
Enlargement	29.1	51.9	22.4	17.9	42.3	26.5	13.6
Deepening	45.3	29.6	56.5	51.5	33.0	49.8	51.4
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	*12,986*	*2,002*	*1,256*	*3,643*	*1,626*	*2,058*	*2,401*

Notes: Country-weights applied for the results across all countries.

geographically closest to potential new member countries. By contrast, only a quarter of all statements deal with the economic sub-issues social regulation or market making. Although secondary to the politico-cultural sub-issues in all countries, economic sub-issues hold comparatively high salience in Switzerland, mainly because a contested referendum on the free movement of persons was held. Economic sub-issues are also relatively important in Germany and France, where adjustments of the monetary union (reform of the stability pact) and the services liberalization directive, respectively, received above-average attention.

The referendums on the Constitutional Treaty and Eastern enlargement were certainly extraordinary events, but how unique are they? In fact, referendums have been constant companions of the integration process since the 1990s, and they have become more frequent. By 2001, there had been 25 referendums on European integration (Hug 2002, 27); by 2009 this number had already risen to 41. And while the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty may have temporarily tempered the enthusiasm of the elite to implement direct-democratic instruments at the European level, they will certainly continue to play an important role at the national level. The issue of further broadening the EU is also

likely to remain important in the future. Although the breadth of the Eastern enlargement round is unique, other candidate countries are already preparing for accession. Even more importantly, it was not the ongoing Eastern enlargement that received most of the public attention, but the lingering conflict about the potential future accession of Turkey. More than half of all statements about enlargement were actually preoccupied with this issue and Turkey's application will stay on the European agenda for years to come. Hence, referendums and enlargement rounds have been extraordinary, but not unique events in the past and both will be part of the integration process in the future.

However, what is certain to vary over time is the relative importance of the four sub-issues. It already has varied by the time of writing: Preoccupied deeply by the aggravating European sovereign debt or euro crises, European politics have become more concerned with the economic aspects of European integration. Yet this is exactly what makes the disentangling of European integration in this study so valuable. While the overall perception of European integration is shifting over the course of time, the underlying mechanisms for each of the four sub-issues should be less subject to change.

THE STANDING OF POLITICAL ACTORS

Most studies of the politicization of Europe restrict their analysis beforehand to a singly type of political actors, political parties, and thereby take their exclusive role for granted. Yet the literature on protest politics and social movements (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995) has long demonstrated that there is more to political conflict than the parties and the electoral arena. There are other actors and alternative arenas where political mobilization takes place and new political issues are introduced. European integration, it has been argued, has increasingly become a target of politicization from below – although this claim was again derived by exclusively focusing on particular actors and action repertoires, namely

protest politics (Balme and Chabanet 2008; Imig 2004; Imig and Tarrow 2001). By contrast, with its focus on the public debate the present study is able to systematically evaluate the importance of all kinds of political actors.

Participating in the public debate on European integration is essential for any actor trying to politicize Europe. A political actor who does not speak up publicly is neither able to make his stand visible nor to convince or mobilize citizens. In the literature on public debates, participation is usually known as standing, which means "having a voice in the media" (Ferree et al. 2002, 13).[23] Describing the standing of different types of political actors (e.g. governments, parties, interest groups and social movements) and explaining the differences between them, also across countries and issues, is routinely done in this literature (on the topic of Europe, see Koopmans 2010; Trenz 2005; Tresch 2007).

Throughout this study, I shall distinguish the following categories of political actors (see *Table 4.3*): At the most general level, there are *public authorities*, *political parties*, *civil society actors*, and unorganized *individuals*. Public authorities are characterized by their policy-output orientation and include *European Union bodies* (mainly the Commission and the Council) on one hand, and *national state actors* on the other. The large majority of statements by the latter stems from the executive, but also the administration, the judiciary and central bank officials are subsumed under this category.

[23] Standing therefore requires more than passive "visibility", another concept used in this literature (e.g. Koopmans and Statham 2000, 144).

Some scholars merge parties and civil society actors under the broader category of intermediaries as they both aggregate societal problems and demands, and translate them into more or less coherent political issues. However, in modern democracies the boundaries between the parties and the state are blurred – also because key positions in the state are filled with party politicians and executive members usually hold a party leadership position. In light of this very powerful and outstanding role of the *parties* in the political system, it is more useful to treat these intermediaries as a separate category. Party politicians speaking explicitly on behalf of the party and party politicians who are members of the legislative are assigned to this category. Moreover, to do justice to the fact that party politicians can be found in other categories as well (e.g. in the executive), some analyses below additionally report the results for the broader category of *party-affiliated actors.* Party politicians are the most important actors in the politicization of Europe, as will soon be shown below, and they therefore receive special attention in the subsequent

TABLE 4.3. *Categorization of the participants of the public debate*

Public authorities	EU actors	European Commission, Council of Ministers, European Council, and other supranational actors
	Foreign state actors	Foreign executive, administrative, and central bank actors
	Domestic state actors	Mainly domestic executives, but also administrative, judiciary, and central bank actors
Intermediary actors	Political parties	National and European party actors (including members of the legislature)
	Labor unions	–
	Business organizations	Employer and producer associations
	Public interest groups	Social movement organizations, charitable and environmental organizations, churches and other religious associations
Non-organized individuals	Experts	Intellectuals and scientists

chapters. They can be further broken down into six party families,[24] namely the C*ommunists and Left socialists* (the Radical Left), the *Greens*, the *Social Democrats*, the *Liberals*, the *Christian Democrats and Conservatives*, and the *Populist/Extreme Right*.[25] *Table A.1* in the appendix shows the individual parties in the six countries under study that belong to these party families.

Among the civil society actors, there are the *labor unions* and *business organizations*. The latter include all kinds of employers' organizations and professional groups, such as farmers' associations. Of these economic interests I distinguish *public interest groups*, which include charitable and environmental organizations, religious associations, and social movement organizations. Among the unorganized individuals, the only empirically salient group are *experts* on whom journalists quite frequently rely. Although these intellectuals and scientists are usually affiliated to some academic institution, they typically speak only for themselves and do not represent any official opinion of those institutions.

In general, participating in the public debate is easier for established actors of the political elite because their prominence and status facilitate access to the mass mediated public (Schmitt-Beck and Pfetsch 1994). Journalists rely heavily on official sources as postulated by the indexing-hypothesis (Bennett 1990; Livingston and Bennett 2003).

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[24] For a thorough discussion of the concept of the party family, see Mair and Mudde (1998).

[25] There are two reasons I treat the Christian Democrats and the Conservatives as a single category. First, differences in attitudes to Europe have become negligible, as shown in *Chapter 5*. A second reason is that each country under study has either a Christian-democratic or a Conservative party, but never both, meaning that for the comparative analyses I have to merge them in any case for pragmatic reasons. The same holds for the Liberal party family where one could distinguish left-liberals vs. conservative liberals.

With regard to how European integration specifically fits into this general pattern, scholars are more ambiguous. For Koopmans (2010, 98–9), European integration leads to a significant redistribution of power that also affects political mobilization and public debates. He refers both to theoretical arguments that expect even more dominance of established actors and to arguments that speak in favor of more openness towards civil society representatives. On one hand, the distant, complex, and bureaucratic EU decision-making process might further limit access by less resourceful actors. On the other hand, as the additional European level provides new and alternative opportunities for exit, veto and information that are off the beaten tracks of the national container and the monopolized national institutions (Hix and Goetz 2001, 12–4), the participation of traditionally disadvantaged actors may be facilitated. However, the fact that the European integration debate is driven primarily by events under the control of EU or national public authorities, as we have seen above, strongly suggests that these actors and the closely connected parties will also dominate this debate.

Only referendums, which proved to be among the most influential events in driving the debate, should to some extent serve as a counter balance against the dominance of well-established political actors. Generally, they lead not only to a greatly intensified public debate, they also expand the scope of participating actors, in the short as well as – in a comparative perspective - in the long term (Hoeglinger 2008, also see Marcinkowski 2005; Tresch 2007, 171–3). This is a result of the greater debate intensity during referendum campaigns, which leads to the increased diversity of actors. As more attention is devoted to the issue that is put to a vote, there are more opportunities for political actors to speak up. Moreover, referendum campaigns are a proto-typical situation of a conflict between two sides. This puts otherwise disadvantaged outsiders on a more or less equal footing with established actors because journalists cannot tell the story by providing only

half of the picture. Hence, during referendum campaigns about Europe and, more generally, in those countries in which referendums are held regularly, the hypothesized disadvantage of non-established actors should be smaller.

Table 4.4 presents the actors' standing in the European integration debate for each of the six countries. Standing is operationalized as the frequency with which statements by a particular actor category appear in the news and is reported as a percentage share of all statements made by political actors.[26] As expected, established political actors – public authorities and political parties – dominate heavily. Across all countries, public authorities account for 51.0 percent of all statements. The single most important actor, the European Commission with 10.4 percent of all statements, also belongs to this actor category. All state actors together, which are almost exclusively various national governments (the share of statements from the judiciary or the central bank is negligible at 1 percent or lower), are responsible for 33.9 percent of all statements. Domestic national governments account for only a third of them, while the rest stems from foreign governments, which suggests – together with the high standing of EU representatives – a high degree of transnationalization. Looking at individual countries, the share of public authorities is highest in Austria, and comparatively low in Switzerland and France.

Besides public authorities, the parties are the second major group with an average standing of 39.3 percent. Moreover, one can argue that this value for party standing still somehow underestimates their real importance as most members of a government

[26] Statements by journalists were excluded from all analyses.

TABLE 4.4. *Actor standing in the European integration debate*

Actor type	All countries	A	UK	FR	DE	NL	CH
Public authorities	*51.0*	*60.8*	*51.3*	*40.8*	*56.7*	*54.37*	*42.1*
European Union	17.0	25.2	16.9	11.2	25.2	14.0	9.9
Foreign state	23.5	28.9	20.8	21.1	21.4	27.8	21.2
Domestic state	10.4	6.7	13.6	8.5	10.1	12.7	11.1
Parties	*39.3*	*31.5*	*39.8*	*46.9*	*39.0*	*37.1*	*41.4*
Civil society	*5.8*	*4.4*	*6.2*	*6.3*	*0.5*	*3.3*	*13.8*
Labor unions	1.6	0.2	1.8	3.1	0.1	1.1	3.1
Business interests	2.2	3.2	1.8	1.4	0.1	0.8	6.1
Public int. groups	2.0	1.0	2.6	1.9	0.3	1.4	4.6
Individuals/experts	*4.0*	*3.3*	*2.7*	*6.0*	*3.8*	*5.3*	*2.7*
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes: Parties includes statements by party politicians in the legislature; country-weights applied for the “all” column.

are party politicians. When they make a statement in public, it is at least partly also perceived as a partisan statement. Hence, the share of all statements by party-affiliated actors (i.e. party speakers, parliamentarians and members of the executive) is a remarkable 50.2 percent. This is a noteworthy contrast to the results reported by Koopmans (2010, 108) who observes the dominance of core state actors in Europeanized public debates to the detriment of both parties and civil society actors. As his study relies on data from 1990 to 2002, the discrepancy may reflect the subsequent increased partisan politicization of European integration.

By contrast, civil society actors (such as labor unions, business and public interest groups) and individuals are not only clearly outnumbered by public authorities and parties, but they are virtually invisible. Across all countries, civil society actors together account for just 5.8 percent of all statements in the public debate over Europe, and individuals – who typically appear in the media because they were contacted by journalists for their expertise and rarely due to their own effort – account for 4.0 percent. To be sure, the low representation of civil society actors can also be found for other, domestic political issues. However, the degree of marginalization of civil society actors in the European integration debate is also exceptional in a comparative perspective. For the immigration debate, the share of civil society actors is more than four times higher in the same time period, namely 17.0 percent, and for economic liberalization the share is even higher with 36.5 percent. These findings confirm similarly bleak assessments about the prospects for creating a genuinely European civil society (Imig 2004; Koopmans 2010). As Koopmans (2010, 104) notes "[i]t is difficult to see how the absence of any form of public visibility could not negatively affect the bargaining power of civil society groups within the European decision making process." This means for the politicization of Europe that civil society actors, including social movements, are largely irrelevant, at least for the time being. The great battle over Europe is certainly not taking place on the streets.

This conclusion is supported by two recent studies of protest politics. Hutter (2010, 187) shows that the issue of European integration is rarely taken up by protesters (only 0.4 percent of all protest events deal with Europe), and that this arena is still dominated by traditional protest concerning cultural liberalism, the environment and, increasingly, immigration. Moreover, Uba and Uggla (2011) find that there is also no observable increase in the level of protest activities related to Europe between 1992 and 2007, as could be expected given the increasing politicization of Europe since the beginning of the 1990s.

How does this general picture change if we look at the impact of referendums on the public debate over Europe? The standing of civil society actors in Switzerland, with its exceptionally strongly developed direct democratic institutions, is with 13.8 percent more than twice as big as the country with the second highest standing, France. This large difference supports the observation that direct-democratic votes, which regularly take place in Switzerland, foster the participation of otherwise marginalized groups in public debates (Hoeglinger 2008). Yet in the other two countries in which a referendum took place during the period under study, namely France and the Netherlands, no such significant effect is visible.[27] Unlike in Switzerland, direct-democratic processes in these countries took place only once during the relevant period and they were not an integral part of the normal political process, but were extraordinary.

[27] One might include the UK in the group of countries with a referendum, as a vote on the Constitutional Treaty was publicly discussed after an announcement by the Prime Minister, but in light of the defeats in France and the Netherlands, the referendum was later cancelled.



Note: Party and civil-society statements as a share of all debate statements in referendum campaigns vs. routine periods (only countries with referendums held). Referendum campaigns are defined as the 60 days leading up to the vote. N for referendum campaigns/routine periods in France = 541/3,088; in the Netherlands = 125/1,902; and in Switzerland = 415/1,911. Referendums held during the period under study: Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands (May/June 2005); Schengen Accord (June 2005), extension of the free movement of persons to the new CEE member states (September 2005), and contribution to the EU cohesion funds (November 2006) in Switzerland.

FIGURE 4.2. Impact of referendums on party and civil society standing

Apart from this systemic impact, we can test the expected effect of referendums more directly by comparing the standing during referendum campaigns and normal periods in those countries where a referendum took place. As *Figure 4.2* shows, the standing of civil society actors is greatly augmented during referendum campaigns in all three of these countries. It increases from 5.1 percent to 13.3 percent in France, from 2.5 percent to 16.0 percent in the Netherlands, and from 9.2 percent to 36.6 percent in Switzerland. Direct-democratic votes ease the disadvantages civil society actors experience in the European integration debate. Furthermore, and quite surprisingly, the standing of parties



Notes: Statements of party families (as a share of all party-affiliated statements); N=6,549. Electoral strength as reflected in vote shares in national elections. Both media data and the electoral vote shares are country-weighted.

FIGURE 4.3. Standing of party families in the European integration debate

also increases strongly in two out of the three referendum countries. In France, the standing of parties goes up from 43.3 percent to 67.3 percent, in the Netherlands from 35.2 percent to 54.8 percent, while it remains unchanged in Switzerland. Hence, not only civil society actors but also the parties gain from referendums in terms of standing. If conflict about Europe is at its highest level, as is the case during referendum campaigns, the parties manage to increase their already high standing even further, thereby underscoring their central role in the politicization of Europe.

Figure 4.3 looks at party-affiliated actors only and compares the standing of the individual party families. Moreover, a second bar indicates the electoral strength. The two values are highly correlated – the media generally seems to rely on vote shares as a guideline for allocating the scarce public attention to parties. As a result, the two electorally

strongest party families, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats/Conservatives account for almost three-quarters of all partisan statements. By contrast, potential fundamental Eurosceptics at the fringes of the party system have difficulties making themselves heard. At 2.3 percent, the standing of the Communists and Left Socialists is only marginal, while Populist/Extreme Right parties account at least for a respectable 10.2 percent of all partisan statements.

Again, what is the effect of referendums on the standing of the different party families? As *Figure 4.4.* shows, the standing of fringe parties increases in all three countries during referendum campaigns. This holds for the Radical Left, partly for the Greens, but is most pronounced for the Populist/Radical Right. In return, the standing of the mainstream party families decreases in these countries or, in a few cases, remains more or less



Note: Statements by the Radical Left, the Greens, and the Populist Right as a share of all party-affiliated statements in referendum campaigns vs. routine periods (countries with referendums only). N for referendum campaigns/routine periods in France = 419/1643; in the Netherlands = 93/930; in Switzerland = 211/888.

FIGURE 4.4. Impact of referendums on the standing of fringe parties

unchanged (not shown in the figure). Hence, parties generally benefit from increased public visibility during referendum campaigns and, of those, the potentially Eurosceptic make the most of this situation. As a result, conflict within the party system increases during referendum periods. However, as already mentioned, what seriously limits the politicization of Europe by means of referendums is that they are exceptional events. And the stronger the opposition that governments expect to face, the more they will be reluctant to call a referendum.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided an overview of the public debate on European integration by looking at the fundamental dynamics, major issues and relevant participants. The debate is primarily driven by extraordinary, but predictable institutional events at the European and national level, which are initiated by public authorities. This further reinforces the usual predominance of executives and the parties in public debates, while it aggravates the lack of civil society participation. Without doubt, and contrary to what some scholars have claimed, the findings strongly suggest that contestation over Europe does not take place on the streets and that protest politics plays a marginal role at best.

Party-affiliated politicians are responsible for every second statement, and while public authorities are also relevant in terms of actor standing, it is not where one should turn to when looking for potential opposition against Europe. Political parties not only have the strength but also the motivation to oppose and to politicize the "government issue" of European integration. Hence, in the subsequent chapter I will again focus in more detail on this particularly relevant group of actors.

As shown, the occasional direct democratic referendums serve to some extent as a counterweight as they broaden the range of actors that engages in the debate. However,

it is not civil society actors but parties that benefit the most from direct-democratic institutions. At these "flashpoints" (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 20) of the politicization of Europe, the parties, particularly including the fringe parties, manage to absorb the largest share of the additionally generated public attention. Thereby, the parties further strengthen the predominance they already have during routine periods.

Although referendums lend a strong impetus to the European integration debate, their role in the politicization of Europe is at the same time limited as they take place only infrequently and the decision whether to call a referendum is usually at the discretion of national governments. The sole exception in that regard is Switzerland, where direct-democratic votes can be initiated by any political group with sufficient resources. As a result, they are held on a quite regular basis. In other countries, however, any actor attempting to politicize Europe in a sustained manner needs to be able to also raise the heat on Europe during the long periods without referendums. It is thus a political issue that is strongly shaped by institutional events initiated and controlled by national governments and the European Union. Actors from the partisan arena with their strong standing in the European integration debate have the largest potential to succeed in this difficult task.

CHAPTER 5

The structure of European integration orientations

Who are the supporters of European integration, which political actors oppose it, and how can we explain these attitudes? The present chapter elaborates on these fundamental questions. The answers are, as will be shown, less straightforward than typically assumed. In line with the general argument of this study, the approach taken in this chapter is motivated by the belief that European integration is a truly multi-faceted issue and should also be treated as such in the analysis and, moreover, by the claim that ideology plays a crucial, although complex, role in the politicization of Europe. As a consequence, we will go beyond the prominent notion that European attitudes take the form of an inverted U-curve, which describes the simple fact that politicians at the fringes of the political spectrum and/or in opposition are generally Eurosceptic, while mainstream actors are mostly supportive.

Specifically, this chapter will look at attitudes about the specific European integration sub-issues, namely deepening, enlargement, social regulation and market making. If European integration were truly multidimensional, we should observe distinct patterns of how elite orientations are shaped towards each of them. This would go unnoticed if we

were only to look at attitudes to Europe in general, as is done in most other studies. Moreover, in addition to describing the patterns the chapter will investigate which factors are actually causing them. The three main theoretical models discussed in the literature to explain the structuring of European integration orientations will be systematically tested, and we will see whether the claim that traditional ideological divides most powerfully shape European integration finds empirical support.

The empirical part of this chapter, following a brief section that introduces the three competing theoretical models, is structured as follows. First, the geopolitical model (postulating that European integration orientations mainly vary along the lines of nationality) is contrasted with the expectation that the bulk of variation is explained by differences between domestic social groups (as argued by both the institutional-strategic and the ideological models). This analysis includes all political actors participating in the public debate – parties, as well as other political actors such as governments, economic interest groups, or social movement organizations. The next section focuses on political parties. The supplementary information available for this particular group of actors allows distinguishing between the hypothesized effects of the institutional-strategic and the ideological models. Further, it is possible to test specific variants of the ideological model and to see precisely whether and how European integration orientations are structured by both the cultural and the economic axis of the two-dimensional political space. Briefly, the results will show that the observed inverted U-curve pattern for general European integration orientations is in fact the outcome of the interplay of distinct underlying factors that differentially shape the orientations towards each of the four integration sub-issues. In addition, the cultural axis of the political space proved to have a consistent and significant impact across all sub-issues. This complex, yet systematic pattern underscores the multi-faceted nature of European integration as well as the critical impact of existing ideological divides.

THREE MODELS TO EXPLAIN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ORIENTATIONS

There are essentially three theoretical propositions concerning how elite orientations towards European integration are structured (Bartolini 2005, 321–6; also see Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002; Steenbergen and Marks 2004, 4–10). The *geopolitical model* claims that European integration attitudes are mainly related to the nationality of a particular actor. Hence, all actors from a particular country would have similar orientations regarding Europe, be it for the same economic, cultural or political reasons. The *institutional-strategic model* assumes that attitudes to Europe are mainly a question of whether a political actor is in government or in opposition. Finally, the *ideological model* postulates that European integration orientations are structured along the basic lines of domestic political conflict and therefore influenced by group interests and ideology. This is in line with the general argument of this study. I will present each of these models and the corresponding expectations.

Europe and national features – The geopolitical model

European integration is a process where individual nation states voluntarily pool sovereignty at the supranational level. Traditionally, such developments beyond the nation state have been the subject of international relations theories. These theories focus on the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis and emphasize as crucial explanatory factors a country's national interest and power, its economic preferences, its national institutions, or its collective identity and culture in general. The geopolitical model postulates that

European integration attitudes are primarily shaped by such varying national context conditions.[28]

Many scholars see culture as an important source of national differences. Díez Medrano (2003) argues that the widespread Euroscepticism in the UK has its roots in the country's imperial past, which created among the population a strong sense of being different and impeded their identification with Europe. As a result, the fear of losing the national identity and culture in the course of the integration process is much more prevalent in the UK than, for example, in Germany where the Nazi past and the country's damaged image after World War II led to both an idealistic and pragmatic endorsement of European integration. Spiering (2004, 146) also acknowledges the deep cultural foundations of Euroscepticism in the UK and argues that this potential is readily taken up and amplified by both an adversarial political system (due to the first-past-the-post voting) and a highly competitive media system that is dominated by the tabloid press.

Deeply rooted politico-cultural Euroscepticism has also been diagnosed for non-member state Switzerland (e.g. Church 2004; Kriesi 2007). European integration is, according to a prominent argument in the literature, perceived as a threat to the three core political institutions of Switzerland – federalism, neutrality, and direct democracy. According to Theiler (2004), members of the largest linguistic group in Switzerland, the Swiss Germans, are particularly receptive to such fears as they are caught in an identity double-bind. As Swiss, they are part of a multicultural state that lacks a single national culture, held together only by its political institutions; as Swiss-Germans they cultivate

[28] Note that the geopolitical model not only includes realist motives of state power and national security, but all kinds of national interests, be they political, economic or cultural.

their distinctiveness from a larger German-speaking culture. This gives rise to a highly fragile identity that is vulnerable to both institutional change and national boundary lowering. Both of these dynamics would be reinforced by accession to the European Union. The author argues that this is the source of the widespread opposition to integration in the German-speaking part of Switzerland.

Besides culture, economic context conditions are also seen as essential factors in explaining national variations in European integration attitudes. Based on the "varieties of capitalism" approach, attitudes in a market-liberal welfare state like the UK should generally be more skeptical of a social market Europe (Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt 2004, 79). By contrast, one might expect stronger opposition to a neoliberal Europe (and more support for a common social model) from Continental welfare states, especially in the presence of high unemployment, such as in Germany and France. Indeed, in France calls for social regulation, public service protection and economic government at the European level are not the exclusive domain of the left, but part of the general political culture (Milner 2004, 64). In Germany, despite overall support for European integration, there is a widespread feeling of unease with regard to increasing foreign labor competition (Díez Medrano 2003, Chapter 2).

Europe as a domestic issue – The ideological and the strategic models

The alternative and more recent view of European integration not as conflict between different national interests, but as a source of domestic political contestation is put forward by the comparative politics literature. Here, European integration is seen as "domestic politics by other means", as Marks and Wilson (2000, 459) put it. Within a country, the impact of a particular European policy on different social groups varies, and per-

ceptions of the pros and cons of European integration are expected to diverge. Accordingly, one would expect considerable variance in European integration attitudes among different social groups and their political representatives as conflict over European integration is very much like conflict over traditional domestic political issues: conflicting interests, values, and identities of different social entities are pitted against each other.

Well in line with this perspective, the *ideological model* argues that the comparatively new issue of European integration is being incorporated into existing patterns of domestic contestation. In *Chapter 2*, I argued in detail why and how this embedding is expected to take place. Based on Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), Steenbergen and Marks (2004) consider the possibility that European integration attitudes are structured along the economic left-right axis, as contrasting views on common economic regulations at the European level divide the left from the right. In contrast, Kriesi and colleagues (2008) argue that Europe is part of a new and primarily cultural conflict over denationalization and therefore orientations are mainly shaped by the cultural TAN-GAL axis of the political space. Yet these two propositions are not mutually exclusive. European integration orientations are, I argued, neither reducible to an economic nor a cultural dimension, but are in fact structured by both axes of the political space – although the cultural axis is expected to dominate. Such a view is also suggested by Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2004). More specifically, I expect that the structure of European integration orientations is conditional on the specific integration sub-issue in question. If economic aspects of European integration are at stake, attitudes should be strongly shaped by the economic left-right axis: The closer a party is to the economic right pole, the more it should oppose social regulation and at the same time support market making. By contrast, if politico-cultural aspects of European integration are affected, attitudes should be primarily structured by the cultural axis: The closer a party is to the cultural TAN-pole, the more it is expected to oppose enlargement and deepening.

Domestic politics, however, are also affected by strategic considerations of vote or office seeking politicians. A common argument in the literature is that government-opposition dynamics are decisive in shaping party attitudes to Europe. This is the fundamental claim made by the *institutional-strategic model* (Mair 2001; Sitter 2002; Taggart 1998). It assumes that it is not programmatic reasons but strategic competition among parties that is the most important factor in explaining European integration orientations. In order to avoid possible intra-party tensions, mainstream parties take a general, if largely tacit, pro-European stance. By contrast, irrespective of their ideological color, minor parties take a distinctly Eurosceptic position to openly challenge the mainstream parties. Hence, in this view, opposition to European integration is less a substantive, ideologically grounded attitude but more a strategic choice of minor parties in their quest for electoral gains.[29]

ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS A DISENTANGLED EUROPEAN ISSUE

The empirical part of this chapter is divided into two. First, the orientations of all political actors participating in the public debate are presented by country and by type of political actor. This and the subsequent multiple regression allows the juxtaposing of the geopolitical model, which postulates that the bulk of variation is to be found between countries, with the alternative of variation primarily between the political representatives of differ-

[29] Minor parties are commonly understood either in terms of government participation, votes, or ideology. Hence, parties in opposition (either continuously or temporarily), small parties, or extreme left and extreme right parties might be more likely to adopt a Eurosceptic position (Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002, 588).

ent social groups. Since it is impossible in this set-up to distinguish between factors related to the ideological and the strategic-institutional models (both are responsible for variation between different types of political actors), a second, refined analysis of party positions is then conducted. Here, we will not only be able to evaluate the two distinct models of domestic political contestation, but the additional information available for the parties also allows us to test whether and how precisely European integration orientations are structured by both the cultural and the economic axis of the two-dimensional political space.

Conflict between countries or contestation between domestic social groups?

How do attitudes to Europe differ depending on the actors' country of origin? *Figure 5.1* presents average orientations of the political elites in the six countries as expressed in the public debate. The graph at the top shows that national peculiarities exert little influence on overall European integration elite orientations. The variation between the different countries is small, and orientations in all countries are slightly supportive. However, there is significantly more national variation if we look at individual integration sub-issues, as shown in the two graphs at the bottom of *Figure 5.1*. As for the politico-cultural integration sub-issues, the UK adopts the comparatively most negative position towards deepening having a highly ambivalent value of +0.06. This demonstrates that the deeply culturally rooted British Euroscepticism finds expression in elite attitudes. Yet it does not translate into unqualified opposition to all things European – attitudes to enlargement are not affected, but are, by contrast, highly positive. Moreover, while the UK adopts a more skeptical stance on deepening than on enlargement, it is the opposite way in all the other countries, which are much more supportive of deepening than of enlargement. This pattern reflects the inherent tension between deepening and widening (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008, 251) or, in other words, between boundary

Overall orientations:



Orientations towards integration sub-issues:



Notes: The average positions can vary between -1.0 (only negative statements) and + 1.0 (only positive statements). The reported average positions are salience-weighted. AT = Austria, UK = United Kingdom, FR = France, DE = Germany, NL = Netherlands, CH = Switzerland.

FIGURE 5.1. National orientations towards European integration

lowering within Europe and European boundary extension. Apparently, for those countries favoring an ever closer union that goes beyond mere economic integration the question of where to draw Europe's external borders and to whom access to the EU should be granted is much more contested.

In the case of the two economic integration modes, national variation is generally higher. Here, France stands out; it is the country most supportive of the social regulation sub-issue, and at the same time most opposed to market making. The orientations of Germany, a country also suffering high unemployment, are similar, although less pronounced. The only country that opposes social regulation at the European level is the UK with its liberal welfare state. These findings are well in line with the explanations discussed above that emphasize national economic contexts when accounting for national differences.

Our expectations are not met in the case of Switzerland where elite attitudes do not reflect the culturally rooted Eurosceptic potential. Overall, they are favorable. This may be due to the fact that the widespread Euroscepticism of the masses is not shared by the majority of the political elite, which is generally supportive of European integration (Theiler 2004, 637-368) – enthusiastically in the 1990s, more pragmatically thereafter. But then the puzzle remains whether and in what conditions elite attitudes adjust to public opinion, as in the case of the UK, or not as in Switzerland.

The European integration orientations of the various actor groups involved in the public debate are reported in *Figure 5.2*. In the following, I discuss each of them in turn. *EU and domestic state actors* are the driving forces behind the integration process, and it is therefore unsurprising that this group is on average supportive of European integration overall as well as of each of the four integration sub-issues. However, there is quite some country-specific variation among domestic executives, reflecting different national interests and contexts (not shown in the figure). In the case of deepening, the UK executive is the least supportive national government (+0.18), while the French and German executives are the most committed (+0.82 and +0.80, respectively). When it comes to enlargement, in contrast, the UK executive is the most supportive national

Overall orientations:



Orientations towards integration sub-issues:



Notes: The reported average positions are salience weighted. Country weights applied. EU = EU actors, n_state = domestic state actors, rl_com = Radical Left, green = Green parties, socdem = Social Democrats, lib = Liberals, cd_con = Christian Democrats and Conservatives, rpr = Populist/Extreme Right, union = labor unions, employ = employer organizations, pub_int = public interest groups, exp = experts. The reported average positions are salience-weighted.

FIGURE 5.2. Group orientations towards European integration

government (+0.41), while the German, Austrian, and French executives adopt ambivalent positions (-0.03, 0.04, and 0.10, respectively). As for the economic integration sub-issues, the only national government opposing social regulation is the UK (-0.30), and both the French and German executives oppose market making (-0.58 and -0.37, respectively). These findings highlight the importance of the geopolitical model in explaining national governments' orientations, but this actor group is exceptional in this regard.

European integration, particularly the common market, has been a salient issue for organized interests for decades and well before the mass politicization of Europe started in the 1990s. Advocating labor and capital owner interests, respectively, *labor unions* and *employers/business associations* occupy the two opposing sides of the economic left-right divide. However, this clash of interests only becomes manifest in their antagonistic views on market making, as can be seen from the two graphs at the bottom of *Figure 5.3*. For the three other European integration sub-issues, including social regulation, labor unions and business interests both hold similar and supportive orientations. Accordingly, when it comes to European integration, the two adversaries wage their fight in a relatively limited field.

Public interest groups are a heterogeneous category and their visibility in the public debate on European integration is extremely low, as shown in *Chapter 4*. Negative statements by anti-European groups, such as the Swiss far-right grass-roots organization AUNS (Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland), and supporting statements by the various pro-European movements are roughly balanced. The global justice movement is overall ambivalent due to its strong opposition to market making and its diffuse support of social regulation – an attitude similar to the Radical Left parties. Interestingly, the distinct negative average orientation of public interest groups vis-à-vis enlargement is the result of the Catholic Church's unease with the accession of Turkey and its related demand for a reference to the Christian heritage of Europe to be placed in the

Constitutional Treaty – a demand also supported by several Christian-democratic and Conservative parties, as will be shown shortly.

Party families and European integration

We now turn to the most important political actors in the European integration debate, the parties. In short, party attitudes to European integration are distinct and well structured. Both party families at the fringes of the political spectrum, the Radical Left and the Populist/Extreme Right, have strong negative overall attitudes to Europe, as shown in *Figure 5.2*. Parties from the center, by contrast, are in favor of or at least ambivalent to European integration. This characteristic pattern has been termed an "inverted U-curve" in the literature on Euroscepticism (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004, 122–3). However, once we disentangle European integration and look at each of the four integration sub-issues separately, the inverted U-curve is not generally applicable, but only observable for one of them, as the graphs at the bottom of *Figure 5.2* show. It only exists in the case of deepening, with the other sub-issues being structured in a different manner.

The other politico-cultural integration mode, enlargement, shows a left-right pattern: All parties of the right, the Liberals, the Christian Democrats and Conservatives, as well as the Populist/Extreme Right are opposed to further enlargement, whereas all parties of the left, including the Radical Left, are supportive. From a purely economic perspective, this is a puzzling finding, because one would expect (economically) rightist parties to support a larger common market. Clearly, in the case of enlargement there is more at stake than simply economic motives.

Economic motives are strongly at work, however, in the case of market making, where again a left-right pattern is observable, but this time in the reverse direction. While all leftist parties oppose market making, parties of the right support these efforts – with

the exception of the Populist/Extreme Right. One might also interpret this finding as a combination of a left-right pattern with an inverted U-curve. Finally, all party families except the Populist/Extreme Right evaluate social regulation efforts towards a social market Europe positively, which makes it a valence issue among mainstream parties. Yet in the absence of truly effective policies in this field (Leibfried 1994; Leibfried and Pierson 1995), this may reflect a lot of cheap talk.

These are the general patterns for the parties, but what about the individual party families? The *Radical Left party family* comprises parties to the left of the Social Democrats, which are still strongly mobilizing on the traditional class cleavage. These parties either have a Communist origin, resulting from an early split of the working class movement (Bartolini 2000), such as the French Communist Party (PCF), or they started as new socialist alternatives to the established left parties in the 1950s and later, such as the Alternative Left in Switzerland. Most members of the Radical Left party family are internationalist and therefore in principle pro-European. However, as they resolutely advocate "another Europe"[30] they are firmly opposed to the current trajectory of European integration which they see primarily as a – more or less incurable – neoliberal project aimed at creating a "Europe of the markets". Consequently, as shown in *Figure 5.2*, they firmly and unanimously oppose any further deepening and market making, but at the same time they embrace the idea of a social Europe and support enlargement.

The *Green parties* have fundamentally changed their attitudes to Europe in the last decade (for Austria, see Pelinka 2004). Still strongly Eurosceptic in the 1990s, the

[30] Statement of the European Left, *Some remarks concerning the creation of the Party of the European Left*. URL: http://www.european-left.org/english/about_the_el/introduction [2010/07/01].

Greens have become the strongest advocates of European integration in the 2000s, as presented in *Figure 5.3*.[31] However, whereas they support further deepening, enlargement and a social Europe, they oppose further market making in line with the other left-of-the middle party families, as shown in *Figure 5.2.*

The S*ocial Democrats* historically have ambivalent attitudes to European integration. Many members of the party family initially opposed their country's accession to the European Union, and while all officially supported the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, some of them suffered deep internal divisions on this issue, in some cases even leading to the formation of splinter groups such as Jean-Pierre Chevènement's *Mouvement de Citoyens* (MDC) in France. How can we explain this wavering of the Social Democratic party family? Marks and Wilson (Marks and Wilson 2000, 442–8) argue that a strong Social Democracy was likely to be opposed to European integration because they simply had a lot to lose: Their national achievements in the class conflict, such as a strong welfare state, Keynesianism or neo-corporatism, risked coming under increased strain by the tougher competition in the single European market. However, over the years EU membership became consolidated, leaving the single market was perceived as less and less feasible, and globalization increasingly undermined national autonomy. At some point in this development, even strongly domestically positioned Social Democratic parties started to endorse the idea of regulated capitalism at the European level. This meant no longer opting for less, but instead pushing for more integration, which is reflected in the enduring supportive stance since the beginning of the 1990s (*Figure 5.3*) .

[31] This finding may be slightly exaggerated by our country selection as it includes no Scandinavian countries, where Greens still hold Eurosceptic positions. Something similar could be said about Ireland (Gilland Lutz 2004).

However, the dilemma for the Social Democrats is still present if we look at their attitudes to the four integration sub-issues in the public debate in *Figure 5.2*. While they fully endorse deepening and enlargement, the class cleavage still has an impact on their orientations towards economic integration. Most Social Democratic parties oppose market making while strongly supporting the alternative vision of a social Europe by means



Notes: Calculated from party statements in national election campaigns in the six countries under study. The time periods in the figure are chosen in order to include for each country at least one election. There is no data available for the 1980s. rl_com = Radical Left, green = Green parties, socdem = Social Democrats, lib = Liberals, cd_con = Christian Democrats and Conservatives, rpr = Populist/Extreme Right.

FIGURE 5.3. Party family orientations towards European integration over time

of more regulation at the European level. Only the British Labour party does not fit this pattern as it takes exactly opposite positions on both integration sub-issues (not shown in the figure), clearly a country-specific stance.

The church-state cleavage, which was originally triggered by the Reformation and opposed the *Conservatives* to the *Christian Democrats*, has been largely pacified in the course of the increasing secularization and the decline of (institutionalized) religiosity in Western European societies since the 1960s (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008, 25; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Therefore, this study treats them as belonging to one single party family. Christian Democrats and Conservatives welcome the positive effects of European integration on economic prosperity, albeit the Conservatives with a stronger neoliberal bent (Hix and Lord 1997, 29–32; Marks and Wilson 2000, 451–8). Nonetheless, in the literature it has been argued that some differences between Christian-democratic and Conservative parties continue to exist. The fact that transnational Christian-democratic networks decisively shaped the trajectory of European integration (Kaiser 2007) and the equally supranational character of the Catholic Church both should result in very supportive Christian-democratic attitudes vis-à-vis European integration. By contrast, the Conservatives' national origins should lead them to adopt a much more skeptical stance.

Yet the empirical results suggest that by now these two groups of parties no longer differ systematically as they may have done in the past. The on average highly ambivalent overall European integration orientations of the Christian-democratic and Conservative parties in the six countries under study (*Figure 5.2)* are not only a result of the historically skeptical attitudes of the British Conservatives (-0.44), but also of the two German Christian-democratic parties, the CDU and the CSU (-0.34 and -0.42, respectively).

If we look at the orientations towards the four integration sub-issues, the source of this unexpectedly strong Euroscepticism of this party family becomes apparent. It is opposition to enlargement that causes the Euroscepticism by the Christian-democratic

and Conservative parties. They all have negative orientations towards this integration mode, the only exception being the Austrian ÖVP which adopts a positive, but still highly ambivalent stance (0.08).[32] In contrast, the second politico-cultural mode, deepening, is supported by all representatives of this party family, with the only exception of the fundamentally Eurosceptic British Conservatives. As for the two economic integration modes, average orientations of the Christian-democratic and Conservative party family are very positive vis-à-vis the social regulation sub-issue, and moderately vis-à-vis market making. The latter sub-issue is, however, opposed by quite a few representatives – the French UMP, the Dutch CDA and even the British Conservatives; the German CSU is highly ambivalent.

The *Liberals* are the other large party family of the moderate right. Most generally, liberalism finds its expression in economic as well as in social and political freedom, and representatives of this party family emphasize the two aspects to varying degrees (Kirchner 1988, 484). European integration, one could argue, serves both ends, and therefore it comes as no surprise that they are – just behind the Greens – the second most pro-European party family in terms of overall orientations. In line with their ideology, they support market making and further deepening. However, they are divided on their attitude to enlargement. The French UDP holds a salient and distinct negative position (-0.98), while the German FDP, the radical liberal Dutch 66 and the British Liberal Democrats are – quite tacitly (less than 5 statements) – in support of enlargement (+1.0, +0.28 and +1.0, respectively); the Dutch VVD is ambivalent (+0.05).

[32] For the British Conservatives, enlargement holds marginal relevance; as a result, only two statements in our data exist on this. Yet they are both positive. This may be an indicator of the party's strategy of promoting widening in order to prevent further deepening.

At the far right of the political spectrum in Western Europe, basically two types of parties can be distinguished (Ignazi 2003, 20–34): the traditional *Extreme Right*, descending from historical fascism, and the *New Populist right*, which is a product of the "new politics" cleavage. While the former has been a relatively marginal phenomenon (with the exception of the electorally successful Italian MSI), the New Populist Right has significantly increased its vote share in many Western European countries since the 1990s. In the countries under study, all relevant representatives of the Populist and Extreme Right party family belong to this latter sub-type – the Dutch LPV and its political heir, the PVV; the Austrian FPÖ including its splinter group the BZÖ; the French FN; and the Swiss SVP. Unlike the traditional Extreme Right, these new Populist Right parties distance themselves from crude biological racism but engage in a "differentialist nativist" and culturalist discourse, and they are supportive of democracy – some are even in favor of enhancing direct-democratic participation (Bornschier 2010, 33).

Bornschier (2010, 35) identifies three distinctive features of New Populist Right parties: First, their party organization is hierarchically structured, which allows them to quickly adjust their programmatic positions for strategic reasons. Second, they engage in a populist anti-establishment discourse. This rhetorical separation of the political elite from the common folk fosters the emergence of a new collective identity among their heterogeneous electorate. Third, they adopt an extreme position near the TAN-pole of the cultural axis of party competition, whereas their position on the economic axis may vary considerably.

The nationalist ideology of the Populist/Extreme right, which emphasizes national identity, culture, and sovereignty, is clearly at odds with European integration.[33] This is suggested by the negative overall orientations towards European integration as shown in *Figure 5.2*. In fact, every representative of this party family in the countries under study is opposed, without exception. Moreover, the Populist/Extreme Right is also the only party family that is on average opposed to all four integration sub-issues, including market making. This latter finding at first sight contradicts Kitschelt's (2007, 1181–4) "winning formula" thesis, which expects the populist right to endorse neoliberal policies. However, one could convincingly argue that market making is an aspect of European integration where the neoliberal and Eurosceptic orientations of the Populist Right clash. And if forced to decide between them, the Populist Right opts for Euroscepticism rather than economic liberalization. This underscores its fundamental and consistent opposition to European integration.

A joint evaluation by multiple regression

Multiple regression allows for a more systematic assessment of how strongly country-specific and actor-specific features shape European integration orientations. The results are shown in *Table 5.1*.[34] To compare the explanatory power of the two sets of dummies

[33] Occasionally, these parties promote an exclusive pan-European identity based on an alleged supremacy of European civilization or by claiming to defend the Christian heritage of Europe against the threat of Islamization. However, this pro-European rhetoric never transformed into actual European integration support.

[34] For similar analyses of general European integration orientations, but restricted to the parties, see Marks et al. (2002); Statham et al. (2010); Statham and Koopmans (2009).

belonging to the geopolitical and the domestic-conflict models, respectively, the omega-squared (ω^2) is also reported. Omega-squared is an effect size measure. Unlike eta-squared (η^2) it is an unbiased estimator of the explained variance in the population. The different Ns in the four regressions are a consequence of the varying salience of the four sub-issues in the public debate – while almost every political actor took a public stance on deepening, many actors did not engage in the debate on social regulation and hence did not communicate their attitude to this sub-issue.

In terms of explained variance of overall European integration orientations, as presented in the first column of *Table 5.1*, the actor-type dummies perform considerably better than the country dummies (ω^2 of 0.35 compared to 0.05). As for single coefficients, the inverted U-curve among the party families is visible: The Radical Left as well as the Populist/Extreme Right are significantly more opposed to European integration than domestic state actors, the reference category. Moreover, the Christian-democratic and the Conservative party family – although less distinctive – is also significantly less pro-European; the same holds for the labor unions and the public interest groups.

However, as argued before, looking only at general European integration orientations, as is usually done by scholars, obscures more than it reveals. Therefore, *Table 5.1* also reports the regression results for each sub-issue. In the case of deepening and enlargement, the domestic-conflict model performs well (ω^2 of 0.35 and 0.40, respectively). For deepening, the individual coefficients correspond to the inverted U-curve pattern among the party families. However, as we have already seen, in the case of enlargement a left-right pattern is at work: The more a party family is to the right, the less it is in favor of further enlargement, with the Christian-democratic and Conservative as well as the Populist/Extreme Right party families all being significantly more negative

TABLE 5.1. *OLS regression of debate actors' European integration orientations*

	Europ. integration overall			*Politico-cultural integration sub-issues*						*Economic integration sub-issues*					
				Deepening			**Enlargement**			**Social regulation**			**Market making**		
	Coeff.	SE	ω^2	Coeff.	SE	ω2	Coeff.	SE	ω2	Coeff.	SE	ω2	Coeff.	SE	ω2
Actors (domestic state ref.):			0.35**			0.36**			0.40**			0.43**			0.07
EU actors	-0.04	0.26		0.04	0.39		0.28	0.37		0.66	0.35+		-0.34	0.48	
Communists/Left Socialists	-0.90	0.25**		-1.21	0.32**		-	-		0.43	0.45		-0.73	0.44	
Greens	-0.13	0.21		-0.24	0.28		0.43	0.28		0.95	0.47+		-	-	
Social Democrats	-0.14	0.20		-0.01	0.26		0.13	0.25		0.36	0.23		-0.80	0.34*	
Liberals	0.07	0.21		0.14	0.27		-0.25	0.29		0.36	0.31		0.00	0.41	
Christ. Dem/Conservatives	-0.64	0.18**		-0.46	0.25+		-0.71	0.24**		-0.07	0.31		-0.33	0.31	
Populist/Extreme Right	-1.21	0.20**		-1.28	0.26**		-0.86	0.28**		-1.60	0.36**		-1.46	0.54*	
Labor unions	-0.42	0.22+		-0.22	0.28		-	-		0.95	0.47+		-0.83	0.44+	
Business organizations	-0.29	0.20		-0.37	0.26		0.13	0.47		-0.15	0.35		-0.44	0.36	
Public interest groups	-0.44	0.19**		-0.33	0.26		-0.19	0.27		-0.41	0.45		-0.64	0.48	
Experts	-0.27	0.22		-0.62	0.29*		0.28	0.26		-0.05	0.27		-0.20	0.37	
Countries (France ref.):			0.05*			0.02			0.00			0.30**			0.12+
Austria	0.28	0.17		0.51	0.22*		0.00	0.22		-0.50	0.34		0.61	0.42	
United Kingdom	0.12	0.16		-0.02	0.21		0.18	0.30		-1.29	0.34**		0.45	0.40	
Germany	0.32	0.18+		0.23	0.23		0.13	0.24		-0.16	0.45		0.73	0.37+	
Netherlands	0.18	0.14		0.17	0.18		0.00	0.20		-0.18	0.29		0.67	0.35+	
Switzerland	0.49	0.14**		0.29	0.18		-0.01	0.36		0.23	0.23		1.18	0.34**	
European/intl. level	0.29	0.16+		0.35	0.22		-0.02	0.26		-0.53	0.25+		0.86	0.37*	
Constant	0.28	0.17		0.39	0.22+		0.08	0.23		0.57	0.24*		-0.18	0.34	
N	94			81			47			33			53		
R^2	0.54			0.53			0.60			0.81			0.43		

Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

than the reference category. For both politico-cultural sub-issues the explanatory power of the geopolitical model is close to zero. The UK has the lowest coefficient of all countries in the case of deepening, although it is not statistically significant.

Turning to the two economic integration sub-issues in the last two main columns of *Table 5.1*, the two theoretical models perform at a more equal level. In the case of social regulation, the impact of both the actor-type dummies and the country dummies is statistically significant. As for single actor-type coefficients, the attitude of the Populist/Extreme Right is significantly more negative than the reference category. Moreover, British actors have significantly stronger negative attitudes than French actors, the reference category. This finding supports the proposition that political actors from a liberal welfare state are more skeptical of regulations at the European level than actors from Continental welfare states.

Market making is the only integration sub-issue where the geopolitical model performs better than the domestic-conflict model, but only slightly. The explanatory power of both models is quite limited (ω^2 of 0.07 for the domestic-conflict model, 0.12 for the geopolitical model). However, a left-right pattern is discernible, which is the opposite way round than in the case of enlargement: Social Democratic parties and the labor unions are significantly more skeptical than the reference category. Moreover, the Populist/Extreme right parties are also significantly less in favor of market making. Finally, all countries are less opposed to European market making than France, the reference category; for Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland this is statistically significant.

Hence, the descriptive findings as well as the regression results showed that there is no uniform structure across the four European integration sub-issues, as suggested by the inverted U-curve hypothesis. By contrast, and as hypothesized, elite orientations towards each of the four different European integration sub-issues are structured in distinct ways, which demonstrates that politicians duly consider the multi-dimensionality of the

European integration issue when arguing about it. The inverted U-turn pattern among the parties was observable only in the case of deepening. In addition, we detected not only left-right patterns in a shifting direction, but also widespread case-wise Eurosceptic orientations among the various mainstream actors.

How Europe is embedded in the political space – Party positions revisited

In the regression analysis in this final section, I use additional information on the location of the parties in the two-dimensional political space based on their statements in national election campaigns as well as data on their government-opposition status (for the calculation of the axis scores as well as a graphical illustration of this additional data, see *Chapter 2*, particularly *Figure 2.1).* This allows us to more precisely uncover the underlying factors that account for the patterns we have observed. The findings so far have suggested that, while variation based on nationality is quite limited, differences among actor groups account for the largest share of the variance in European integration elite orientations. Yet the different variants of the ideological model and the institutional-strategic model suggest different underlying causes of this actor-specific variation. In principle, government-opposition dynamics, ideological extremism, or the combined impact of both the economic and the cultural axis could each be the source of the inverted U-curve. However, only the latter is in line with the general argument of this study that the two-dimensional political space shapes the politicization of Europe. If this is the case, it remains to be seen whether the expectation that the cultural axis is dominating finds empirical support.

Table 5.2 reports the results of the separate OLS-regressions that were estimated for each of the four European integration sub-issues. The independent variables belonging to the ideological model are a party's scores on the cultural TAN-GAL and the economic left-

right axis of the political space, respectively, and the extremism variable. The two axis scores range from -1.0 to +1.0. The extremism variable is the squared Euclidian distance of a party from the average location in the center of the political space, and values therefore range from 0 (least extreme) to 1 (most extreme). The opposition variable testing for the institutional-strategic model is the duration a party was in opposition from 2002 until 2006 and ranges from 0 (always in government) to 1 (always in opposition). Country dummies control for the effects of the individual countries.

Contrasting the three theoretical models, the results show that the ideological variables clearly outperform the opposition-party variable as well as the country dummies in terms of explained variance. This is indicated by the considerably higher and statistically significant values of ω^2 for the ideological variables across all sub-issues. This confirms the findings above regarding the very limited impact of the geopolitical model, which I will therefore no longer address here. In addition, the even worse performance of the opposition-party variable is quite surprising – it has no statistically significant effect in all four regressions and, moreover, the direction of the effect is unstable.[35] These findings corroborate the main conclusion by Marks et al. (2002) who relied in their analysis of data from an expert survey that the ideological location of a party has the strongest impact.

[35] I tested various alternative operationalizations of the opposition variable, such as time in opposition for a ten-year period instead of the used five-year period, (less precise) dummies for being in opposition/in government in the 2000s, and a trichotomous variable with an additional intermediate value for being in opposition for a limited time during the 2000s only. However, none of these highly correlated alternative operationalizations was significant.

TABLE 5.2. *OLS regression of party positions on European integration*

	Politico-cultural integration sub-issues						*Economic integration sub-issues*					
	Deepening			**Enlargement**			**Social regulation**			**Market making**		
	Coeff.	SE	ω2	Coeff.	SE	ω2	Coeff.	SE	ω2	Coeff.	SE	ω2
Ideology:			0.33**			0.41**			0.37**			0.17+
Cultural TAN-GAL	0.77	0.20**		1.01	0.28**		1.10	0.27**		1.34	0.45*	
Economic left-right	0.38	0.25		-0.18	0.47		0.80	0.35+		1.23	0.52*	
Extremism	-0.92	0.39*		-0.13	0.62		-1.69	0.62*		-0.33	0.70	
Opposition party	-0.28	0.23	0.01	-0.11	0.34	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.00	0.44	0.44	0.00
Countries:			0.00			0.04			0.17+			0.14
Austria	-0.01	0.28		-0.18	0.38		-0.35	0.33		0.75	0.61	
United Kingdom	0.16	0.28		0.78	0.50		-1.30	0.36**		0.65	0.48	
Germany	0.51	0.24*		0.36	0.30		0.09	0.25		1.27	0.42*	
Netherlands	0.08	0.21		0.29	0.26		-0.23	0.25		0.75	0.38+	
Switzerland	0.06	0.28		-	-		-0.02	0.34		1.18	0.52*	
(France ref.)												
Constant	0.28	0.24		-0.39	0.35		1.22	0.28**		-0.32	0.44	
N	35			21			18			20		
R^2	0.68**			0.71*			0.88**			0.72*		

Notes: Both axis scores range from -1.0 to +1.0 (see *Chapter 2* for the calculation of the scores based on general issue positions in election campaigns). Extremism is measured as the squared Euclidian distance from the average location in the political space and ranges from 0 to 1. Opposition party is the time a party was in opposition in 2002–2006 and ranges from 0 (never in opposition) to 1.0 (always in opposition). Significance levels: ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$.

How is it possible that opposition status has no significant impact, despite several studies claiming the opposite? Indeed, if we only look at bivariate correlations between opposition status and European orientations, we find statistically significant correlations in the expected negative direction in two out of the four sub-issues, namely in the case of deepening and market making (deepening: -0.42*, enlargement: -0.16, social regulation: +0.06, market making: -0.37^{+}). However, these effects disappear when controlling for a party's location in the political space as done in the regressions. This suggests that it is more the ideological characteristic of opposition parties that is responsible for their Euroscepticism and not their opposition status per se. Moderate and mainstream opposition parties are not more affected by Euroscepticism than parties in government. Interestingly, also in the case of EU-issue voting, de Vries (2010, 109–10) finds no statistically significant effect of opposition status when controlling for ideological extremity.

If we take a closer look at the variables related to the ideological model, several findings stand out. First, the cultural axis has a statistically significant, strong positive linear effect on European integration orientations, irrespective of the particular integration sub-issue at stake. The more culturally liberal a party, the more it favors not only deepening and enlargement, but also the economic integration sub-issues of social regulation and market making.

Second, the economic axis also has an impact, but it is weaker. Not only does the size of the coefficient change considerably, but also the direction. However, the economic line of conflict has a statistically significant impact on orientations towards the two economic integration sub-issues social regulation and market making. What is surprising in this regard is that the relation between both economic integration sub-issues and the economic left-right axis is positive, meaning that the more to the economic right a party is, the more it is supportive. While this is in line with our expectations in the case of market

making, it contradicts them in the case of social regulation, where we would have expected the parties to be the more favorable the more they are to the economic left. One reason for this finding might be the fact that this sub-issue is at the moment hardly salient and little contested, and therefore most parties take a supportive stance towards it.

Third, ideological extremism, meaning a location distant to the center of the political space irrespective of the direction, has a significant negative impact in the case of deepening and social regulation. Hence, fringe parties in general are more likely to oppose integration as suggested by the notion of the "inverted U-curve" to explain European integration attitudes. Nevertheless, this effect is found only in two of the four sub-issues, and it is by far not the strongest factor shaping European integration orientations.

CONCLUSION

Elite orientations towards European integration, this chapter showed, are systematically related to ideological core concerns. Other frequently discussed factors such as government-opposition status and nationality only have secondary relevance, if anything. While we found that the geopolitical model had at least some significant impact in the case of the economic integration sub-issues, the institutional-strategic model – somewhat surprisingly – had no significant effect at all. This is not to deny that opposition parties are likely to be Eurosceptic – yet they are not against European integration merely because they are in opposition, but for the reason that many of these parties are ideologically extreme, either with regard to the left-right or the TAN-GAL axis of the political space. Euroscepticism is more than a strategic choice; it is a substantively motivated attitude. What has often been described in the literature as an inverted U-curve is in fact the combination of two different linear effects: The cultural and the economic axis critically shape orientations towards European integration. Moreover, the relative impact of these two axes (in

the case of the economic axis even the direction) is conditional on the particular sub-issue at stake, which confirms the inherently multidimensional nature of the European integration issue.

Interestingly, what we observed here for elite attitudes is what Hobolt (2009, 227; also see Hobolt and Brouard 2010, 11) also concludes for voters: "[T]he issue of European integration is no longer disconnected from traditional Left-Right and liberal-authoritarian political cleavages. Yet, nor is the European issue firmly fixed within the existing policy space; and depending on which aspects of the issue are emphasized, the position […] may change accordingly."

Yet what is stable across all four integration sub-issues is a strong positive linear effect of the cultural axis, which means that opposition from the TAN-pole is a constant factor. The parties closest to the TAN-pole are the Populist/Extreme Right, but also several members of the Christian-democratic and Conservative parties are culturally conservative. These findings corroborate the path breaking study by Hooghe et al. (2004) which also found that the cultural axis most powerfully shapes European integration orientations – much to the surprise of the scholars involved. The economic left-right axis has some influence, too, but it is considerably weaker and its direction is shifting.

In addition, while we found evidence of fundamental Euroscepticism at the fringes of the political spectrum, also many mainstream political actors displayed opposition against some aspects of European integration. Social Democrats, the Liberals as well as the Christian Democrats and Conservatives selectively defect to the opposition camp, the former if economic aspects of European integration are touched, the latter if the politico-cultural dimension is at stake, specifically if enlargement is debated. This pattern would have gone unnoticed had we not disentangled the European integration issue and dealt only with principled European opposition or support, as mostly done in previous research. Euroscepticism on a case-by-case basis is not the exception, but the rule. In light of these

findings, the abundantly discussed scholarly question of whether a particular actor exhibits soft or hard Euroscepticism seems less relevant than the question of the exact target of this opposition.

What do these findings add to the more general question of the politicization of Europe? The fact that the European integration issue as a whole cannot be pinned down to a single locus in the political space, but is linked to it in several and complex ways, not only puts high demands on political analysts who strive to uncover these patterns. It also poses a challenge for politicians on the ground, who struggle with how to incorporate European integration into their programmatic profiles. This is a delicate task and, in the end, I would argue, it makes this particular political issue hardly promising and less attractive to most politicians. Because of the multiple linkages of Europe with the political space, the issue offers many opportunities for politicization, not only for fringe parties, but also for mainstream actors. Yet for the same reason, politicians might end up with strange bedfellows, they have to cope with their seemingly contradictory and inconsistent attitudes, and strong framing efforts are required to make their point clear to voters. In sum, as I will argue below, although this does not prevent the politicization of Europe, it is likely to considerably limit this phenomenon in most Western European countries.

CHAPTER 6

European integration issue-emphasis strategies

The previous chapter on elite positions suggested that European integration has become integrated into existing conflict structures – not straightforwardly, however, but in a complex way: Orientations towards deepening, enlargement, market making and social regulation are well-structured by the cultural TAN-GAL axis of the political space and, to a lesser extent, by the economic left-right axis. This double linkage with the political space creates difficulties for many political actors. Radical Left parties, for example, face the difficult question of whether they should oppose Europe for economic motives or support it for cultural reasons. Similarly, culturally conservative mainstream parties from the Christian-democratic and Conservative party family hold a Eurosceptic potential for cultural reasons, but this conflicts with their economically motivated pro-common market view or with their being in government. Moreover, it is a delicate task for established political actors to adapt or reverse traditional, long-held European integration positions.

In these circumstances, when European integration orientations do not fit neatly into a political actor's ideological profile, if they threaten internal cohesion or may scare away potential voters, a useful strategy is to try to shift public attention away from this

political issue. By contrast, if politicians think they will benefit from increased politicization – because they hold a European position that is attractive to their voters and is at the same time consistent with their general programmatic profile – they will try to move Europe further up on the political agenda. Hence, politicians deliberately either emphasize or downplay European integration relative to other political issues in order to win public support and achieve electoral gains.

The vast literature on *issue emphasis* and *issue ownership* claims that this is exactly what political competition is all about: The parties that manage to put their preferred issues on top of the political agenda will win the election. Therefore, parties deliberately choose to emphasize issues that are favorable to them, and de-emphasize unfavorable ones (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge et al. 2001; Petrocik 1996; Riker 1986). Partly developed as a critique of spatial theories of party competition, which claim that parties compete simply by changing their positions towards issues, this literature objects that issue positions are not flexible, but sticky. Politicians cannot easily change them as they have an ideological reputation to lose and do not want to upset principled rank-and-file members. In contrast, issue emphasis is a much more flexible tool in this regard (see, e.g., Bale et al. 2010, 413–4). Hence, instead of changing their position on an issue because it is electorally disadvantageous, parties might instead shift emphasis to an issue where they are closer to the median voter or for which they are perceived to be more competent. As an illustration, Petrocik (1996) finds that US presidential candidates generally mentioned those issues in their campaigns more frequently which they "owned". Voters saw Democrats as better able to handle welfare issues, while the Republicans were perceived as more successful in solving problems related to budget and crime, and the parties directed their communicative efforts accordingly.

The present chapter looks at issue emphasis in the context of European integration. First, it investigates how and why parties emphasize European integration in national

election campaigns. This focus can be justified in light of the findings of *Chapter 4* which showed the parties are the most important actors in the public debate on European integration. The analysis relies on an additional dataset, generated with the same method as the public debate dataset, but stretching over a considerably longer period and not being limited to the issue of European integration. Rather, the dataset includes statements regarding all political issues, as required for the analysis in this chapter. With this information at hand, we can test several competing theoretical explanations of European integration issue emphasis. The empirical results confirm the still not generally recognized insight that the role Europe plays on the general political agenda of a party system matters a great deal in explaining the issue emphasis of individual parties. In addition, and in line with the general argument of this study, I show that a party's location in the political space is a further main determinant of issue emphasis – in interaction with the position held towards Europe. Both ideology and position have largely been neglected in previous research on European integration issue emphasis, and in research on issue emphasis in general.

Next, European integration issue-emphasis is put into a broader perspective by tracking the development over time and comparing it to the related issue of immigration, a political issue that is also part of the new structural conflict induced by the globalization process. We will see that the Populist/Radical Right, who are the driving force of this new cleavage, pursue a much more aggressive issue emphasis strategy in the case of immigration. This suggests that European integration is a less attractive issue for them to promote the new cleavage.

Finally, the chapter considers issue emphasis *within* European integration, at the level of sub-issues in the public debate. Again, the aim is to disentangle the black box of European integration and see which particular aspects political actors actually promote when talking about Europe. Notably, the Christian-democratic and Conservative parties

strongly emphasize in public their opposition against the accession of Turkey, although at the same time they stick to their traditional pro-European stance in other fields, particularly deepening.

WHY POLITICIANS EMPHASIZE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Why do some politicians choose to emphasize Europe, while others try to downplay it? The findings in the existing literature on European integration issue emphasis are inconclusive. The most ambitious study to date by Steenbergen and Scott (2004) tests for office-seeking, cohesion-seeking and vote-seeking motives, and finds strong empirical support for the latter. Specifically, the closer a party's European integration stance is to the population mean, the more a party emphasizes Europe. Moreover, cohesion seeking also seems to have an effect, although it is less consistent across different years. Modest levels of internal division reduce the salience of Europe, while high levels of dissent within a party increase it. Office-seeking, finally, seems not to be a relevant predictor of European issue salience. However, when cross-validating these results based on the Chapel Hill expert surveys with data from party manifestos and public opinion data, Netjes and Binnema (2007) conclude that none of these individual factors and, moreover, neither opposition status[36] nor party size have a consistently significant impact on European integration issue emphasis.

[36] Moreover, the study by Kriesi (2007) based on the same media data as used in the present study finds that opposition status has not a positive, as would be expected theoretically, but a statistically significant *negative* effect on European integration issue emphasis. But see below for a critical discussion of the results of this study.

Fortunately, there is at least one factor that Steenbergen and Scott (2004) consider in their study whose impact is corroborated by the findings by Netjes and Binnema (2007). They find a strong and statistically significant effect of the systemic salience of European integration on issue emphasis across the different data sources. The systemic salience of European integration is, in other words, the salience of Europe within the party system as a whole. As Steenbergen and Scott (2004, 187–8) note, "[p]arties cannot decide on issue salience willy-nilly. Lest they find themselves marginalized from the mainstream national political debate, they will have to consider the importance that other parties attach to the issue of European integration." This insight is shared by scholars from the agenda-setting field who criticize traditional issue-emphasis approaches for not being able to explain the considerable issue overlap between individual parties, as regularly found in empirical studies. After all, if parties only emphasized their own issues, we would expect them to talk past each other most of the time. From an agenda-setting perspective, however, "party interaction is thus completely expected because individual parties have a strategic interest in shaping the common party-system agenda, even when that involves paying attention to disadvantageous issues. Surely, it may be tempting for a party to ignore an unfavorable issue […]. Ignoring an issue on the party-system agenda may nevertheless be both difficult and risky. Difficult because political parties are expected to have an opinion on all issues and therefore may come under pressure from various actors – in particular the mass media – to address issues that are prominent on the party-system agenda. And risky because […] ignoring such an issue means relinquishing influence over how it is framed" (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 261). Similarly, Sides (2006) argues that politicians are "riding the wave" of prominent issues because they want to appear responsive to public concerns, even when this means emphasizing issues that are unfavorable to them (for a fairly skeptical view on that, see Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994).

In light of this argument, any analysis of issue emphasis remains seriously incomplete and risks being flawed if it fails to consider the systemic salience of the issue under investigation. Specifically, *the importance of European integration on the general political agenda is expected to have a strong positive effect on the issue-emphasis of individual parties.* We leave the question of what actually accounts for the varying impact of European integration on the general political agenda to *Chapter 8*. For now, we are content with simply including systemic salience as an independent variable in our analysis of politicians' issue-emphasis strategies and we shall not delve into the underlying causes of the systemic salience.

In addition to systemic salience, the subsequent analysis considers three factors in detail: positions, ideology, and opposition status. Research on issue emphasis generally tends to largely ignore positions, and the major empirical research project in this area, the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann 2006), consequently only codes issue salience, but no issue positions. However, these two components of political competition were jointly analyzed in recent studies and it was shown that both are relevant and inter-related (e.g., Green and Hobolt 2008; Meguid 2005; Wagner 2012). As explicated in *Chapter 2*, politicization is not reducible to issue salience only, and the position parties adopt vis-à-vis European integration should also influence whether they emphasize this particular issue. Eurosceptic parties, it has been argued, have the opportunity to broaden their electoral appeal due to the considerable gap between the on average largely supportive political elite and the skeptical public opinion concerning European integration in general (de Vries 2010, 97; Hooghe 2003). The results in *Chapter 5* corroborated the claim that political elites are on average supportive of European integra-

tion in general (although there is considerable variation in support at the more disaggregated level of sub-issues[37]). Moreover, in election campaigns in the 2000s the parties' average position towards European integration is a high 0.23 (N=57). Hence, Eurosceptic parties may be able to attract voters by emphasizing their negative stance on this issue, which is close to the median voter, while pro-European (often mainstream) parties are expected to remain as quiet as possible in this field in order not to scare voters away with their unpopular stance. Therefore, *Eurosceptic parties, with all other things being equal, are expected to emphasize European integration more strongly than their pro-European counterparts*.

A further factor in explaining European integration issue emphasis that has so far largely been neglected in the literature is ideology. In line with the general argument of this book, I expect that Eurosceptic parties should greatly profit from emphasizing their anti-European stance *only* if they can convincingly link it to their ideological profile, i.e. if it dovetails nicely with their main political concerns. Otherwise, it might both damage their reputation as a credible and ideologically consistent party, and could spur internal division. In *Chapter 5*, I showed that opposition to European integration is linked to both the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis, and – albeit less strongly – to the economic left pole. Moreover, only the cultural axis had a consistent negative impact across all European sub-issues, while the impact of the economic axis was considerably weaker and its direction shifting. Hence, *the closer a Eurosceptic party is to the TAN-pole of the*

[37] See Hooghe (2003) for the related argument that this elite-citizens gap narrows considerably if one focuses not on European integration in general, but on particular sub-issues. The findings in *Chapter 5* that negative orientations towards particular sub-issues are quite common even among mainstream parties support this argument.

cultural axis, the more it will emphasize European integration, as a Eurosceptic position fits in nicely with their general ideological profile. Further, due to the weaker and unstable impact of the economic dimension, we might expect a similar, but less pronounced pattern the more a party is to the left pole of the economic axis. As already indicated in the above formulation, the effect of ideology is expected *to be conditional on the position a party adopts – it should be triggered for Eurosceptic parties only*, not pro-European ones. For example, a culturally conservative party that is pro-European should show little interest in publicly promoting this stance as it is very likely to conflict with the more skeptical views of its constituency.

Finally, we will also test whether issue emphasis may be influenced by a party's position in government or in opposition. Why should we include this variable, despite its weak performance in *Chapter 5* on European integration orientations? In fact, there are good arguments that in the short-term and for strategic reasons parties would prefer to manipulate the salience of an issue instead of changing their position. Adapting or even reversing a position is much more risky as it may damage credibility, scare off "true believers", foster internal dissent, and in any case it takes quite some time to implement (Bale et al. 2010, 413–4). Hence, although strategic and tactical reasons (electoral strategies, coalition formation) (see Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008, 256–60) proved to be of little relevance in explaining European integration orientations, they may be crucial in explaining issue emphasis. A Eurosceptic party in government, we expect, would rather tone down its anti-European rhetoric than reverse its position. *By contrast, if in opposition, the same party would emphasize that it is opposed to the government's pro-European policy.* Again, this effect is – as formulated – likely to be conditional on a party's position vis-à-vis European integration.

ISSUE EMPHASIS IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS IN THE 2000S

Before turning to the empirical analysis, a few words on the data and the operationalization of issue emphasis are necessary. The data are the same as used for the calculation of the parties' score on the economic and cultural axes in the political space (see *Figure 2.1* and the regression analyses in *Table 5.2*). They have been generated by the same nuclear coding method used for the public debate data. However, they not only include statements related to European integration, but statements on all kinds of political issues. This is necessary to calculate the issue emphasis, as will be shown shortly. To make the coding feasible, it is restricted to public statements made by parties during election campaigns, i.e., the two months prior to election day (see Kriesi et al. 2012 for further details). Election campaigns are chosen because they constitute a focal point of political contestation between parties, during which all relevant issues are pitted against each other. Issue emphasis is operationalized as the public statements by a political actor on a particular issue as a percentage share of all issue statements by this actor.

This approach has several benefits. First, the measure is relative, which means that if we add up the issue-emphasis values of all issues by a particular actor, we always end up with 100 percent. This adequately reflects the fact that the amount of attention that is available is largely fixed – if issue emphasis increases for one issue, it necessarily has to go down for another issue. In the Chapel Hill Expert surveys (e.g., 2004, 187–8), by contrast, experts are simply asked to evaluate the importance of each issue in a parties' public stance on a five-point scale. It is at least doubtful whether experts are able to systematically assess the importance of an individual issue for a party relative to all other issues that are present in political competition, and this task is even more difficult for small parties and hardly salient issues. The Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann 2006) measures issue emphasis in the same way as the present study,

but uses party manifestos instead of relying on public statements for the mass media data. This rigorous measurement is clearly an advantage over expert surveys. However, party manifestos reflect what parties intend to do, not necessarily their actual behavior (Netjes and Binnema 2007; also see Epstein and Segal 2000). Current events and the actions of their competitors may force them to revise their planned strategy in the short term and react to these changing circumstances. Clearly, issue emphasis as measured in the mass media is a more direct measure of how parties actually behave in real-world political competition (also see *Chapter 3* for further methodological discussions).

Table 6.1 provides a descriptive overview of issue-emphasis in national election campaigns during the 2000s. The results show that the various parties generally pay some attention to European integration, although at a moderate level: On average, every twentieth statement made by a party politician in an election campaign is about Europe (an

TABLE 6.1. *European integration issue emphasis in election campaigns in the 2000s*

Party family	Mean	Standard deviation
Radical Left	4.4	4.8
Greens	4.2	5.3
Social Democrats	3.8	3.5
Liberals	3.8	3.6
Christian Democrats /Conservatives	6.3	6.5
Populist/Extreme Right	6.4	3.8
All parties	4.9	4.7

Notes: Averages of individual parties' issue emphases (percentage shares) in election campaigns from 2000 to 2006. In each country under study, at least two election campaigns took place in the period covered: Austria 2002 and 2006, UK 2001 and 2005, Germany 2002 and 2005, Netherlands 2002, 2003 and 2006, Switzerland 2003 and 2007.

overall mean of 4.9 percent). This may seem marginal, but considering that there are virtually hundreds of potential issues out there, and only a small number is taken up by parties, particularly during elections, this is still a respectable figure.

The two party families that on average most strongly emphasize European integration are the Christian Democrats/Conservatives and the Populist/Extreme Right – more than 6.3 percent of all their statements deal with European integration, compared to the other party families with average values of 4.4 percent and lower. However, as the standard deviations indicate, variation within party families is large and as a result they do not differ from each other in a statistically significant way. Still, the descriptive pattern tentatively suggests that the two party families close to the cultural TAN-pole tend to accentuate Europe in political competition, which is well in line with our expectations.

The regressions in *Table 6.2* test whether the factors discussed above actually exert the hypothesized effects.[38] The analysis starts with a first model that only includes the systemic salience of European integration. It tries to explain a party's issue emphasis on European integration by the importance European integration has on the general political agenda at a particular time and in a particular place.[39] This simple model performs very well and corroborates the findings by Scott and Steenbergen (2004) and Netjes and Binnema (2007). The strong and statistically significant effect of

[38] As potential country effects are part of the systemic salience and adjusted standard errors correct for clustering, it makes little sense to include country dummies. Nevertheless, I tentatively estimated models with country dummies but, as expected, none of them was significant. Moreover, the introduction of country dummies did not change any other coefficients substantively.

[39] Note that I calculated the systemic salience for each party at a particular election by excluding the party's own statements in order to avoid endogeneity (see Steenbergen and Scott 2004 for the same approach). This ensures that any visible effect is not a methodological artifact.

TABLE 6.2. *How to explain European integration issue emphasis in election campaigns in the 2000s (OLS regression)*

	Model 1 Baseline		*Model 2 Europ. integration position*		*Model 3 Ideology and opposition*		*Model 4 Joint model with interactions*	
	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
Systemic salience	0.748	0.077**	0.797	0.088**	0.791	0.0757**	0.783	0.109**
Eurosceptic position			0.029	0.011*			0.016	0.015
Cultural tan-gal					-0.047	0.011**	-0.010	0.014
Economic left-right					-0.022	0.009*	-0.011	0.011
Extremism					0.004	0.016	-0.021	0.021
Cultural-gal*Eurosceptic							-0.053	0.017**
Econ.-right*Eurosceptic							-0.010	0.018
Opposition party					-0.022	0.013	-0.020	0.015
Opposition*Eurosceptic							0.014	0.022
Constant	0.012	0.005*	0.000	0.005	0.020	0.007**	0.016	0.007*
N	57		57		57		57	
R^2	0.34**		0.43**		0.46**		0.53*	

Notes: Systemic salience is the salience of European integration in the whole party system and for the particular election (without the impact of the party for which the value is calculated, in order to avoid endogeneity problems). Eurosceptic position is a dummy (1 if a negative position towards Europe). Both axis scores range from -1.0 to +1.0 (see *Chapter 2* for details of the calculation). Extremism is measured as the squared Euclidian distance from the average location in the political space and ranges from 0 to 1. Opposition party is the time a party was in opposition during the ten years before the election and ranges from 0 (never in opposition) to 1.0 (always in opposition). Cluster-adjusted standard errors used (for both party and election, calculated with cluster2.ado in STATA). Significance levels: ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$.

this variable, which also persists throughout the further models, impressively demonstrates that parties are strongly constrained in their issue-emphasis strategies by the party system agenda. Individual parties are highly adaptive to important political events and their competitors' actions (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010).

A telling example in this regard is the British election in 2001 in which the Conservatives heavily emphasized European integration in their campaign. As *Chapter 7* on framing will outline in more detail, they framed the whole election as the "last chance to save the pound", and even reactivated former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher for this purpose. Indeed, roughly every fourth statement by the Conservatives during the 2001 election campaign in our data is about Europe. This strategy forced the main competitor, Labour, which tried to capitalize on the prospering economy, to adapt its original plans and also take up the potentially risky issue, as reflected by the still impressive share of 12.7 percent of its statements that deal with Europe. Although not part of its own campaign platform, Labour could not ignore the European integration issue as it had been put so forcefully on top of the political agenda by the Conservatives.

The following Models 2, 3 and 4 in *Table 6.2* all control for the impact of systemic salience, but include the hypothesized individual determinants of parties' issue-emphasis in different combinations. Model 2 adds Euroscepticism as an independent variable. As expected, Eurosceptic parties do emphasize European integration more strongly. Model 3 considers ideology and opposition status similarly as in *Chapter 5* where we looked at European integration orientations. Model 4 has interactions of Euroscepticism with the other independent variables of interest to capture the expected conditional effects.

What about the effect of the opposition variable? A Eurosceptic party in opposition, as argued above, will put pressure on the government by emphasizing Europe, while it will tone down its anti-European rhetoric if in government. After all, adjusting issue

emphasis should be easier than changing positions (which might contradict a party's ideology and damage its reputation). However, the findings suggest that this does not happen. Opposition status has no statistically significant effect on issue emphasis – not in Model 3, nor when interacted with Euroscepticism as in Model 4. To corroborate this finding, I tested alternative operationalizations of the opposition variable, such as a trichotomous version (instead of an interval one) and being in opposition on the day of the election – none of them performed any better.[40] Hence, opposition status not only has no effect on European integration orientations, as shown in *Chapter 5*, but also does not affect European integration issue emphasis. For both aspects of politicization the evidence speaks against the strategic model; parties do not to politicize European integration systematically merely because they are in opposition.

Still, if we look at individual cases there is some evidence of sporadic strategic and tactical considerations when emphasizing Europe, as is suggested by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008, 256–60). Again, the Eurosceptic British Conservatives are a case in point. Learning the hard way from the devastating defeat at the 2001 election, where they played the European integration card in vain, they largely dismissed this issue thereafter. The Conservatives' issue emphasis of European integration plummeted from a record high 26 percent in 2001 to a low 1 percent at the 2005 election, while they kept their skeptical orientations towards European integration. This suggests that instrumental changes in European integration issue emphasis take place, but they are more ad-hoc and defy any systematic explanation.

[40] Moreover, I also estimated a model with the opposition variable and systemic saliency only, but the opposition variable was also not statistically significant in this model.

By contrast, ideology has a systematic effect on European integration issue-emphasis. In Model 3, the negative coefficient for the cultural axis of the political space is large and statistically significant. The effect of the economic axis is also significant, although considerably weaker. In other words, the more culturally conservative a party is, and – to a smaller extent – the more it is to the economic left, the more it emphasizes European integration. However, regardless of the direction and the axis, extremism has no significant effect.

Specifically, the theoretical argument was that the effect of ideology is conditional on Euroscepticism. Model 4 with the interaction terms allows this to be tested. Compared to Model 3, the main effects of both axes decrease considerably, now lacking statistical significance. Yet the interaction between Euroscepticism and the cultural axis exerts a strong and statistically significant effect. *Figure 6.1* shows this graphically: In the case of Eurosceptic parties, the effect of the cultural axis on European integration issue emphasis is large, as reflected in the steep slope of the corresponding line. Eurosceptic parties, as hypothesized, emphasize European integration all the stronger the more they are culturally conservative, i.e. the closer they are to the TAN-pole of the cultural axis. By contrast, in the case of pro-European parties, the effect of the cultural axis is negligible (and not statistically significant), as the almost flat line shows. As expected, culturally conservative parties that are pro-European have no interest in emphasizing their European attitudes, which do not fit in with their general ideological profile and therefore might scare off potential voters. Yet what is more surprising is that also pro-European parties close to the culturally liberal GAL-pole, which might have good reasons to emphasize Europe as their stance fits their ideological profile, do not emphasize European integration more.



Note: The interaction was calculated for the joint model with all independent variables (Model 4).

FIGURE 6.1. Interaction of the cultural axis and Euroscepticism on issue emphasis

This finding holds even when we exclude fringe parties, the Radical Left and the Populist/Radical Right, from our sample. The interaction of the cultural axis and Euroscepticism remains negative and statistically significant in a regression that did not include members of these two party families. Hence, the pattern also applies to mainstream parties and is not restricted to parties at the fringes of the political system. Moreover, this effect is observable not simply because our country sample includes the two Eurosceptic countries of the UK and Switzerland, which some scholars consider as outlier cases (Green-Pedersen 2011; Statham et al. 2010) – the interaction remains significant in a regression that excludes these two countries (see *Table A.2* in the appendix for these regression results).

Moreover, the effect of the economic axis, unlike the cultural axis, is considerably weaker (as in Model 3) or even non-significant (as in Model 4). This pattern is similar to

the one observed in *Chapter 5* when explaining European integration orientations: The economic axis has some effect, but it is clearly secondary to the cultural axis.

The only other study that has considered the impact of ideology on European integration issue emphasis, to my knowledge, is by Kriesi (2007). His results on whether ideology has an impact on issue emphasis are less unambiguous since he finds that only the Conservatives and the Populist Right in the UK and Switzerland emphasize Europe significantly more than other parties. However, two reasons suggest our findings here are more valid. First, Kriesi operationalizes ideology in a less sophisticated way by distinguishing different party families, while I rely on the more precise axis scores of each individual party. Second, he did not model the effect of ideology as being conditional on a party's European integration position. Finally, and most importantly, he did not control for the powerful and potentially confounding effect of systemic salience, as has been done here.

In sum, the results suggest that ideology and position jointly determine whether parties emphasize European integration during election campaigns. Only those parties that have both the proper position, namely being Eurosceptic, and the proper ideological package, namely being culturally conservative, strongly emphasize European integration. Moreover, parties' issue-emphasis strategies seemed to be severely constrained by the salience of Europe in the party system as a whole, as the large effect of systemic salience suggests.

Putting the European integration issue emphasis in context

The analysis in the above section revealed the major factors that determine parties' European integration issue emphasis. These attempts to politicize Europe take place in a highly competitive environment in which rival parties are trying to put their own preferred issue

on top of the agenda, and where other issues also compete for the scarce attention of political actors. While a systematic comparison of European integration issue emphasis with other issues is beyond the scope of this study, contrasting it with immigration and tracking the development of these two issues over time may yield valuable insights. Kriesi, Grande and colleagues (2012; 2008) argue that conflict over European integration is part of a newly emerging cleavage between the winners and losers of globalization. Apart from European integration, immigration is a further key issue that drives the emergence of this new cleavage and it has become increasingly politicized during the last few years. Hence, one should expect that issue-emphasis strategies in the case of these two issues follow a similar pattern – in particular, culturally conservative parties, which firmly oppose politico-cultural globalization, should mobilize on both of them.

The development over time indicates that since the beginning of the 1990s, parties have considered European integration as a relevant issue. The average European integration issue emphasis in election campaigns back in the 1970s was 2.0 percent, while in the 1990s it was 7.4 percent and in the 2000s 4.9 percent. However, there is considerable variation between party families, as shown in *Figure 6.2*. For all three party families to the right, the issue emphasis of European integration reached a peak in the second half of the 1990s, most accentuated by the Populist/Extreme Right with 11.5 percent of all their statements dealing with European integration. Until the 1990s, a similar pattern can be observed for the issue of immigration. Immigration was not very salient in the 1970s and has substantially increased since then, particularly among the Populist/Extreme Right. This indeed suggests that both issues are driven by the same underlying logic, as argued by Kriesi, Grande and colleagues. However, in the 2000s, the development of the two issues bifurcates. The issue emphasis of immigration by the Populist/Extreme Right shows a continuing upward trend, whereas the issue emphasis of European integration declined. Moreover, the two moderate party families to the right, the Liberals and the



Notes: Averages across all countries under study for each party family. The time periods in the figure are chosen in order to include at least one election for each country. No data are available for the 1980s. rl_com = Radical Left, green = Green parties, socdem = Social Democrats, lib = Liberals, cd_con = Christian Democrats and Conservatives, rpr = Populist/Extreme Right.

FIGURE 6.2. Issue emphasis of Europe and immigration in election campaigns over time

Christian Democrats and Conservatives, also relied comparatively more strongly on immigration than on European integration in the 2000s. Hence, in the most recent decade, the emphasis on European integration given by the political right is clearly in the shadow of the obviously more attractive immigration issue.

The parties to the left, on the other hand, generally mobilize less on European integration. They exhibit more modest and more constant levels of issue emphasis. A partial exception is the Greens which emphasized European integration comparatively

strongly at the beginning of the 1990s (6.2 percent), and again in the most recent period from 2005–07 (6.3 percent). Yet in between these two periods they completely reversed their attitudes to Europe. Having been the most Eurosceptic party family back then, they became the most pro-European party family by the 2000s (see *Figure 5.3*). The low profile regarding Europe in the transitional phase in between is likely to be a consequence of this fundamental reorientation.

In sum, the findings suggest that the upward trend until the end of the 1990s in European integration issue emphasis which could be observed for all party families with culturally conservative affinities, particularly the Radical/Extreme Right, was halted or even reversed by the 2000s. By contrast, the trend for immigration, the other issue closely related to the denationalization cleavage, is still going upward. While there are good theoretical reasons to argue that European integration is part of the new cleavage, there seem to be other, issue-specific factors that inhibit a similar development as in the case of immigration. *Chapter 8* will elaborate more on the reasons that limit the politicization of Europe.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SUB-ISSUE EMPHASIS

We now shift the perspective from an emphasis *on* European integration (relative to other political issues) to the sub-issue emphasis *within* European integration. If politicians talk about Europe, which particular aspects do they emphasize? Is it mainly market making and social regulation, or do they choose deepening and enlargement as the central themes of concern? To answer this question, we switch from the above focus on parties during election campaigns, a specific but crucial subset of the public debate, back to a broader analysis including public statements about Europe made by all political actors during the period 2004 to 2006.

Similarly as above for issue emphasis in election campaigns, we would expect that a political actor's share of attention to a particular European integration sub-issue is determined by a systemic and an actor-specific component. The *systemic component* means that political actors cannot ignore the general content and dynamics of the public debate over Europe and therefore all actors are expected to emphasize the two sub-issues that dominated the public debate, namely deepening and enlargement (as shown in *Chapter 4*). For example, before the upcoming referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005, all political actors had to address this political-institutional issue in some way if they wanted to be heard.

However, at the same time political actors have some margin to deliberately emphasize those aspects about which they care most, and which in their view are what conflict over Europe is essentially about. This *actor-specific component* is expected to be related to their specific role and their general ideological concerns. The parties close to the culturally conservative TAN-pole of the political space, the Populist/Radical Right and representatives of the Christian-democratic and Conservative party family, are expected to put a heavy emphasis on politico-cultural aspects of European integration, namely deepening and enlargement. By contrast, economic interest organizations should put a particular emphasis on economic aspects. Similarly, the Radical Left, whose Euroscepticism is primarily driven by economic motives, should try to focus public attention on the generally less visible economic sub-issues. Coming back to our example from above, a case in point is the strategy pursued by the French Radical Left during the referendum campaign. It linked the debate on the Constitutional Treaty with the simultaneously ongoing discussion about the services directive, which aimed at further liberalizing

the internal market. Thereby, it strategically emphasized an economic sub-issue during a period that was otherwise heavily dominated by a political-institutional issue.[41]

Table 6.3 presents the sub-issue emphasis for each of the different actor types and the six party families. Deepening, the sub-issue that dominates the European integration debate overall, is also the most important sub-issue for each of the different actor types, with percentage shares of between 38.7 percent and 79.6 percent. The only exception in this regard is the European Union (mainly the Commission), which emphasizes enlargement the most, the second most important sub-issue in the debate (40.8 percent of all its statements). The focus on deepening is most pronounced among the parties. Overall, the systemic component is clearly visible. Hence, what we have already observed for parties in election campaigns *across* political issues is also confirmed here *within* a single debate at the level of sub-issues – political actors largely emphasize the same issues when they engage in public debate.

Apart from this basic pattern, however, there is also some actor-specific variation. Two points stand out. First, unlike all other actors, the EU, business interest organizations and the labor unions put a strong emphasis on economic issues in general and market making in particular, with one-third or even more of their statements dealing with this sub-issue. While this was expected, it is quite surprising that no party family on the left, which is skeptical of economic integration (see *Chapter 5*), puts a particular emphasis on economic sub-issues. A more detailed analysis (not shown in the table)

[41] Moreover, a further strategy by the French Radical Left was the reframing of the referendum debate in economic terms. The Radical Left opposed the Constitution with its mostly political-institutional content because, in its view, the occasional references to a "social Europe" were too weak and the treaty would instead only codify the existing "neoliberal Europe". *Chapter 8* looks at framing strategies in detail.

TABLE 6.3. *Sub-issue emphasis in the public debate over Europe*

Actor type	Market making	Social regulation	Enlargement	Deepening	Total (%)	*N*
Public authorities						
European Union	**32.7**	7.6	**40.8**	18.8	100.0	*2,059*
Domestic state	22.3	8.2	24.2	45.3	100.0	*2,766*
Parties						
Radical Left	12.9	5.0	2.5	**79.6**	100.0	*182*
Greens	5.8	4.3	27.7	**62.2**	100.0	*270*
Social Democrats	9.3	8.1	18.1	**64.5**	100.0	*1,521*
Liberals	12.3	5.4	21.5	**60.8**	100.0	*496*
Christian Dem./Conserv.	9.9	2.7	**39.6**	47.8	100.0	*1,390*
Populist Right	17.3	8.7	14.9	**59.1**	100.0	*649*
Civil society						
Labor unions	**39.2**	7.5	1.1	52.3	100.0	226
Business interests	**33.8**	8.4	14.8	43.0	100.0	297
Public interest groups	12.4	5.6	23.9	**58.1**	100.0	252
Individuals/experts	28.3	8.9	24.1	38.7	100.0	365
All actors	18.8	6.8	29.1	45.3	100.0	12,986

Notes: Sub-issue shares that are more than 10 percentage points above the overall share (last row) are highlighted in bold. Country-weights applied. Values for foreign state actors not reported.

reveals that this holds for all individual parties except the Swiss Radical Left and the Swiss Social Democrats, which strongly emphasize economic sub-issues. They engaged heavily in the debate about the extension of the free movement of persons to the new Central and Eastern European member countries, and the question of how to protect Swiss employers from increased pressure on wages and social dumping. In general, however, parties of the left are, unable or unwilling to forcefully voice their existing concerns about economic integration – despite such efforts of the French Radical Left during the referendum campaign, as mentioned above. They do not actively challenge the dominant view that European integration, at least for the time being, is basically about enlargement and

deepening – both being aspects about which they are quite in favor. This impedes any serious attempts by the political left to politicize Europe.

Second, as all party families strongly emphasize politico-cultural sub-issues, we cannot observe any additional effort to stress these sub-issues even more by parties close to the culturally conservative TAN-pole. However, it is noteworthy that Christian-democratic and Conservative parties stress enlargement in particular. 39.4 percent of all their statements deal with this sub-issue, which is roughly twice as much as the other two large mainstream party families, the Liberals and the Social Democrats. This is most accentuated for the German CDU and CSU, with 73.6 percent and 59.0 percent, respectively, of all their statements about Europe referring to enlargement. *Chapter 5* showed that the Christian-Democratic and Conservative party family is firmly opposed to enlargement, specifically against the accession of Turkey, while still largely in favor of other aspects of European integration such as deepening and economic integration. Hence, by strongly emphasizing their critical stance towards enlargement, they attempt to mobilize on the widespread cultural opposition against Europe, without having to abandon their traditional pro-European orientation in other fields.

For the other culturally conservative party family that mobilizes Euroscepticism, the Populist/Extreme Right, there is no need to shift attention away from the dominating sub-issue of deepening, as it is firmly opposed to both deepening and enlargement. Moreover, these parties remain largely silent on the two economic integration sub-issues, which underscores that their opposition is primarily motivated by cultural motives.

CONCLUSION

Politicians try to manipulate the salience of political issues. They deliberately emphasize those issues they think they benefit from, while keeping silent on unfavorable ones. The present chapter found that this also holds for European integration. In particular, the specific combination of position and ideology boosts a party's issue emphasis. Political parties promote European integration if they are Eurosceptic and the closer they are to the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis of the political space. This mainly includes the Populist/Radical Right, but also several members of the Christian-democratic and Conservative party family. Opposition status, on the other hand, had no effect, as we would expect if parties politicized European integration for purely strategic reasons and even without a proper ideological underpinning.

Politicians differ not only in how strongly they emphasize Europe, but also in the relative weight they give to the different sub-issues within the European integration issues. Most notably, the Christian Democrats and Conservatives heavily emphasized their opposition to the accession of Turkey, resulting in an overall ambivalent or even Eurosceptic image of these parties, even though their attitudes to other aspects of European integration, particularly deepening, are still largely pro-European. Hence, their profile in the European integration debate is at the same time pro-European and culturally conservative, a relatively new combination that might help them contain their much more fundamental Eurosceptic challengers to the right, the Populist/Extreme Right parties, without having to abandon the European project. Conversely, this strategy could backfire if the Euroscepticism from the mainstream right, although only targeted against specific aspects, nurtures the existing diffuse opposition among the electorate against all things European.

Moreover, while European integration issue emphasis increased in the 1990s, this trend stopped in the 2000s. Unlike immigration, which is stressed by the same political actors and also related to the ongoing denationalization process, the issue emphasis of European integration is stagnating, and it seems to be less attractive for them – a finding to which we will return in *Chapter 8*.

A further major finding of this chapter is that efforts of political actors to (de-)emphasize European integration are severely constrained by the general political agenda. An individual political actor cannot remain silent on Europe if all other parties are talking about it and, likewise, he/she cannot talk extensively about it if all other parties remain silent. This important constraint of the systemic salience of an issue on actor-specific issue emphasis is well in line with the literature on agenda setting, but has not yet received sufficient consideration in the literature on issue emphasis and issue salience (but see Steenbergen and Scott 2004). A reason for this might be the frequent use of party manifestos in this area. Party manifestos are much less affected by the general political agenda than media data and they therefore tend to overestimate the room for maneuver parties have when emphasizing issues. Hence, when interested in the actual behavior of parties and not their prior intentions, mass media data are a source to which scholars should turn more often.

If it is common behavior for politicians to talk about issues they do not "own" simply because they cannot ignore the general political agenda (a phenomenon Sides 2006 calls "trespassing"), then rhetorical strategies that help them shape the perception of an issue in their preferred way become highly relevant for political competition. *Chapter 7* that follows investigates in detail the various ways in which politicians frame the issue of European integration.

CHAPTER 7

The framing of European Integration[42]

In 2001 at an election rally in Plymouth, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher addressed the issue of whether the UK should adopt the euro as follows: "The greatest issue in this election, indeed the greatest issue before our country, is whether Britain is to remain a free, independent nation state or whether we are to be dissolved in a federal Europe. There are no half-measures, no third ways and no second chances. A country which loses the power to issue its own currency is a country which has given up the power to govern itself. Such a country is no longer free. And it is no longer democratic. To surrender the pound, to surrender our power of self-government, would betray all [that] the past generations down the ages lived and died to defend" (Guardian, 23.05.2001, cited in Baker 2002, 320). In the same election campaign, Tony Blair, then Prime Minister and leader of the Labour Party, countered: "I am British and I am proud of it but I have never

[42] Some of the material in this chapter draws on previously published work by the author and collaborators (Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wueest 2010; 2012).

regarded being pro-British as being anti-European or anti-anything else. It is an absurd position. [...] In the end the British people will make a judgment on what is best for jobs, industry and investment. And should we make a recommendation it will be because we have studied the economic conditions and said, look, this is the right thing for the British economy" (Observer, 13.5.2001, cited in Baker 2002, 322).

This episode of British politics is a vivid example of how European integration is being framed. In general, politicians frame political issues because they "attempt to mobilize voters behind their policies by encouraging them to think about those policies along particular lines. This is accomplished by highlighting certain features of the policy such as its likely effects or its relationship to important values" (Chong and Druckman 2007b, 106). In the above quotes, the two politicians address the same issue, namely whether to join the monetary union and adopt the common euro currency, but they interpret it in very different ways. Thatcher gives the debated issue a nationalist slant by relating it to state sovereignty, and even state survival. Blair, by contrast, explicitly refuses such an interpretation, instead putting economic considerations to the fore.

This chapter explores the various ways political elites frame European integration. With regard to the overall argument of this study, the analysis of the framing serves two main purposes. First, we will check whether the multifaceted nature of European integration also leaves its mark on the framing of this political issue. We will see that European integration allows for a diverse framing and that the four sub-issues are each framed in distinct ways. Second, we will examine how particular political actors frame European integration, and what reasons account for the differences in their behavior. The main argument developed is that it is not national characteristics but politicians' own ideological profiles that constitute the major determinant of how they frame European integration. Hence, unlike most previous work in this area, this chapter puts less emphasis on national contrasts (see in particular Díez Medrano 2003), but on the differences *within* countries,

specifically between the representatives of different social groups. As we will see, due to the multi-faceted nature of this issue politicians enjoy considerable leeway in how to frame European integration. However, this does not lead politicians to put forward just any frame they can possibly use to back up their position on Europe. Rather, political actors have specific preferences in line with their general programmatic profile as how to present European integration to their constituency and how to cue citizens regarding what Europe is all about.

FRAME ANALYSIS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION POLITICS

This first section introduces in more detail the framing concept by explicating its relevance to political science and the particular approach to frame analysis taken by this study. Moreover, it will show how the frames have been coded and categorized for our particular research question.

What do we understand by the concept of framing in political science? The basic premise of the framing literature is that any issue can be viewed from different angles. Framing, as distinguished from agenda setting, does not guide us as regards *what* to think about, but *how* to think about a particular issue. In the famous words of Entman (1993, 52), to frame is "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient [...] in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation." Similarly, frames have been described as "schemata of interpretation" (Goffman 1974, 21) or "packages with a central organizing idea" (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 3) that guide our perception of reality and give meaning to an issue.

Framing is ultimately relevant because it has the ability to influence individuals' preferences regarding issues and political actors (Brewer and Gross 2005; Chong and

Druckman 2007a; Zaller 1992, chapter 9). Moreover, in particular the social movement literature stresses the ability of frames to mobilize the audience for some form of collective action (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). To elaborate the mechanism through which framing influences individual attitudes, we can distinguish between "frames in thought" and "frames in communication" (Druckman 2010).[43] Frames in thought are the set of considerations, values and beliefs an individual uses to evaluate an object, such as a political issue. These frames in thought are, in turn, shaped by frames in communication, in our context frames that are promoted by the political elite via the mass media. In the first place, frames in communication establish the *availability* of a particular frame – after all, an individual has to understand the significance and meaning of a consideration before they can use it for evaluative purposes. Moreover, and most importantly, exposure to frames in communication increases the *accessibility* of the particular frame, i.e. the likelihood a stored consideration is actually retrieved and used for a particular evaluation. Thereby, frames in communication may alter the relative weight an individual places on different considerations in the evaluation process. As a result, frames in communication may change an individual's opinion on a political issue. Of course, the actual impact of a frame in communication is conditional on factors such as the *applicability* (its strength or persuasiveness) and context factors, e.g. whether the individual is at the same time exposed to competing frames. In addition, an individual's traits and prior beliefs also play an important role (Chong and Druckman 2007b, 104–11; Druckman 2010).

[43] For an alternative distinction in terms of stages of the framing process, see e.g. Matthes (2007, Chapter 2).

Given that framing is potentially effective, it is no surprise that political actors use frames strategically to achieve their political goals. Sadly for them, in many cases politicians may not be able to frame a political issue in a preferred way because an issue is not ready for a "new spin" (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008, 441–2) or the favorable frame does not fit (in our terminology above, it is not applicable). In the case of European integration, however, framing is comparatively easy and effective as it is an abstract and – in terms of mass politicization – relatively new issue. Therefore, its meaning for citizens is still in flux and malleable by politicians. Political entrepreneurs are able and even actively have to link European integration with existing lines of political conflict to make the issue politically salient and electorally rewarding (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 13; Janssen 1991, 468). This makes European integration an ideal issue to study the framing strategies of political actors. The initial example demonstrated that European integration can be plausibly presented as a political issue where national independence is at stake, but it may just as well be depicted as belonging to the sphere of economic affairs. And these are just two frames out of many more, as we will soon see.

In his seminal work on the framing of Europe in Germany, Spain and the UK, Díez Medrano (2003) explores the different ways of seeing European integration in these countries and tries to explain it with distinct historical legacies and national cultures. A few other studies have also examined the framing of European integration in a comparative perspective (Trenz 2005), most with a special focus on media framing (de Vreese 2003; de Vreese, Peter, and Semetko 2001; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). More recently, Díez Medrano and Gray (2010, 196) assess these earlier findings and conclude that "[f]or all the talk of Europe's cultural diversity, Europeans are generally thinking about the same beast when they reflect the European Union." They argue that there is a commonly shared political culture in most European countries, the sole exception being

the UK, which differs markedly in its emphasis on national sovereignty and national interest.

However, is European integration truly the "same beast" for all? Looking at national contrasts may overlook significant variation *within* countries. If conflict about European integration is mainly a domestic conflict, as argued by this study, then we should expect significant differences between the various domestic social groups and their political representatives. Acknowledging the shortfalls of analyses that privilege the role of national over social determinants, Díez Medrano and Gray (2010) compare the framing of European integration by journalists, state actors including parties, and civil society. They find only modest differences among these different actor types. However, this finding may be misleading because such a purely functional differentiation ignores major ideological differences, particularly among parties. In line with the general argument of this study, I expect that these ideological differences would result in very specific framing strategies as politicians try to link the European integration issue to their particular core political concerns. Hence, any frame analysis that aims to uncover politicians' underlying motives to prefer certain frames over others needs to distinguish political actors not only based on their functional role, but also on their ideologies.

Methodology and a general typology of frames

Methodologically, moving beyond national contrasts and looking at how particular actors frame European integration requires that frames be coded at the level of individual statements. This allows us to attribute each frame to a specific statement made by a particular political actor. Such information about "frame ownership" is lacking in most framing studies, which usually extract frames at the level of whole news articles. Moreover, actors often back their issue statements by using multiple frames at the same time (Lerch and

Schwellnus 2006, 307), usually because their statements in public debate are targeted at a heterogeneous audience, and frames resonate differently among the various constituencies. Hence, using multiple frames can be seen as a strategy to maximize the appeal of a particular issue position. To account for this behavior, we coded up to five frames for each nuclear sentence.

Frames are a notoriously fuzzy concept. For the subsequent empirical analysis, we narrow our understanding of frames to *patterns of justifications*. Which arguments are put forward by political actors in public debate to justify their issue positions? These justifications express what actually is, according to the speaker, at stake in the contested issue. Thereby, justifications not only define the problem that the policy is about to solve (or to bring along, if the speaker is opposed to it), but usually guide the evaluation in one particular direction and suggest a certain causal interpretation of related events or facts – essential functions of frames as noted by Entman in his above-mentioned definition.

The coded frames are then categorized according to a general typology of public debate frames that distinguishes between cultural, economic, and other utilitarian frames, which are further differentiated into sub-categories, as shown in *Table 7.1*. The typology builds on Habermas's (1993; 1996) distinction between different types of argumentations in his works on discourse ethics and communicative rationality. The typology is general enough to allow for cross-country and cross-issue comparison and has also been applied in Kriesi et al. (2012) to the issues of immigration and economic liberalization.

Habermas distinguishes between group-related ethical-political, universalist-moral, and pragmatic arguments. Ethical-political arguments point to ideas and values inherent in a given community. A particularly important variant of such identity-related frames are *nationalist frames*, the first sub-category of the cultural frames in our typology. Exclusivist nationalist frames emphasize the need for cultural homogeneity to uphold an exclusive identity. This is reflected in statements expressing a fear of mass immigration

or "Islamization", statements that deplore the loss of unique national traditions and values, or statements expressing xenophobic attitudes. There are also nationalist frames that are less ethnic but more civic (Statham and Koopmans 2009). These civic frames are not based on the idea of a distinct and exclusive ethnic community, but on the belief in the exceptionality of a political community and its constitution. Such nationalist-institutional frames argue that a certain policy threatens to undermine national independence or particular national institutions, such as direct democracy or federalism. Note that national independence is defended here not for utilitarian reasons but for its own sake – the symbolic value of national sovereignty is what matters here. The initial quote by Margaret Thatcher nicely illustrates this.

The second cultural sub-category, *multicultural-universalist frames*, includes another type of identity-related arguments, which are the exact opposite of the nationalist

TABLE 7.1. *Frame typology*

Cultural frames	Nationalist
	Multicultural-universalist
Economic frames	Labor & social security
	Economic prosperity & wealth
Other utilitarian frames	Political efficiency & efficacy
	Security & ecology

ones. Multicultural-inclusive arguments favor cultural openness and the peaceful coexistence of cultural and religious groups in a society. This sub-category also includes what Habermas calls moral-universalist arguments. They refer to general moral principles and universal rights claimable by everyone. Examples include basic civil rights, many political rights, and international solidarity. For the sake of parsimony, these two closely related groups of frames that counterbalance the nationalist frames are subsumed under the same sub-category.

Pragmatic arguments are used to justify a position by emphasizing its ability to attain a specific goal or by its potential to meet particular interests (Lerch and Schwellnus 2006, 306). They are instrumental and output-oriented. Among them, I distinguish between economic and other utilitarian frames as we have a special interest in economic frames. They deal with the traditional economic left-right conflict and the first sub-category, *labor and social security frames,* includes arguments about fears of unemployment, falling wages, and retrenchment of the welfare state. Those who use this frame argue, for instance, that EU membership leads to harmful competition in the job market and a dismantling of national welfare states. *Economic prosperity and wealth frames*, the second sub-category of the economic frames, consist of arguments that put European integration in the context of economic wealth and growth, international competitiveness and budgetary considerations. Typical arguments in this area include claims that the common European market is economically beneficial or that states are too small to independently face economic challenges in the age of globalization.

Among the remaining other utilitarian frames, *the political efficiency and efficacy frames* encompass arguments related to the workings of the political system such as the capacity of a state to act, state power, or an efficient bureaucracy. Politicians who use these frames may refer to the poor governance of European Union institutions or to the

need to break a country's political isolation. Finally, the *security and ecology* sub-category contains several additional arguments, with each of them not being very salient utilitarian ones, such as references to internal security (crime, corruption) as well as external security (peace, regional stability), environmental protection, and other rarely addressed objectives.

Framing, ideology, and politics

Having clarified this study's particular approach to frame analysis, we can formulate our expectation more precisely. Which frames do different political actors use in a real-world political context when engaging in public political debate? The main argument here is that political actors do not frame issues in any way that might persuade the largest number of citizens (which is often implicitly assumed by researchers when conducting their framing experiments). Instead, politicians are seriously constrained in their framing efforts by their ideological profile. As Sniderman and Theriault put it, frames "are not exogenous to political competition; they are endogenous to it" (Sniderman and Theriault 2004, 141). This has two relevant implications. First, it is only when political actors succeed in framing their issue stance in line with their ideological profile that they are actually able to persuade a constituency. Persuasion only works if arguments are credible, and arguments are only credible if they are based on some long-standing commitment. For example, we would be quite reluctant to trust a Green party's true intentions if, out of the blue, it justified opposition to Europe on nationalist grounds – although citizens would regard such arguments credible if uttered by a Populist/Extreme Right party.

Moreover, while most framing studies focus on whether framing is able to shape citizens' views on a particular issue (persuasion), framing at the same time also serves the long-term goal of political actors to promote their ideology and give coherence to

their programmatic profile. For example, European integration may provide a welcome opportunity for a Radical Left party to denounce the "excesses of capitalism" – making this traditional leftist frame more salient and therefore available, and ultimately more readily accessible to citizens. Either way, framing by political actors is supposed to be heavily based on their underlying core political concerns, similar as we argued for positions and issue emphasis in the previous chapters. Moreover, connecting an issue to political core concerns that resonate widely and have the power to mobilize the public is an essential element of politicization. The conflictive issue and existing political divisions mutually stabilize and reinforce each other; political conflict stretches beyond the individual issue and feeds broader political divisions, thereby permitting sustained politicization.

Surprisingly, the connection between framing and ideology has found little attention in empirical framing research. A rare exception is the article by Petersen et al. (2010) who conceive of the structure of party competition as a frame for citizens. They provide evidence that the positions different political parties adopt vis-à-vis a particular issue provide a cue to citizens as to how to situate the issue within the political space. However, in the case of European integration, the ambivalent positions many parties adopt on this issue (as shown in *Chapter 5*) preclude any straightforward inference based solely on positional cues by the voters. Rather, substantial and explicit framing by the parties is required if they want to cue citizens regarding where to place the new and multi-faceted issue of European integration in the broader political context.

In short, the framing by politicians is, to a considerable extent, the concrete articulation of the core political values for which they have a reputation. Hence, the



FIGURE 7.1. Frames and their relation with the political space

frames used are expected to be a function of a political actor's location in the two-dimensional political space. *Figure 7.1* summarizes the resulting propositions about the relationship between actor framing and the political space. Politicians close to the leftist pole of the economic axis of conflict are likely to link European integration to social protectionist considerations and therefore emphasize labor and social security concerns, while proximity to the rightist pole should go along with neoliberal ideas and, accordingly, the prevalent use of economic prosperity and wealth frames. Likewise, politicians close to the conservative TAN pole of the cultural axis are likely to promote nationalist frames when engaging in the European integration debate, while those at the liberal GAL-pole can be expected to base their framing on multicultural and cosmopolitan views.

Moreover, I suggest that mainstream actors in the center of the political space, besides using these ideological frames, also rely strongly on pragmatic frames, emphasizing in particular political efficiency and efficacy to support European integration. Often, these actors are well represented in government and thus have to frequently deal with concrete problems and the need to communicate specific policy choices, which are less easily connectable to basic ideological concerns. Because these "neutral" or rather technical arguments cannot be clearly located in the political space, they potentially appeal to a broader and ideologically heterogeneous audience. Especially governments and European Union actors may use these frames frequently to appear impartial and standing above the controversies of everyday politics.

Finally, while politicians try to deploy their preferred frames, they also have to take into account the general context, which may force them to engage with their opponents' arguments and to take up well-resonating frames although they are unfavorable to them (Jerit 2008). If ignoring a frame is no longer a feasible option, because it is highly salient, then two strategies are available. Either a politician can rebut an opponent's frame by questioning its validity or appropriateness. For example, Thatcher's statement quoted above may be "counter-framed" (Benford and Snow 2000, 617) by arguing that national sovereignty is *not* affected by European integration. This is exactly what Blair did when he denounced Thatcher's position as "absurd", arguing that the issue is not about national independence but economics. Or politicians can try to take possession of the opponents' frame by rhetorically flipping it over. For example, a pro-European politician could argue that European integration does not threaten, but rather *enhances* national sovereignty by providing a country with more leverage at the European level, as suggested by the concept of shared sovereignty. Hänggli (2010, 98–107) terms these two distinct strategies defensive vs. offensive use of the opponent's frame. However, she finds that both strategies are rare compared to the emphasis of one's own frames, which is unsurprising given the risks

involved: Rebutting the opponent's powerful frames may simply direct even more public attention to an opponent's most persuasive argument, and trying to flip it on its head may not work and in the long term damage one's own reputation. In short, while politicians cannot fully avoid responding to the adversaries' most salient frames, we can expect them to do so only reluctantly and to use their adversaries' frames rarely.

WHAT EUROPE IS ALL ABOUT – EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Throughout this volume it is argued that European integration is a political issue that is multi-faceted, but at the same time well-structured by both an economic and a cultural axis of conflict. Here, we can test this proposition against the data on framing. The results for the overall framing in the six countries in *Table 7.2* show that the political elites reduce European integration neither to its economic nor cultural aspects. Clearly, the multidimensional nature of this issue also becomes manifest in the framing. Two-fifths of all frames are cultural and one-third is economic, the remaining quarter refers to other utilitarian arguments – such as political efficiency and efficacy or security and ecology. Overall, cultural frames outnumber economic frames, but the cultural slant is marginal in size.

Among the cultural frames, multicultural-universalist arguments about fairness and solidarity (27.2 percent) outnumber nationalist frames (12.4 percent). This level of nationalist framing may appear to be quite modest. Yet compared to other public debates on the opening up of political, economic and cultural borders, the European integration debate exhibits the highest share of nationalist framing. In the public debate on economic liberalization, nationalist arguments are almost absent (1.1 percent), and even in the immigration debate the share is slightly lower with 9.8 percent (see Hoeglinger, Wueest, and Helbling 2012). Hence, European integration seems to constitute the most fertile ground for culturally based opposition against denationalization.

Across the four sub-issues of European integration, the framing varies systematically, as shown in *Table 7.2*. Economic framing turns out to be much more likely for the debate on market making and social regulation, while cultural framing dominates the debate on enlargement and deepening. This finding supports our theoretical distinction between economic and politico-cultural sub-issues. However, the framing of a single sub-issue is far from being fully pre-determined. Political actors enjoy considerable leeway in their strategic choice of frames. Thus, the two sub-issues of enlargement and deepening, which are mostly framed in cultural terms, still give rise to a considerable share of economic frames (18.6 percent and 22.5 percent, respectively). Likewise, cultural frames make up 26.7 percent of all frames in the economic sub-issue of social regulation, but only 9.5 percent of the frames of the sub-issue of market making, the sub-issue that is most clearly dominated by economic logic.

Moreover, between the two politico-cultural sub-issues of enlargement and deepening the kind of nationalist frames that are used vary considerably. As noted above, nationalist arguments can be related to ethnic or civic nationalism. Accordingly, we can distinguish between (ethnic) nationalist-exclusive frames and (civic) national-institutional frames. The former emphasize the defense of one's own ethnic community, national traditions, and values, while the latter, by contrast, insist on the symbolic value of national independence or the protection of valued national institutions. Ethnic nationalism is concentrated around the issue of enlargement – nationalist-exclusive frames predominate here with 87 percent of all nationalist frames. In contrast, civic nationalism finds its main target in opposition against deepening – 70 percent of all nationalist frames used in this context are nationalist-institutional. More detailed analysis reveals that the nationalist-exclusive frames put forward in the context of enlargement are targeted primarily against the accession of Turkey. Interestingly, not only traditional *national* identities are defended here, but also a nascent *European* identity – culturally defined and

both exclusive (against Turkey) and inclusive (within Europe) at the same time. This is highlighted by the centrality of the argument about Europe's "Christian heritage" among the opponents of Turkey's EU accession. It supports the popular claim that the "Turkish question" is a crucial factor in the emergence of an exclusive European identity (Giannakopoulos and Maras 2005; Madeker 2008).

To conclude our general overview, are there significant differences among the six countries under study? Based on our data and in line with Díez Medrano and Gray (2010), it is fair to say that European integration is seen in fairly similar ways in these countries, although some variation exists (see *Table A.3* in the appendix). As found in previous studies, nationalist framing is particularly prevalent in the traditionally Eurosceptic UK with 17.2 percent. But even in the least nationalist debate, in Germany, this category still accounts for a significant 6.8 percent of all frames. Moreover, economic framing is strongest in Switzerland with 44.7 percent. This is due to the country's "integration without membership" (Lavenex 2009). This particular approach to European integration privileges economic integration. But as soon as the more fundamental and highly controversial question of EU membership flares up in public debate, as happened repeatedly in the 1990s, cultural aspects gain importance. Notwithstanding these peculiarities, there are substantial shares of economic and cultural framing in all six countries. And the variations among countries are considerably smaller than those among different sub-issues and, as we will see shortly, among different political actors.

TABLE 7.2. *The framing of the European integration debate and its sub-issues*

Frame	*Overall*	*Economic sub-issues*		*Politico-cultural sub-issues*	
		Market making	Social regulation	Enlargement	Deepening
Cultural frames	*39.6*	*9.5*	*26.7*	*53.3*	*46.0*
Nationalist	12.4	4.2	8.9	14.5	17.6
Multicultural-universalist	27.2	5.3	17.8	38.9	28.5
Economic frames	*34.4*	*76.9*	*48.7*	*18.6*	*22.5*
Economic prosperity	24.4	52.2	36.9	14.4	13.7
Labour & social security	10.1	24.7	11.8	4.2	8.9
Other utilitarian frames	*25.9*	*13.6*	*24.6*	*28.1*	*31.4*
Political efficiency& efficacy	17.6	12.1	19.1	14.9	22.4
Security/ecology	8.4	1.5	5.6	13.2	9.0
Total	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*
N	9,212	1,868	931	2,177	4,121

Notes: Percentages of frames of a particular category that are used. Data weighted by country.

Framing opposition and support

Opponents and supporters of European integration frame their statements differently, which means that the evaluative component or inherent "loading" (Neidhardt 2002, xiii) of a frame is not arbitrary. Some frames are used by only one side of the debate, while other frames appeal to both sides and, hence, are more contested. The direction and persuasive power of a frame depends on pre-existing and relatively stable social and cultural resources (Williams 2004), including ideologies. We know from the previous chapters that opposition to Europe is concentrated strongly at the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis, as well – to a lesser extent – at the leftist pole of the economic axis, while support is found at the two opposite poles and in the center of the political space. In line with the *Figure 7.1* above, opposition to European integration should therefore be based primarily on nationalist arguments, along with labor and social security concerns. By contrast, supportive voices should emphasize the positive effects on economic prosperity and multicultural-universalist values, and rely on the more pragmatic frames. These expectations should be reflected in the average positions of the frame categories towards European integration, as shown in *Figure 7.2.* A negative value indicates that a frame is used more frequently to oppose Europe, while a positive value indicates that this frame is used more often to articulate support.

The pattern for the cultural framing is in line with these expectations. The two sides follow distinct framing strategies, with both nationalist frame categories expressing clear-cut opposition to European integration (-0.29 and -0.33, respectively), while multicultural-universalist arguments articulate solid support (+0.52). In the case of economic framing, the arguments of the two sides are less clearly distinct. While prosperity arguments are largely used to support integration (+0.19), labor and social security frames are also positively connoted (+0.12). The latter is contrary to expectations. It suggests that, on average, European integration is seen less as a threat to the traditional national welfare



Notes: The average positions can vary between -1.0 (only negative statements) and + 1.0 (only positive statements). Country-weights applied.

FIGURE 7.2. Frame average position towards European integration

state, and more as a potential answer to the challenges of economic globalization. However, the fact that the values for both economic frame categories are comparatively close to zero indicates they are contested and that both camps use them to persuade citizens of their views about European integration. Political efficiency and efficacy as well as security and ecology frames, finally, are uncontested showing a decidedly positive tilt (+0.41 and +0.54, respectively).

In sum, these results strengthen the claim that the engine of opposition to European integration is fueled primarily and most consistently by nationalist motives and is, therefore, driven strongly by the cultural logic. Labor and social security concerns, which we also expected to be used mainly by opponents, are considerably more contested and are being used by both sides. All other frames are used primarily to argue in favor of European integration. However, who are the concrete political actors that oppose or support European integration for these various motives? The following section tackles this question in detail.

The framing of European integration by political actors

How do the different political actors frame European integration? *Table 7.3* reports the relative frequency with which a given actor type uses a particular frame. For ease of interpretation, frames responsible for a substantial share of the overall framing of a particular actor type are highlighted in bold. In addition, the shading indicates whether a frame is used predominantly in connection with statements that oppose or support European integration. Hence, *Table 7.3* enables us to not only see how relevant a specific frame is for a particular political actor type, but also whether the actor type uses the frame to express support or criticism. This is particularly instructive for ambivalent political actors who may support European integration for one reason and oppose it for another.

We first turn to the two party families at the periphery of the political spectrum, the Radical Left and the Populist/Extreme Right. They fundamentally oppose European integration as shown in *Chapter 5*. Accordingly, both party families use all frame categories to oppose European integration (as indicated by the shading in the table). However, there are considerable differences in the salience of the particular frame categories. This suggests they oppose European integration for quite different reasons. The actors from the Radical Left frame their opposition heavily in terms of labor and social security, which is responsible for 34.0 percent of their overall framing. The heavy weight they attach to these concerns is only exceeded by the labor unions. Both of these leftist actors justify their Euroscepticism primarily by recourse to traditional concerns about welfare state retrenchment, public service cutbacks, wage cuts, and unemployment. Moreover, the Radical Left also substantively emphasizes economic prosperity and multicultural-universalist arguments in its framing.

By contrast, the discourse of the Populist/Extreme Right is strongly dominated by nationalist frames (45.4 percent), as could be expected given their location in the political space. This share of nationalist frames is more than twice as high as for any other political

actor. Although the Populist Right does not have a monopoly on nationalist framing, it clearly is its main promoter. Economic prosperity ranks (an already distant) second with a share of 21.1 percent of the overall framing of this actor type.

The Christian Democrats and the Conservatives as well as the Liberals adopt the Populist Right's nationalist framing, although to a smaller extent (22.1 percent and 17.3 percent of the overall framing, respectively). Interestingly, the discourse of the two most Eurosceptic parties from the moderate right, the British Conservatives and the German CDU/CSU, is also the most nationalist among them (50.6 percent and 34.0 percent of their overall framing, respectively). This suggests that cultural Euroscepticism based on nationalist motives is not confined to the Populist Right, but is also articulated by members of party families of the moderate right.

What is the precise content of this nationalist framing? According to Statham and Koopmans (2009, 461), nationalist opposition to European integration is not mainly expressed in ethnic and exclusive terms by xenophobic arguments such as the fear of mass immigration or Islamization. Rather, they argue, it is mostly articulated in the more moderate form of "civic nationalism", meaning the defense of national sovereignty. However, more detailed analysis of the data does not support such a conclusion. Actor types relying strongly on nationalist framing use ethnic nationalist-exclusive frames and civic nationalist-institutional frames to roughly an equal extent (each sub-category being responsible for 40 percent to 60 percent of the overall nationalist framing). That these frame categories make a joint appearance suggests that the motives are closely linked – no civic nationalism without ethnic nationalism, and vice versa. Hence, for culturally motivated Eurosceptics, European integration poses a dual threat as it weakens both one's own ethnic community and national sovereignty (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004, 131).

Political actors from the left also occasionally rely on nationalist framing. There are two reasons for this. First, part of the political left does not completely refrain from

employing nationalist framing to oppose European integration. This applies to the labor unions and the Radical Left, as *Table 7.3* shows. They fear the negative implications of the "pooled sovereignty" that greater European integration might have on national social and labor policies, which results in (civic) nationalist-institutional but not (ethnic) nationalist-exclusive framing against European integration. However, in terms of salience these frames are clearly secondary and other, primarily economic arguments play a much more important role for them.[44] Second, the use of nationalist frames by leftist politicians is, as hypothesized, a response to fight the Populist Right's framing by explicitly rebutting such arguments or by flipping them around to argue in favor of their conflicting pro-European stance. This is reflected by the supportive positions towards European integration that are connected to the – normally strongly negatively connoted – nationalist frames as in the case of the Greens and the Social Democrats.

Does the moderate left, by analogy to the moderate right, also adopt the framing of their more radical counterparts? Indeed, the Social Democrats are skeptical Europeans when it comes to economic considerations. For the Social Democrats, economic prosperity frames are, with 25.2 percent, highly salient and negatively connoted. Likewise, labor and social security frames are also relevant in terms of salience and ambivalently connoted. These findings reflect quite well the contradictions that Social Democrats have to face in the European integration debate when assessing the potential of various European policies to advance a truly "social Europe". The Greens, by contrast, worry little about the economic consequences of European integration, as suggested by the low salience of these frame categories.

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[44] See Milner (2004) for a more detailed elaboration of this argument for the French case.

TABLE 7.3. *How the different political actors frame European integration*

Frame	EU actors	Domestic state	Labor unions	Business interests	Public interest groups
Cultural frames					
Nationalist	4.0	8.4	8.5	**11.1**	**19.2**
Multicultural-universalist	**32.6**	**25.0**	**11.5**	5.6	**28.4**
Economic frames					
Economic prosperity	**33.1**	**24.0**	**20.7**	**55.9**	**18.5**
Labour & social security	5.4	8.6	**50.1**	**17.5**	**17.4**
Other utilitarian frames					
Pol. efficiency & efficacy	**15.9**	**25.1**	3.4	8.4	7.5
Security/ecology	9.0	8.9	5.8	1.5	9.1
Total	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*
N	1,382	2,365	257	364	265

Frame	Radical Left	Greens	Social Democrats	Liberals	Christian Democrats/ Conserv.	Populist/ Extreme Right
Cultural frames						
Nationalist	**13.5**	8.0	8.0	**17.3**	**22.1**	**45.4**
Multicultural-universalist	**22.4**	**31.9**	**30.2**	**31.7**	**26.5**	9.0
Economic frames						
Economic prosperity	**24.8**	2.9	**25.2**	**13.5**	**18.3**	**21.1**
Labour & social security	**34.0**	2.2	**15.4**	8.8	5.1	9.2
Other utilitarian frames						
Pol. efficiency & efficacy	3.2	**31.0**	**12.4**	**20.8**	**24.2**	5.4
Security/ecology	2.2	**24.2**	8.9	8.0	3.8	9.9
Total	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*
N	134	190	1,001	383	898	442

Notes: Percentages of frames of a particular category that are used. For ease of interpretation, highly salient frames (more than a 10.0% share) are highlighted in bold. If the particular frame category is mainly used to oppose European integration (frame average position below -0.20), the values are shaded in dark grey. Shading in light grey indicates they are mainly used for support (average position above +0.20). Data weighted by country.

Note that the Populist Right parties also raise labor and social security concerns at times. This frame category is responsible for 9.2 percent of their overall framing. The combined occurrence of identity-based nationalist framing and labor and social security framing lend some credence to the argument that they pursue a strategy of welfare chauvinism (Andersen 1992; Mudde 2000). An illustrative example is the infamous "Polish plumber"[45] who was used to stoke fears in the context of the upcoming Eastern Enlargement. Similarly, the Swiss SVP argued during the referendum campaign against the free movement of persons that the massive influx of foreign "social benefits scroungers" would overburden the welfare state. These findings are puzzling in light of the "winning formula" argument which states that the Right Populist's success rests on its combination of nationalist and neoliberal – not social protectionist – appeals (Kitschelt 2007; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Yet if the answer to social concerns is seen (only) in limiting access to the welfare state exclusively to "our own people", it may well be compatible with neoliberal ideas. Moreover, the neoliberal element is not imperative for all members of this party family if we recall their location in the political space. While clearly at the nationalist TAN-pole of the cultural axis, its members are widely spread along the economic axis and not only located near the rightist pole (see *Chapter 2*).

Apart from the above selective but systematic departures of mainstream parties from the large pro-European consensus, well in line with their ideological core concerns,

[45] The term "Polish plumber" was actually coined by the leader of the French right-populist MPF, Philippe De Villiers, but subsequently spread across all Europe. It was eventually even taken up in an ad by the Polish Tourism Bureau in France, in which a Polish model depicting a plumber says "I'm staying in Poland. Lots of you should come" (New York Times Online, June 26, 2005).

public authorities and mainstream parties generally argue in favor of European integration. For this purpose they mainly rely on multicultural-universalist frames, economic prosperity frames and, moreover, pragmatic frames. Specifically, they heavily emphasize political efficiency and efficacy gains resulting from European integration. A prime example is the often heard argument that a particular policy can no longer be realized by going it alone, but only through close collaboration at the European level. The Greens share this framing pattern, which tentatively supports their transformation into an established mainstream party in most Western European countries (see, e.g., Pelinka 2004).

The framing of civil society actors generally follows their allies in the political system. Employer and business associations frame their supportive stances on European integration in terms of economic prosperity and wealth (55.9 percent). While this is the dominant strategy, it is not endorsed unanimously by all business and producer interests. Particularly farmers' associations, but also other economic sectors that profit from sheltered national markets, are a significant source of Euroscepticism, as indicated by the substantive share of labor and social security concerns used to criticize European integration (17.5 percent). Of course, the labor unions voice social and economic concerns much more frequently (50.1 percent).

By contrast, public interest groups use economic frames less frequently. Generally, public interest groups are a heterogeneous crowd, but it has been repeatedly shown that, in practice, they are dominated by left-leaning groups, as the right is hardly active outside the party arena (Hutter 2012; Kriesi 1999). As a consequence, public interest groups strongly emphasize multicultural-universalist frames (28.4 percent), which is well in line with the postmaterialist world view of the new social movements and their heirs. How to evaluate European integration based on this world view is contested among these groups, resulting in neither a clearly pro-European nor anti-European connotation of this frame. In addition, and quite unexpectedly, public interest groups also voice discontent

based on nationalist-exclusive motives (19.2 percent). This is largely because several representatives of the Catholic Church spoke against the accession of Turkey with reference to the Christian heritage of Europe. Most prominently, the then Cardinal Ratzinger, who would later become Pope Benedict XVI, argued in an interview with Le Figaro magazine (9.8.2004) that Turkey would be in permanent contrast to Europe, making allusions to the repeated incursions of the Ottoman Empire into Europe in past centuries.

Partisan framing and the political space

Instead of grouping the parties into own party families as was done in the previous section, this section alternatively uses information on the location of parties in the general political space to test its impact on their framing strategies in a more straightforward way.[46] Does a party's score on the economic left-right axis and the cultural TAN-GAL axis of the political space have the hypothesized effects on its framing strategy in the European integration debate? *Table 7.4* reports the corresponding regression results for each frame category. As in the regressions in the previous two chapters, I included the parties' scores on both axes of the political space as well as an extremism variable. Remember that the axis scores of a particular party are calculated from its general policy positions as articulated during national election campaigns in the 2000s. In addition to

[46] Note that this information on the precise location in the political space (the axis scores) is, unfortunately, only available for a limited set of political actors, namely the parties, as it is based on general policy positions articulated during election campaigns. This is why I proceed in two steps, first analyzing the framing of all political actors and, second, looking at the framing strategies of the parties only.

TABLE 7.4. *The impact of the political space on the framing of European integration by the parties (OLS-regression)*

	Cultural frames				*Economic frames*				*Other utilitarian frames*			
	Nationalist		**Multicultural-universalist**		**Economic prosperity**		**Labour & social security**		**Political efficiency & efficacy**		**Security/ecology**	
	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
Ideology:												
Cultural tan-gal	-0.25	0.08**	0.21	0.09*	-0.05	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.04
Economic left-right	-0.02	0.06	-0.09	0.09	0.08	0.05	-0.11	0.05+	0.09	0.05+	0.06	0.03+
Extremism	0.19	0.10+	0.07	0.10	-0.25	0.04**	0.08	0.08	-0.12	0.07+	0.03	0.04
Cultural sub-issue	0.08	0.03*	0.24	0.05**	-0.19	0.04**	-0.21	0.04**	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.03*
Countries:												
Austria	0.13	0.10	-0.15	0.07*	-0.02	0.06	-0.13	0.06*	0.18	0.05**	-0.01	0.03
United Kingdom	-0.02	0.08	0.00	0.13	-0.04	0.03	-0.02	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.04
Germany	-0.09	0.07	-0.07	0.09	-0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.04**	0.02	0.05
Netherlands	0.00	0.08	0.04	0.08	-0.03	0.04	-0.04	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.02
Switzerland	-0.07	0.08	-0.12	0.08	0.10	0.05*	-0.08	0.07	0.10	0.05+	0.07	0.03*
(France ref. cat.)												
Constant	0.11	0.08	0.12	0.08	0.40	0.03**	0.24	0.07**	0.12	0.04**	0.00	0.02
N	59		59		59		59		59		59	
R^2	0.50		0.46		0.57		0.44		0.31		0.26	

Notes: The dependent variable is the share of the indicated frame category on the overall framing by a party. Both axis scores range from -1.0 to +1.0 (see *Chapter 2* for details of the calculation). Extremism is measured as the squared Euclidian distance of the party from the average location in the political space and ranges from 0 to 1.0. Cluster-adjusted standard errors used (parties). Significance levels: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

these ideological variables, I also included dummies to control for potential country effects. A dummy for cultural European integration sub-issues allows for the expected higher baseline level of nationalist framing for the politico-cultural sub-issues of enlargement and deepening (in contrast to the economic European integration sub-issues of market making and social regulation).

With regard to the nationalist and the multicultural-universalist framing, we expect that the use of these frame categories is primarily influenced by the cultural axis of the political space. The closer a party is to the liberal GAL-pole, the less it should rely on nationalist frames and, in turn, the more it should use multicultural-universalist frames. The results in *Table 7.4* are in line with these expectations. Nationalist framing is highest at the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis and decreases the more a party moves to the opposite liberal GAL-pole. Likewise, there is a statistically significant effect of the cultural axis on the frequency of the multicultural-universalist framing, but as expected in the opposite direction: The closer a party is to the liberal pole of the cultural axis, the more likely it is to use multicultural-universalist arguments to justify a European integration stance. Moreover, there is also a positive significant effect of extremism on nationalist framing – the more extreme a party is, the more frequently it relies on nationalist arguments.

For the use of economic frames, we expect an analogous effect of the economic left-right axis of the political space. The empirical results here are less clear-cut than for cultural framing. Although the direction of the effects on economic framing is in line with our expectations – the closer to the rightist pole of the economic axis it is, the less likely a party is to use social security and labor frames, but the more likely it is to rely on economic prosperity frames – the coefficient reaches statistical significance only in the case of the former. Moreover, there is a strong negative and statistically significant effect of extremism on economic prosperity framing. In other words, parties located in the center

of the political space are likely to use this frame more often than those parties at the fringes of the political spectrum. This finding suggests that economic prosperity seems to be primarily an argument of the mainstream parties and ideological orientations matter less here.

Ideological extremism also has a statistically significant negative effect on the use of political efficiency and efficacy frames, as hypothesized. As expected, moderate parties at the center rely more frequently on these non-ideological, pragmatic frames to justify their (mostly supportive) European integration stances. Yet there is also a significant positive effect of the economic axis, which means that the more a party is to the right, the more likely it is to use this frame. For the residual framing category security/ecology, moreover, we find a similar significant positive effect of the economic axis.

In sum, these findings for our ideological variables support the argument that framing patterns of political parties are heavily shaped by their ideological profiles. In particular, the effects of the two axes of the political space on the use of the four cultural and economic frame categories was always in the expected direction and reached statistical significance in three out of the four frame categories – despite the relatively small number of cases. Moreover, the hypothesized effects of the cultural TAN-GAL axis were considerably stronger than those of the economic left-right axis, suggesting that ideological differences along the cultural fault line are more distinctly articulated in the public debate on European integration than the economic divide.

In addition to these results for the main variables of interest, the effect of the sub-issues type is strong and statistically significant for the economic and cultural framing. This suggests that political actors are not only constrained by their ideological profile, but also by the inherent characteristics of the sub-issue debated. By contrast, country effects in all of the six regression analyses are rare and only marginal. Hence, there is no evidence in our data for systematically distinct national elite discourses on European integration in

terms of framing (cf. Díez Medrano 2003; Díez Medrano and Gray 2010). Rather, the findings tentatively suggest that the varying frame content of the public debates in the individual countries is primarily a result of the differential standing of the various political actors. For example, the alleged nationalist slant of the European integration debate in the UK is mainly due to the strong standing of the British Conservatives and their strong use of nationalist frames. Their framing strategy, however, is not unusual if we compare it with parties in other countries that share a similar ideological profile.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided an insight into the framing of European integration, in other words, how political elites attempt to shape citizens' thinking about this political issue. The findings substantiated our expectation of a diverse framing, which confirmed that the question of what European integration is all about is an open one. On one hand, this is due to the inherently multi-faceted nature of this political issue. Deepening and enlargement are framed primarily in cultural terms, and economic framing prevails in the sub-issues of market making and social regulation. Yet even within the individual sub-issues, the framing is far from homogenous. Politicians do not share a common image of Europe; rather, an intense framing contest is raging. Clearly, contestation about Europe can be reduced neither to only an economic nor to a cultural dimension of conflict.

The fault lines of this framing contest do not run along national boundaries, where most previous framing studies have looked, but between different domestic social groups. The strategies of individual political actors are strongly shaped by their intention to tie European integration to their more fundamental ideological concerns. Notably, politicians close to the economic leftist pole, particularly the Radical Left, and politicians close to the culturally conservative TAN-pole, particularly the Populist Right, oppose European

integration, but for different reasons. The former emphasize labor and social security concerns, while the latter rely heavily on nationalist framing. We did not explore the impact of elite framing on citizens' attitudes, but both of these motives have been shown to be crucial in explaining negative attitudes among the population (Bornschier 2011; Garry and Tilley 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2004; 2005; McLaren 2004; 2006; 2007). Moreover, Edwards and de Vries (2009) found that the presence of Populist Right parties increases Euroscepticism among individuals with national exclusive identities, whereas the presence of Radical Left parties mobilizes Euroscepticism among individuals who feel economically insecure. The present chapter strengthens this argument by providing the missing link between the presence of these parties and the importance of the corresponding motives in European attitude formation. It found that these politicians explicitly and frequently articulate their respective arguments in public debate, cueing receptive citizens to evaluate European integration in their preferred way.

Contrary to politicians at the fringes of the political spectrum, mainstream parties, national governments and the EU rely frequently on pragmatic frames that potentially appeal to a broader audience than ideological frames when justifying their overall pro-European attitudes. This strategy is shared by the Green parties, which suggests that this party family has firmly arrived in the political mainstream – not only regarding its pro-European positions (as shown in *Chapter 5*), but also with respect to the arguments it puts forward. However, mainstream party families share the motives of their more radical counterparts at the periphery of the political spectrum and at times join in their critical views. The Social Democrats are highly critical of Europe if evaluated in the light of economic considerations. The parties of the moderate right, in turn, evaluate European integration negatively in light of nationalist considerations. Particularly the German CSU and the British Conservatives also rely heavily on nationalist frames, which are advocated most forcefully by the Populist Right.

Interestingly, the nationalist framing by these political actors close to the culturally conservative TAN-pole commonly combines both ethnic and (more moderate) civic nationalism. This suggests that these two nationalisms are just two faces of the same coin. European integration is perceived by these politicians as a dual threat weakening both one's own ethnic community and national sovereignty. Moreover, the Populist Right also occasionally adopts the framing strategy of the Radical Left and emphasizes labor and social security concerns which suggests that, now and then, they purse a "welfare chauvinist" strategy. In general, however, their nationalist framing clearly prevails. In the following chapter, we will see which implications the possibility to frame European integration in such diverse ways has on the politicization of this political issue in Western European countries.

CHAPTER 8

The limited politicization of Europe

The previous chapters examined which political actors are trying to politicize European integration, and for what reasons. We identified those actor characteristics that explain which politicians are more likely to adopt negative positions vis-à-vis European integration – in general, but also towards each of its four sub-issues (*Chapter 5*). We explored which politicians are more likely to emphasize European integration in public (*Chapter 6*), and we studied which frames are preferred by whom when talking about Europe (*Chapter 7*). Ideology, conceptualized in a two-dimensional political space, proved to be a key factor. Notably, but – to complicate matters – not exclusively, the closer a politician is to the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis, the more likely he or she is to politicize Europe.

These strategies are a necessary precondition for any system-wide politicization of Europe. Yet the question whether these individual efforts by political entrepreneurs can ultimately rock the boat, i.e. whether they have a significant impact on the political system *as a whole*, is a different one – although equally relevant. The present chapter will tackle this question of how strongly European integration is being politicized in Western European political systems.

Scholars sharply disagree on the broader significance of conflict about European integration and whether it is powerful enough to affect domestic political conflict in general. Hooghe and Marks (2009, 22) acknowledge the large-scale politicization of Europe as an established fact and argue that it is "difficult to believe that [it] could be stuffed back in the bag". Other authors are more skeptical and claim that, in general, the level of politicization in Western European countries is low (see, e.g., Mair 2001; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008a). The most elaborated theoretical argument to date as to why the normal case should not be the abundance but the lack of politicization of the European integration issue, is put forward by Green-Pedersen (2010; 2011). For him, European integration – unlike immigration – has been and will remain "a giant fast asleep" because mainstream parties find the issue to be not very attractive.

The present chapter contributes to this ongoing scholarly debate in two ways. First, it evaluates these arguments and adds new ones, both based on the detailed analyses in the previous chapters. Second, it presents new empirical results on the level of politicization by applying an alternative measure of politicization. While previous work based their claims, if not merely on anecdotal or unsystematic evidence, on either issue salience or positions, the indicator applied here accounts for both issue salience and issue polarization, in line with a comprehensive conceptualization of politicization.

We will see that the empirical results on how strongly European integration is being politicized relative to other issues, over time, and across the various countries, suggest a sustained but at the same time limited politicization of Europe. Moreover, the findings will reveal considerable variation across countries and over time. Particularly the search for factors able to explain country differences has occupied scholars in this area for quite some time. Yet finding a convincing and simultanously parsimonious explanation appears to be a challenging task. It is telling that, after examining the roughly 20 individual case studies in their edited volume, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008, 358) have

to conclude somewhat helplessly that "it is specificities of the cases rather than the similarities between them that generate such contestation. In short, open contestation over Europe in party systems appears to occur for different reasons in different states." Notwithstanding this difficulty, this chapter will also try to shed some light on this question and identify the factors accounting for differences across countries. Because of the limitations imposed by the small country sample of the present study, these findings are necessarily tentative.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION – A POLITICAL ISSUE THAT CAN ROCK THE BOAT?

In a widely cited article, Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that European integration has become increasingly politicized following the Maastricht Accord in 1991. According to them, this has happened not because public opinion on Europe has changed fundamentally, but because on many crucial European issues decision-making has shifted from insulated elite politics to mass politics, as some political entrepreneurs have taken advantage of the Eurosceptic potential that has existed among the population for quite some time (2009, 13). Although mainstream parties suffered from internal disagreement about this issue and tried to depoliticize European integration, they ultimately failed to do so. The Populist Right parties, national Conservatives and the Radical Left "smelled blood" and did not pass up this opportunity (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 21; also see de Vries 2007). Moreover, Kriesi and colleagues (2006; 2008; 2012) argue that Europe is, together with immigration and economic liberalization, a key element of a newly emerging conflict between the winners and losers of globalization, which has spurred a far-reaching restructuring of the political space in Western European countries and is primarily driven by opposition from parties close to the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis. As a result, both groups of scholars argue, European integration has become an integral part

of domestic political contestation gaining critical significance in elections, referendums, and party competition.

Scholars who challenge this affirmative view primarily take issue with the claim that Eurosceptic extreme parties are able to drive the politicization of Europe. The crucial point is rather, they argue, whether and how the mainstream parties react to these efforts to politicize newly emerging issues (for the general argument, see Meguid 2005). Building upon that objection and based on a "crucial case" study of Denmark, Green-Pedersen (2010) arrives at a bleak assessment regarding the potential for the politicization of Europe in Western Europe. According to him, mainstream parties have no incentives to politicize a new issue if it makes government coalition-building more difficult and if it does not fit easily into the established patterns of political conflict –- the latter brings the risk of ending up with strange bedfellows. Because European integration is effectively such a difficult issue, he argues, the "sleeping giant" is expected to remain fast asleep.

What do the findings in the previous chapters of the present study suggest regarding the potential to politicize Europe? In sum, they provide a mixed assessment and suggest a sustained but at the same time limited politicization of this issue. *Chapter 4* showed that public attention to European integration is strongly focused on institutional events initiated and controlled by (generally pro-European) national governments and the EU, such as constitutional reforms, enlargement steps, and referendums. As a result, it is difficult for challengers to get a grip on this issue and to politicize European integration continuously and independently. In the case of immigration, to mention a closely related cultural issue, this is easier as the issue is driven by smaller events and party political contestation.

A welcome opportunity for the disadvantaged challengers are referendums on European matters, which are often considered as "flash points" of the politicization of Europe (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 20; also see Mudde 2011, 17; Mair 2001, 48). However,

although referendums lend strong impetus to the European integration debate, their role in the politicization of Europe is at the same time limited as they take place only infrequently and the decision whether to call a referendum is usually at the discretion of national governments. Hence, any actor attempting to politicize Europe in a sustained manner also needs to be able to raise the heat on Europe during the long periods without referendums. The sole exception in this regard is Switzerland, where any political group with sufficient resources can initiate direct-democratic votes. Unsurprisingly, the right populist SVP has made frequent use of this opportunity in its effort to politicize Europe.

The findings on the nature of the European integration issue and on the politicization strategies of the political actors in *Chapter 5–7* are more ambiguous regarding their implications for the system-wide politicization of this issue. The fact that it is a highly multi-faceted issue leads to complex, multiple and over time shifting linkages with the general political space. As a result, we found opposition to Europe in different places (although concentrated at the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis), case-by-case Euroscepticism even among mainstream actors, and highly diverse framing by individual political actors.

On one hand, these findings can be interpreted as being conducive to a large-scale politicization. The fact that European integration is systematically related to the existing basic lines of domestic political conflict (and that it does not constitute an independent and fundamentally new line of conflict, as suggested by some scholars) provides opportunities for politicians from the entire ideological spectrum. For most political actors, even from the political mainstream, there is an aspect of European integration that runs counter to their programmatic profile and on which they are able to mobilize opposition if they want to. Moreover, they should be able to convey such an opposing stance compellingly to their constituency by framing European integration accordingly and connecting it to their core political concerns. Culturally conservative politicians draw on fears of

losing sovereignty and weakening the national community, while economic leftist actors promote concerns about the retrenchment of the welfare state, unemployment and harmful competition by the economic left.

Further, the most powerful and consistent opposition to Europe comes from the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis – these politicians continuously fuel the politicization of Europe. Parties close to the TAN-pole exist in all six countries under study, although they are not necessarily Right Populist. The Conservatives in the UK and the Swiss SVP are the most powerful representatives of this kind in our sample, they have vote shares of around 30 percent or more. However, Austria and France also both have a significant Populist Right, and the German CDU/CSU is also close to the culturally conservative TAN-pole. Only the Netherlands did not have a relevant culturally conservative actor during the period under study as the Populist Right was still clearly below 10 percent back then. However, as I argued above, also for these culturally conservative parties European integration is a challenging issue and, as shown in *Chapter 6*, less attractive than immigration, on which they strongly mobilize.

On the other hand, the intricate linkage of European integration with the political space and the abundance of opportunities may instead impede any effective politicization. Indeed, why should political actors invest heavily in the politicization of European integration if this issue is particularly difficult to own and does not help to distinguish themselves clearly from their competitors because it is highly evasive and its lines of conflict are blurred? In the end, politicians may be deprived of the fruits of their labor or have to share them. Even worse, politicians might find themselves siding with their enemies as both the Radical Left as well as the Populist Right oppose European integration, albeit for different reasons. The risk of strange bedfellows constitutes a potential problem, particularly for the mainstream parties (Green-Pedersen 2011). This is not the case in the

field of immigration. Here, the political right does not run the risk of being involuntarily joined in their opposition by actors of the political left.

Finally, even strong framing efforts may not help to overcome these difficulties. As shown in *Chapter 7*, the diverse framing of European integration leads to a situation in which the image of European integration – i.e., what this issue means for the broader public – is difficult to control for any single actor. Orientations towards Europe might suddenly not fit in with a political actor's ideological profile because of an unexpected re-framing of the public debate. Green-Pedersen (2011, 10) illustrates the difficulty of controlling the framing by pointing to the Euro Referendum in Denmark in 2000, where even with a concerted effort the mainstream parties did not succeed in establishing their (pro-European) economic frame as hegemonic and, as a result, lost the vote (see de Vreese and Semetko 2004).In sum, European integration is an issue politicians find particularly difficult to handle. Its multiple connections to core political concerns of politicians of various sorts might be a blessing as well as a curse. Certainly, they provide many opportunities for politicization, but, at the same time, the intricate situation poses a challenge, particularly for the mainstream parties, and may make the issue hardly attractive for large-scale politicization efforts by political entrepreneurs. Moreover, the fact that the issue is usually under the tight control of national governments and the EU complicates any politicization by challengers, and it is unclear whether the occasionally held referendums can compensate for that. Hence, based on these quite mixed arguments, I expect a moderate level of politicization of European integration. The issue is unlikely to be irrelevant in domestic political competition, but it is equally implausible that it will become all-dominant.

MEASURING THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPE

How strongly is Europe actually being politicized in the six Western European political systems under study? This section presents in detail the empirical findings for the 2000s as well as the development over time. However, before then a few words on the measurement of politicization are necessary. Politicization remains an ill-defined concept in the literature and it is not always clear what scholars actually understand by it. Often, the level of politicization in a particular country is assessed qualitatively, usually based on impressionistic or anecdotal evidence (see, e.g., Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008a). More systematic accounts simply equate politicization with issue salience, with the advantage that this can be measured systematically and in a straightforward way. Green-Pedersen (2011, 5–6) strongly encourages the use of this indicator. In his view, diverging attitudes between different social groups or political actors are a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for politicization – what is instead needed is a certain level of attention. Hence, he suggests that researchers should focus on issue salience. The first part of his argument is persuasive. Indeed, diverging attitudes are not the only element of politicization. In *Chapter 3*, I argued in favor of a more comprehensive conceptualization of politicization that includes polarized attitudes, salience, and the framing of an issue. In light of this argument, the remedy to rely on issue salience only is again incomplete. Hence, what I propose in the following is to combine issue salience with a systematic measure of the polarization of attitudes. These are elements of politicization that both can be measured by quantitative indicators. Unfortunately, it is impossible to integrate the third element of politicization – how and whether an issue is connected to more basic political concerns by its framing – as this cannot be quantified.

Why is it crucial to conceive of politicization as the result of both polarization and salience? To make this point compellingly, I first look at both of these elements separately in the data. Again I rely on the data on national election campaigns as used in *Chapter 6*

because that allows me to calculate the salience of European integration compared to all other political issues. Hence, the subsequent findings reflect the level of politicization in the partisan arena. This includes only a subset of political actors but, as shown in *Chapter 4*, partisan actors are by far the most relevant ones in the European integration debate.

Figure 8.1 shows the hierarchy of issues on the political agenda in the 2000s across all six countries as reflected in national election campaigns. The figure reports the average salience of all 12 categorized issues. European integration is ranked number 10, as party politicians devote on average 5.2 percent of all their statements to it. Dominating the agenda is the issue of welfare, which party politicians refer to in every fifth public statement. Cultural liberalism (support for cultural diversity, gender equality, human rights etc.) and economic liberalism are the second and third most salient issues. Hence, European integration is definitely not a top-ranking issue on the political agenda. Several other issues receive more attention and rank higher, including immigration with 7.8 percent and rank order number six. On the other hand, one has to acknowledge that European integration has at least made it onto the political agenda – unlike myriads of other potential political issues that never gain any visibility. If a politician has the opportunity to speak to the public, in at least one out of 20 cases he or she will actually utter a statement about Europe. Yet, altogether, we can safely say that the salience of European integration in our six countries is only modest. Green-Pedersen (2011) finds similar results for Denmark, a crucial case in his view. Based on this result, he draws the more general conclusion that the degree of politicization has been exaggerated in most of the literature and that European integration is still and will remain a "giant fast asleep".

However, before adopting his interpretation, let us look at how polarized attitudes to European integration are. The polarization measure used for this purpose is the same as in Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012). It is based on Taylor and Hermann's (1971) index, which

was originally designed to measure the degree of left-right polarization in a party system. Yet it can also be used to indicate how strongly actor positions differ in a given country over a specific issue. Polarization is defined as follows:

$$\text{Issue polarization} = \sum_{k=1}^{n} u_k(x_k - \bar{x})^2$$

where u_k is the standing of political actor k for the issue, x_k is the position of political actor k on the issue, and $\bar{x}$ is the weighted average position of all political actors on the issue. The latter is calculated as:

$$\bar{x} = \sum_{k=1}^{n} u_k x_k$$

The possible values of this polarization index range from 0 to 1. Polarization is high if there is a high level of divergence in attitudes to the particular issue. Generally, the value increases the more those actors with substantial standing adopt extreme and conflicting attitudes.

In fact, this second indicator paints quite a different picture. *Figure 8.2* shows the degree of polarization for the various issues that are ranked on the political agenda. The two issues that are the most polarizing in our six countries are the army and European integration (both 0.31). Immigration comes in an already distant third. These are those issues on which politicians fundamentally disagree and on which they are most deeply divided. Hence, if we were to evaluate the politicization of Europe based on its polarization we would come up with an assessment that directly contradicts the one above based on its salience.



Notes: Averages of issue salience for the six countries. In each country under study, at least two election campaigns took place in the period covered. Austria 2002 and 2006, UK 2001 and 2005, Germany 2002 and 2005, Netherlands 2002, 2003 and 2006, Switzerland 2003 and 2007.

FIGURE 8.1. The political agenda in election campaigns in the 2000s



Notes: Averages of issue polarization in election campaigns in the six countries.

FIGURE 8.2. Issue polarization in election campaigns in the 2000s

More generally, a comparison of the results presented in *Figures 8.1* on issue salience and *8.2* on issue polarization reveal that the two elements of politicization do not go together so often.[47] High levels of issue salience are not necessarily accompanied by high levels of polarization. As mentioned above, the issue of European integration is only modestly salient, but at the same time highly polarizing. A substantive share of politicians adopts (negative) extreme positions on European integration, although the opportunities to articulate them are limited. The issue of welfare, by contrast, is highly salient, but the conflict surrounding it is not very polarized. Most politicians take balanced positions and no one questions the existence of a system of social security in principle, although there are numerous minor disputes about the adequate scope, level and specific means to achieve welfare goals. Interestingly, our findings for these two issues are consistent with Green (2007). She argues that in the UK issues along the economic left-right dimension – although still highly salient – have transformed from traditionally highly conflictive into consensual "valence issues" (Stokes 1992), while European integration, by contrast, has become increasingly polarized.

This may also explain why there is so much disagreement in the literature on the level of the politicization of Europe – depending on what one measures, one arrives at different conclusions. Well, where do we go from here? Which issues are more politicized, those that are more salient, as suggested by adherents of the agenda-setting approach; or those that are more polarizing, as (implicitly) assumed by spatial models of voting? In line with the comprehensive approach adopted in this study, I would argue that

[47] For the issue of European integration, the correlation between salience and polarization in individual elections in the six countries between the 1970s and the 2000s is a low 0.18 (not significant, N=32), which corroborates this observation.

both answers miss the point. It would be wrong to contend that the highly salient issue of welfare is per se an irrelevant issue only because it is not very polarizing. However, it would be equally wrong to claim that the strongly polarized issue of European integration is not important for political conflict merely because its salience is modest. Instead, salience and polarization represent different, but equally essential elements of politicization (for similar arguments in the context of European issue voting, see Clements and Bartle 2009; de Vries 2007). Both is needed, issues that are either only highly salient or only strongly polarizing are not politicized as the other necessary element is missing. Conversely, the most politicized issues are those which are both highly salient and strongly polarizing. Hence, to systematically compare the level of politicization across issues, countries and over time, an indicator is needed that combines these two elements. For this, I simply take the product of the two separate elements:

$$\text{Issue politicization} = \text{issue salience} \times \text{issue polarization}$$

This indicator more adequately reflects the politicization of an issue than relying either on issue salience or on polarization alone.

With this combined indicator in hand, we can compare the politicization of European integration with other political issues. What are the politicization scores of the various issues? As shown in *Figure 8.3*, the two most politicized issues are both well-established, namely budgetary rigor and cultural liberalism, with scores of 2.3 and 2.2, respectively. Behind these two, a larger group of four issues follows, each with above-average politicization scores of between 1.5 and 1.8. This group includes the issues of immigration, economic liberalism, welfare, and European integration. The remaining six of the overall twelve political issues all have considerably lower levels of politicization. Hence, if we consider both salience and polarization in our politicization measure, the issue of European integration can be found in the upper midrange. It is neither marginal, nor is it the one issue that is dominating domestic political competition. These findings are well



Notes: Averages of issue politicization in election campaigns in the six countries. Politicization is the product of salience and polarization.

FIGURE 8.3. Issue politicization in election campaigns in the 2000s

in line with our mixed assessment and the corresponding expectation of a significant but simultaneously limited politicization of Europe.

Until now, I have deliberately ignored country differences to keep matters simple. It is time to consider them in more detail. *Table 8.1* shows the degree of politicization as well as the salience and polarization of European integration in the 2000s for each of the six countries under study. Both the absolute value and the resulting rank order among the 12 political issues are reported. The UK is the country in which European integration is politicized most heavily. In fact, its politicization score of 3.04 is higher than for any other political issue debated in the UK. This is the result of its considerable salience as well as its high level of polarization in this country. The salience of European integration is 9.3 percent, making it the fifth most salient issue during this period. The value for

polarization is 0.28, which is the highest value of all political issues considered. Switzerland comes close with the second highest politicization score of 2.62, which is particularly influenced by the strong polarization regarding European matters, while the salience of European integration is only average in a comparative perspective. Yet politicization in Switzerland sharply decreased in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, when it reached an all-time high, as we will see soon. In the four remaining countries, both the absolute value of the politicization of Europe as well as the rank order among the 12 political issues are considerably lower than in the UK. The Netherlands is the country where Europe is the least politicized (0.43), as it is both not very salient (2.9 percent) and not very polarizing (0.15). The remaining countries Germany, Austria, and France adopt a middle ground with politicization scores of between 1.0 and 1.5.

TABLE 8.1. *Politicization, salience and polarization of Europe in the 2000s, by country*

Country	**Politicization** (salience*polarization)		**Salience** (%)		**Polarization** (0-1)	
	Value	*Rank no.*	*Value*	*Rank no.*	*Value*	*Rank no.*
UK	3.04	1	9.3	5	0.28	1
Switzerland	2.62	4	4.8	11	0.54	2
Germany	1.42	4	4.2	8	0.21	5
Austria	1.34	5	5.4	8	0.24	6
France	1.07	6	4.8	10	0.46	1
Netherlands	0.43	12	2.9	12	0.15	5
Overall	1.65	4.5	5.2	9	0.31	3.5

Notes: The values are averages of the two first elections in the 2000s for each country (except NL, the first three elections). Rank number of Europe among all 12 political issues. The rank number indicated in the overall row is the median.

How the level of politicization develops over time in the individual countries is shown in *Figure 8.4*. As a benchmark for comparison, the figure also displays the level of politicization for two additional issues – the equally newly emerging cultural issue of immigration, which is closely related to European integration since it also deals with denationalization processes and the traditional economic issue of welfare. European integration was largely absent from political competition in the 1970s, whereas it has subsequently gained momentum. Yet the increase in politicization in the 1990s and/or 2000s varies from modest to massive in scale across the countries. Moreover, there is no clear trend observable in the most recent years.

Let us briefly look at the development in individual countries. In the UK, European integration was highly politicized from the mid-1990s until the first election of the 2000s. The values for welfare and immigration are considerably lower, as shown in *Figure 8.4*. The all-time high was reached at the 2001 elections, when the Conservatives made the question of whether to join the euro one of their main campaign issues – yet with only modest electoral success (Evans 2002; but see Baker 2002, 324). In the subsequent elections of 2005, the Conservatives focused instead on the issue of immigration (Fisher 2006, 1282), while keeping fairly quiet on Europe. As a result, immigration was for the first time more politicized than European integration.

In Switzerland, the politicization of Europe has remained continuously at a high level since the early 1990s, when the Swiss People's Party (SVP) won the referendum against joining the European Economic Area single-handedly and incorporated opposition to European integration as a defining issue of its programmatic profile. Yet in the last two elections covered by our data, European integration has become, somewhat unexpectedly, less politicized. This is probably because Swiss mainstream parties have adopted less Euro-enthusiastic stances than in previous years and embarked on a strategy of "integration without membership" (Lavenex 2009) based on a number of bilateral



FIGURE 8.4. Politicization of Europe, welfare and immigration over time, by country

agreements with the EU. In fact, in 2007, the Social Democrats were the only mainstream party that was openly in favor of opening EU accession negotiations. As a result, immigration has caught up with European integration in Switzerland in terms of politicization in the 2000s.

Austria, France and Germany are countries where European integration has been moderately politicized since the 1990s. Unlike in the UK and Switzerland, European integration there has remained mostly in the shadow of the more heavily politicized immigration issue. Yet this was not the case in Germany at the recent elections of 2005 when European integration was, by contrast, considerably more strongly politicized than immigration. This was mainly due to the pronounced opposition of the CSU/CDU to Turkey's prospective EU membership. Finally, the Netherlands not only exhibited a low level of politicization of Europe in the 2000s, as shown in *Table 7.1*, but this issue also played a

marginal role in the 1990s. Immigration, in contrast, is continuously more strongly politicized there.

Summarizing these findings, we can group the six countries in three distinct clusters depending on the level of their politicization of European integration (*Figure 8.5).* First, Europe is highly politicized in the UK and Switzerland. As shown above, both countries not only exhibited high average levels of politicization in the 2000s, but they also had downright outbursts in which European integration was dominating individual election campaigns, either in the 1990s or 2000s. In the literature, the UK and Switzerland are often described as particular cases with a strong Eurosceptic tradition (see, e.g., Kriesi 2007; Statham et al. 2010; for the UK also Díez Medrano 2003; Mair 2001, 35). While according to Kriesi (2007) these two countries represent typical cases and forerunners of a more general development in Western Europe caused by the newly emerging globalization cleavage, Green-Pedersen (2011) sees them as atypical outliers. In his view, their peculiar political systems (majority voting and the resulting one-party government in the UK; the "magic formula" that guarantees government participation for all relevant parties in Switzerland) make coalition considerations less relevant – in contrast to most other Western European countries. However, this argument is at odds with the findings in the previous chapters which suggested that, first, politicization efforts are not restricted to fringe parties but are also common among mainstream actors and, second, that government-opposition dynamics are largely irrelevant in explaining the politicization strategies of individual actors. What matters more is that in both countries there are electorally very strong culturally conservative parties close to the TAN-pole which proved to be the main drivers of opposition to European integration. Moreover, for Switzerland, the ready availability of direct-democratic instruments – also for the Eurosceptic challengers – seems, as expected, to facilitate the politicization of European integration.

TABLE 8.2. *Level of politicization of European integration in the six countries*

High:	United Kingdom Switzerland
Medium:	Germany Austria France
Low:	Netherlands

The countries with medium politicization levels in our sample are Germany, Austria and France. Here, European integration is neither wide awake nor fast asleep. All three have culturally conservative parties with significant vote shares, and the opposition of the German CDU/CSU and the French UMP to the accession of Turkey illustrates that cultural opposition against European integration is also prevalent among mainstream actors. Of course, this opposition is selective and not fundamental, but it is – in combination with more fundamental, but less visible opposition from marginal actors – able to keep the politicization of Europe going. A significant Eurosceptic force at the left pole of the economic axis exists only in the case of France, not in the other countries. Finally, the only country in our sample with a low level of politicization is the Netherlands. Here, European integration is quite an insignificant issue – both on average and at individual elections. This might be explained by the fact that the Extreme/Populist Right was comparatively weak in electoral terms during the period under study.

CONCLUSION

In domestic politics, the European giant is neither wide awake nor fast asleep, as both proposed in the literature. In light of the findings of this chapter, the answer to how strongly the issue of European integration is being politicized in Western European political systems lies somewhere in between. We found evidence of sustained but at the same time limited politicization. While Europe integration was, after all, the fourth most politicized issue during election campaigns in the 2000s across all countries under study, it was surpassed by the equally newly emerging and in many respects very similar issue of immigration, as well as by the more traditional issues of budgetary rigor and cultural liberalism. European integration is currently a highly relevant political issue, but it is far from being all-dominant. Clearly, its level of politicization has considerably increased since the 1970s. Yet at the same time we observed no steady upward trend – the level of politicization declined in the 2000s compared to the 1990s. Moreover, differences between countries and fluctuations between individual elections are high. Only in a few countries has European integration become the major issue in political competition, and only temporarily. Nevertheless, it is even rarer that European integration has been marginally politicized.

Explaining these patterns of the politicization of Europe at the country level is a difficult task, as already indicated in the introduction. Like immigration, European integration is related to the denationalization process and politicized by similar political actors. However, the politicization of European integration is less straightforward than the case of immigration because of its multi-faceted nature, the resulting multiple linkages with the political space, and its characteristic as an issue that is strongly in control of national governments. As this chapter has shown, these complications limit the politicization of Europe and prevent a steady rise, but they do not preclude its politicization at a more moderate, yet still significant level.

As the present study is limited to six countries, the question of which factors account for country variations can necessarily only be answered tentatively. The results suggest that a strong party close to the culturally conservative TAN-pole, regardless of whether it is from the Populist/Radical Right or the Christian-democratic and Conservative party family, seems to be conducive to the politicization of European integration. In those two countries with the two electorally strongest TAN-parties, European integration is also the most politicized. Moreover, the Swiss case further suggests that the ready availability of direct-democratic instruments also increases the level of politicization as it provides otherwise rare opportunities for challengers to put European integration on top of the political agenda. The power of referendums to focus public attention can hardly be overestimated, as *Chapter 4* showed. However, referendums are rare events in most Western European countries and, although they may lend extra impetus to the politicization of Europe in the short term, they are definitely unable to ensure its sustainability.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

The goal of this study was to examine the politicization of European integration in Western Europe and to explore how the different political actors deal with this political issue in domestic politics. What have we learned? Four main points of this study stand out. First, the analysis showed that ideology matters greatly for the politicization of Europe. Pre-existing lines of conflict have been proven to crucially shape politicians' responses towards European integration. The three strategies available to politicize an issue – issue positions, issue emphasis, and framing – are all significantly influenced by a political actor's location in the two-dimensional political space. Other frequently mentioned factors, such as nationality and strategic considerations (i.e., opposition-government status of the parties) were shown to be clearly secondary or even irrelevant. This is not to deny that opposition parties are likely to be Eurosceptic – yet they are not against Europe merely because they are in opposition but for the reason that many of these parties are, first and foremost, ideologically extreme. Eurosceptic attitudes and European integration issue emphasis are more than strategic choices; they are substantively motivated.

This finding is well in line with the literature that stresses the importance of traditional lines of conflict and well-established programmatic profiles to explain whether

and by whom European integration is being politicized (e.g., Kriesi 2007; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002). In contrast, it calls into question the competing argument that opposition to European integration is motivated primarily by strategic considerations (e.g., Sitter 2002; Taggart 1998). The deeper reason for this result, I suggested, is that politicians are highly reluctant to jeopardize their well-established and costly ideological reputations even if they might benefit in the short term from adjusting their European integration attitudes. Moreover, while I hypothesized that politicians might enjoy more strategic flexibility when emphasizing Europe (compared to adjusting their attitudes), the empirical analysis also provided no evidence regarding the significance of government-opposition status in that case. Instead, an individual political actor's choice about how strongly to emphasize Europe proved to be most seriously constrained by the salience of Europe on the general political agenda. If no one else is talking about Europe, an individual actor is not able to prioritize the issue on their own. More generally, this results in the considerable overlap between individual parties on the issues they address in election campaigns, a fact largely ignored by traditional issue-emphasis approaches, as adherents of the agenda-setting perspective have criticized (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Sides 2006; for European integration, Steenbergen and Scott 2004).

Second, and following up the first point, the study showed that the European integration issue is linked to the political space in multiple, shifting and sometimes contradictory ways. Further, precisely how European integration is aligned with pre-existing lines of conflict profoundly influences by whom and how the issue is being politicized. *Chapter 5* in particular revealed that the inherent multidimensionality of European integration best explains why this issue is linked to the political space in such a complex way. By disentangling the "black box" of the European integration issue – all too rarely done in preexisting research – it could be shown that orientations are neither "too inchoate and

incoherent" (Mair 2007, 158) nor "orthogonal" (i.e., unrelated to traditional lines of conflict; see Hix and Lord 1997). Instead, European integration orientations are systematically related to the cultural as well as the economic axis of conflict, but the exact magnitude as well as direction of this effect depends on the particular sub-issue at stake – whether market making, social regulation, deepening, or enlargement is the subject of debate.

Generally, the closer a politician is to the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis of conflict, the more they are likely to adopt negative orientations towards Europe and to emphasize this particular issue. The Populist/Extreme Right parties are nearest to the TAN-pole, but several mainstream right parties, such as the British Conservatives and the German CDU/CSU, are also culturally conservative. The cultural dimension, to the detriment of the economic one, has also increasingly come to dominate domestic politics in general since the early 1990s. This makes these actors the driving force in the ongoing politicization of Europe. Such cultural opposition is accompanied primarily by nationalist framing emphasizing the dual threat of European integration weakening both one's own ethnic community and national sovereignty.

However, not only the cultural axis but also the economic axis has an impact, although to a smaller extent; and the direction of the latter is shifting. Opposition to European integration from the left pole of the economic axis is concentrated among the Radical Left and chiefly motivated by worries about unemployment and a dismantling of the national welfare state. Left mainstream parties also share these concerns to some extent, leading them to selectively abandon the pro-European mainstream consensus and to join their more radical counterparts in their Eurosceptic attitude, a phenomenon we could also observe for the mainstream political right. Similar observations led Statham et al. (2010) to speculate about a "normalization" of Euro-criticism in national party politics. Support for European integration, still prevalent among mainstream parties and public

authorities at the European and national level, is frequently framed by referring to moral-universalist and multicultural values or by stressing pragmatic reasons, i.e. political efficiency and efficacy.

Third, the study found that the partisan arena still plays the main role in the politicization of Europe. Contrary to other claims in the literature (Imig 2004; Imig and Tarrow 2001), the results suggest that contestation over European integration does not take place on the streets – protest politics is barely visible and civil society actors, including social movements, play a marginal role at best. By contrast, party-affiliated politicians are responsible for every second statement in the public debate and, while public authorities are also relevant in terms of actor standing, opposition is clearly concentrated among the parties. The reason that European integration is under such tight control of these two actor groups is that the public debate over Europe is mainly driven by key institutional and policy-related events which are initiated and scheduled by either the European Union or national governments (also see Boomgaarden et al. 2010).

Moreover, the findings showed that referendums may to some extent indeed serve as a counterweight due to their strong tendency to focus public attention and to broaden the range of the participating actors. Therefore, referendums lend fresh, strong impetus to the European integration debate and, in several instances, the political elite was caught on the wrong foot by unexpected developments, as the referendum defeats of the Constitution in France and the Netherlands amply demonstrate. Yet, to our surprise, the actors that benefit most from these periods of heightened public attention are not the marginalized civil society actors but the already strong parties, particularly the Eurosceptic fringe parties, which manage to increase their already high standing still further (also see Hoeglinger 2008). However, what severely limits the politicization of Europe by means of referendums is that they only take place rarely. And the stronger the opposition that

governments expect to face, the more they will be reluctant to call a referendum. Hence, any actor attempting to politicize European integration in a sustained way needs to be able to also raise the heat during the long periods between referendums. The sole exception in that regard is Switzerland, where direct-democratic votes can be initiated by any political group with sufficient resources. Tellingly, it is a party – namely the Right Populist SVP – that routinely and quite successfully makes use of this opportunity in its effort to politicize Europe.

To sum up the first three main points, we found that the multiple linkages of the European integration issue with the political space provide many opportunities for politicization from various angles – opposition to European integration can be substantively motivated by cultural or economic reasons, from the left as well as from the right. At the same time, this constellation leads to ambivalent attitudes and unclear lines of conflict, which prevents European integration from becoming an "easy" issue (Carmines and Stimson 1980; also see Slothuus and de Vreese 2010, 643). The risk of strange bedfellows also looms (particularly for the mainstream parties). Moreover, the meaning of the issue is difficult to control for any individual actor in light of the highly diverse and contested framing. Further, while referendums give great momentum to the European integration debate and may provide a window of opportunity for otherwise marginalized actors and Eurosceptic fringe parties, the catch is that in most countries they are held only rarely. This mix of conducive and impeding factors results in – and this is the fourth main point – the moderate yet sustained politicization of Europe in Western European countries, as *Chapter 8* showed.

The empirical findings in this chapter are based on a comprehensive indicator that takes both polarization and salience into account and suggested that the answer to the

scholarly question of whether the sleeping giant of European integration has finally awakened (de Vries 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kriesi 2007; van der Eijk and Franklin 2004) or, by contrast, is still fast asleep (Green-Pedersen 2011; Mair 2001) lies somewhere in between these two perspectives. European integration was the fourth- most politicized issue during election campaigns in the 2000s across all countries under study, only being surpassed by the issues of immigration, budgetary rigor, and cultural liberalism. Yet we have also observed that, after it reached an all-time high in the 1990s, the level of politicization again declined in the 2000s. As a result, the emphasis on European integration given by the culturally conservative parties, the main driving force behind the politicization of Europe, is clearly in the shadow of the very similar but more attractive issue of immigration. Hence, European integration has become politicized on a sustained basis but with a limited magnitude only, as it is no easy issue – politicians are struggling with this intricate giant that is difficult to both domesticate and unleash for very long.

What are limitations of this study and where are possible avenues for future research? First, the proposed comprehensive conceptualization of politicization that incorporates the three elements – polarization of attitudes, intensification of the public debate (salience), and the connection to preexisting basic political concerns (which is accomplished by framing and ensures wider resonance in the public) – has not been fully maintained throughout this study. While all three related strategies were separately analyzed in depth, I did not incorporate the third element in the systematic measure of politicization and, as a consequence, the level of politicization was examined in *Chapter 8* by jointly considering only polarization and salience. While this is undoubtedly a step forward compared to previous research, future efforts might try to integrate the third element as well, possibly by utilizing public opinion data.

Next, while part of the analysis in this study stretched over several decades, the focus was clearly on the 2000s, as the more detailed data about the non-electoral public debate, which included information on non-partisan actors and the framing, was restricted to this period. It would be worthwhile to extend this focus over a larger time span, enabling the study of changes over time with regard to actor participation, framing, and sub-issue emphasis (as the present study already does with general European integration orientations and issue emphasis). Moreover, I proposed that while the relative weight of the different sub-issues in public debate is subject to regular change as the agenda of European integration advances, the underlying mechanism and the patterns at work in each sub-issue are expected to be much more persistent. Detailed data over a longer period of time would be required to further probe this proposition.[48]

The effort to open the "black box" of European integration and to systematically distinguish between the different fundamental subareas of this issue proved to be very productive and useful for our research question. Clearly, the point is not that European integration is multidimensional and other political issues are not but that, in our case, this multidimensionality is a critical factor in politicization and attitude formation. While the more recent research into the politicization of Europe and Euroscepticism already pursues similar paths, more consequential work needs to be done, and scholars should try harder to move beyond all-too-simple unidimensional concepts and measures.

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[48] Moreover, in the long term the relative impact of the factors shaping the politicization may also change. For example, one could hypothesize whether strategic considerations played a more important role in earlier times when the newly emerging issue of European integration was only beginning to become embedded in the political space.

The finding that the parties are the key players in contestation about European integration is good news for the majority of scholars who routinely only consider this actor group in their research – it suggests that this is indeed a viable strategy. Still, a few words of caution are in order. One should not treat this finding as being set in stone and it is certainly worth rechecking it once in a while. The observed partisan predominance may disappear during extraordinary circumstances. Moreover, one should not generalize this finding across issues – in the immigration debate, to mention the example in *Chapter 4*, civil society actors participate much more actively.

Moreover, the theoretical framework and the innovative data used in the present study could well be applied to other political issues. Kriesi et al. (2012) compared the public debate on European integration with the public debate on other issues that are also related to globalization, namely immigration and economic liberalization – albeit less extensively and with a different research interest than the present study. Studying other political issues similarly as was done here for European integration would further advance our general understanding of why a particular political issue becomes politicized or not, and in which ways.

To conclude, European integration is no "easy" issue. Therefore, it will not fundamentally reshape domestic political competition single-handedly; by contrast, the issue is instead influenced by the existing, more general lines of political conflict. One might ask what the limited domestic politicization of Europe implies for the future prospects of European integration. Simon Hix (2008) proposed several institutional measures to "fix what's wrong with the European Union". These measures aim at promoting limited democratic politics at the European level, which means more open political competition and partisan politics. Ideally, there is some level of political conflict that would bring the European Union closer to the people but, at the same time, it is limited enough not to lead

to policy gridlock or major disruptions. As we have seen in the present study, this already holds for European contestation within national political systems and, in this sense, it seems to me that the moderate domestic politicization of Europe might positively support similar developments at the European level.

APPENDIX

Additional tables

TABLE A.1. *Party families and their national and European representatives*

	Austria	*UK*	*France*	*Germany*	*Netherlands*	*Switzerland*	*European parliament groups*
Communists/Left Socialists (rl)			Parti Communiste Français – PCF	Die Linke	Socialistische Partij – SP	Alternative Liste – AL	European United Left/Nordic Green Left – EUL/NGL
Greens (gr)	Die Grünen/Die Grüne Alternative		Les Verts	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	GroenLinks – GL	Grüne Partei der Schweiz – GPS	European Greens – EGP
Social Democrats (soc)	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ	Labour Party	Parti Socialiste – PSF	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – SPD	Partij van de Arbeid – PvdA	Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz – SPS	Party of European Socialists – PES
Liberals (lib)	Liberales Forum – LIF	Liberal Democratic Party	Union pour la Démocratie Française – UDF	Freie Demokratische Partei – FDP	Democraten'66 – D'66; Volks-partij voor Vrijheid en Democratie – VVD	Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei – FDP	Alliance of Liberals & Democrats for Europe –ALDE
Christian Democrats/ Conservatives (con)	Österreichische Volkspartei – ÖVP	Conservative Party	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire – UMP	Christlich-Demokratische Union – CDU, Christlich-Soziale Union – CSU	Christen-Democratisch Appel – CDA;	Christlich-demokratische Volkspartei – CVP	European People's Party – European Democrats EPP-ED
Populist/Extreme Right (rr)	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – FPÖ & Bündnis Zukunft Österreich - BZÖ		Front National – FN; Mouvement pour la France – MPF		Lijst Pim Fortuyn – LPF & Partij voor de Vrijheid – PVV	Schweizerische Volkspartei – SVP; Schweizer Demokraten SD	Union for Europe of the Nations – UEN; Independence/Democracy – IND/DEM

TABLE A.2. *European integration issue emphasis by parties, regressions with sub-sets*

	Model 1 w/o fringe parties		*Model 2 w/o Switzerland/UK*	
	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
Systemic salience	0.772	0.131**	0.748	0.185**
Eurosceptic position	0.020	0.024	0.010	0.007
Cultural TAN-GAL	-0.009	0.018	-0.007	0.016
Economic left-right	-0.022	0.011+	-0.009	0.013
Extremism (sq.)	-0.007	0.021	-0.042	0.031
Cultural-gal*Eurosceptic	-0.053	0.026*	-0.061	0.011**
Econ.-right*Eurosceptic	0.012	0.034	-0.014	0.023
Constant	0.012	0.008	0.011	0.012
N	46		42	
R^2	0.53*		0.48*	

Note: Fringe parties are the Radical Left and the Extreme/Populist Right.

TABLE A.3. *The framing of the European integration debate by country*

Frame	Austria	UK	France	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
Cultural frames	40.2	46.5	42.5	34.3	47.2	27.0
Nationalist	14.4	17.2	12.7	6.8	13.9	9.7
Multicultural-universalist	25.9	29.3	29.8	27.6	33.3	17.3
Economic frames	34.8	25.7	41.5	36.4	23.4	44.7
Economic prosperity	24.1	18.6	28.4	28.8	16.8	29.6
Labour & social security	10.7	7.2	13.2	7.6	6.6	15.1
Other utilitarian frames	24.9	27.8	16.0	29.2	29.4	28.3
Political efficiency& efficacy	15.1	20.3	13.5	18.5	20.9	17.2
Security/ecology	9.9	7.5	2.6	10.8	8.6	11.0
Total	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*
N	850	641	3,689	725	2,148	1,748

Notes: Percentages of frames of a particular category that are used.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

DOMINIC HÖGLINGER

ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Visiting lecturer at the Dept. of Political Science, University of Lucerne	2015–2016
Senior research and teaching associate ('Oberassistent'), acting as caretaker of the vacant chair for comparative politics, Dept. for Political Science, University of Zurich	2012–2015
Visiting fellow at the Dept. of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark	2010–2011
Scientific coworker at the Dept. for Political Science (Prof. Hanspeter Kriesi), University of Zurich	2006–2011
Student researcher at the Research Institute for the Public Sphere & Society (*fög*, Prof. Kurt Imhof), Institute of Mass Communication and Media Research and Institute of Sociology, University of Zurich	2003–2006

EDUCATION

Ph.D. studies in Political Science, University of Zurich (thesis supervisors Prof. H. Kriesi, Prof. C. Green-Pedersen)	2006–2012
Visiting student at Hamburg University, Germany	2002–2003
M.A. (lic. phil.) from the University of Zurich in political science (major), social and economic history, and international law (minors)	2000–2006

ADDITIONAL EDUCATION

Leadership Skills & Project Management for Postdocs (Centre for Continuing Education, University of Zurich)	2013
Certificate "Teaching Skills" (advanced training program in university didactics), University of Zurich.	2012
Various quantitative social science methods courses, University of Essex and ECPR summer schools	2007–2008

RESEARCH GRANTS, AWARDS

Fellowships for prospective researchers from the Swiss National Science Foundation (funding for a 6-month stay abroad).	2010
Prize for best student paper of the faculty (nominated by Prof. Daniel Thürer; "Democracy and the Protection of Minorities").	2005

SERVICES TO THE PROFESSION

External reviewer for journals such as *Comparative Political Studies, European Union Politics, Party Politics,* and *Political Studies*	2012–
Member of search committee for a professorship in political methodology at the Department for Political Science, Zurich University.	2010

TEACHING

Lecture „Comparative Politics" (25 students), University of Lucerne	fall 2015
Undergraduate course "Comparative Politics (advanced)" (lectures and seminar, ~125 students) (for 6 terms), University of Zurich	2012–2015
Graduate elective course "Political Representation in Comparative Perspective" (co-teaching with D. Caramani) (8 students), University of Zurich	fall 2014
Undergraduate course "Introduction to Comparative Politics" (lectures, ~300 students) (for 4 terms), University of Zurich	2011–2014
Supervision of several M.A. theses in comparative politics, political communication, and Swiss politics, University of Zurich	2008–2013
Undergraduate tutorial "Methods in Political Science (advanced)" (lectures and lab sessions, 40 students), University of Zurich	2007

PUBLICATIONS

BOOKS

Politicizing European Integration. Struggling with the Awakening Giant. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Political Conflict in Western Europe. Co-authored with Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Swen Hutter, and Bruno Wüest. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

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WORKING PAPERS

„Drei Welten der politischen Kommunikation? Ein Vergleich der Strukturen politischer Öffentlichkeit in der Schweiz, Deutschland und den USA", *National Competence Center of Research (NCCR) Challenges to Democracy* Paper No. 3, 2007.